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Abstract 
Modern diplomacy is currently experiencing fundamental changes at an 
unprecedented rate, which affect the very character of diplomacy as we 
know it. These changes also affect aspects of domestic and international 
politics that were once of no great concern to diplomacy. Technical develop-
ments, mainly digitization, affect how the work of the diplomat is under-
stood; the number of domestic and international actors whose activity 
implicates (or is a form of) diplomacy is increasing; the public is more sen-
sitive to foreign policy issues and seeks to influence diplomacy through 
social media and other platforms; the way exchange between states, as well 
as the interchange between government and other domestic actors, pro-
gresses is influencing diplomacy’s ability to act legitimately and effectively; 
and finally, diplomats themselves do not necessarily need the same attri-
butes as they previously did. These trends, reflecting general societal devel-
opments, need to be absorbed by diplomacy as part of state governance. 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, diplomats and governments in general 
should therefore be proactive in four areas: 
1. Diplomats must understand the tension between individual needs and 
state requirements, and engage with that tension without detriment to the 
state. 
2. Digitization must be employed in such a way that gains in efficiency 
are not at the expense of efficacy. 
3. Forms of mediation should be developed that reconcile the interests of 
all sides allowing governments to operate as sovereign states, and yet simul-
taneously use the influence and potential of other actors. 
4. New and more open state activities need to be advanced that respond to 
the ways in which emotionalized publics who wish to participate in govern-
ance express themselves. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
New Realities in Foreign Affairs: 
Diplomacy in the 21st Century 
Modern diplomacy extends its activities into many 
spheres, but today it is subject to unprecedented in-
fluences and restrictions. An example of its diversify-
ing influence is reflected in the expansion of the 
framework and themes of traditional multilateral 
diplomacy: the UN Climate Change Conference in 
Bonn in 2017 was the largest multilateral conference 
ever held in Germany; issues such as climate and 
health, which in the past were by no means part of 
the foreign policy realm, are handled by diplomatic 
means today as a matter of course. At the same time, 
in some areas of international relations, policy makers 
are turning away from multilateralism – and it is 
not just U.S. President Donald Trump, who assumes 
that foreign policy issues are better solved bilaterally. 
Finally, the public, in turn, is more directly –often 
mediated by social media – placing demands on 
diplomacy, be it to stop whaling, halt the flow of 
refugees, or any other issue on the contemporary 
agenda. 
Such change has become increasingly noticeable in 
the decades since the end of the Cold War, or perhaps 
it is an altogether recent emergence. The new expan-
sions of and restrictions on diplomacy deserve aca-
demic consideration, if only because of its influence 
on the politics of modern states. During the years 
2016 to 2018, a working group named Diplomacy in the 
21st Century has taken on the task of more thoroughly 
and comprehensively examining today’s diplomacy 
at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) 
in Berlin, financially supported by the German 
Federal Foreign Office and ZEIT-Stiftung. 
Modern diplomacy is in the midst of a process of 
change, and that rate of change is likely to approxi-
mately match the pace of general change in modern 
industrial societies. However, diplomats’ responses to 
modern challenges often fall under the radar of gov-
ernments and the public, precisely because they do 
not conform to what is traditionally considered to be 
typically diplomatic. Nevertheless, at the same time 
they have a strong influence on the actions and self-
understanding of governments, and probably also on 
the public’s understanding of foreign policy. 
Issues and Recommendations 
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Rapid changes in the character of modern diplo-
macy are well recognized by those who are accustomed 
to being active in diplomacy, to be affected by it or to 
observe it, and the fact that diplomats are trying to 
navigate the implications of rapid changes is demon-
strated by several recent developments. A variety of 
reform efforts – in Germany, pursuant to the com-
prehensive ‘Review’ analysis undertaken in 2014 – 
endeavour to exchange information between the for-
eign ministries of the EU member states with regard 
to the need for reform and the reforms currently under 
way. The fact that even China is dealing with ques-
tions of modern diplomacy highlights the significance 
of the emerging changes in the nature of diplomacy. 
Such shifts in the focus of diplomatic activity raise 
questions about which changes in modern diplomacy 
will have longer term impacts, as well as if and how 
governments should respond to those changes. Four 
aspects concerning diplomacy seem to be of central 
importance: (1) The personality of the individual dip-
lomat; (2) fundamental changes that come with tech-
nical developments, especially due to digitization; 
(3) the increase of diplomatically active actors; (4) the 
new sensitivities of various publics to foreign policies. 
The heterogeneity and pluralism of thinking about 
modern societies impacts the diplomat’s personality 
and their work as much as anyone else. An example 
might be what occurs through the use of social media: 
even the way a diplomat uses social media constitutes 
a ‘message’ from the diplomat’s society to the outside 
world beyond what a government wants to officially 
communicate. This changes the appearance and pre-
sumably the orientation of diplomacy and must be 
taken into account in the recruitment, training and 
employment of diplomats. 
As a matter of course, governments are always 
using new technical instruments. The means of digitiza-
tion, for example, thus intervene in the functioning of 
administrative action. Such intervention can hinder 
or accelerate diplomacy, for example in the collection 
and processing of information. Furthermore, digiti-
zation influenced by social media in turn influences 
the preservation, gain, and loss of trust in the public 
of a country and its international partners. 
A number of new actors involve themselves in 
diplomatic processes on their own initiative and/or 
are deliberately involved in dealing with new tasks of 
diplomacy. These actors include other national insti-
tutions, such as other ministries whose tasks extend 
into foreign policy, to international organizations – 
mostly UN sub-organizations – or, for Europeans, to 
EU institutions. They may include transnational com-
panies and non-governmental organizations. At the 
same time, when diplomats appear more visible to 
the public thanks to the digital revolution, they stand 
more in the shadow of other foreign policy actors. In 
fact, professional diplomacy as a whole tends to be 
overshadowed at least partially by the activities of 
traditionally non-diplomatic actors. 
Lastly, and incessantly, new and often highly emo-
tional sensitivities of publics arise, and these too make 
use of social media to communicate with one an-
other. When making demands of governments, and 
when governments wish to accommodate those de-
mands, the problem of the democratic legitimacy of 
such publics and their demands immediately arises. 
All of these factors are becoming increasingly 
impactful as a result of the progress of inter-state ex-
change and domestic connectivity of state action, and 
possibly even the shifting moods of relevant individ-
uals. These factors signify and reinforce the trend of 
traditional diplomacy’s diminishing influence. This 
tendency, as it reflects overall societal developments, 
needs to be absorbed by diplomacy as a part of govern-
ance of a state. If well directed, changes in diplomacy 
may be able to inform future governments’ actions 
and the societies that represent them. Therefore: 
∎ Diplomats must understand the tension between 
the condition of the individual and state require-
ments, and engage with that tension without detri-
ment to the state. 
∎ Digitization must be used in such a way that gains 
in efficiency are not made at the expense of efficacy; 
∎ it is important to develop forms of mediation and 
reconciliation of the interests of both sides that 
allow governments to operate as sovereign states, 
but at the same time make use of the influence 
and the potential of other actors; 
∎ dealing with publics is likely to raise the gravest 
problems and requires the development of new 
and more open forms of state activity that respond 
to the ways in which emotionalized publics who 
wish to participate in governance express them-
selves. 
At the same time, the principles of representative 
democracy must be kept intact; if not, the state will 
suffer damage to the legitimacy of its system of 
governance. The crucial question will be how govern-
ments can ensure sufficient efficacy and efficiency, 
and thus also their legitimacy, to be able to address 
adequately the needs of a state. 
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Diplomacy, like so many areas of public administra-
tion, is affected by the radical changes of the 21st cen-
tury. Shocks within the international order, the revo-
lution of internet-based global communication, and 
legitimacy problems of liberal governments seem to 
necessitate a fundamental re-orientation of foreign 
policy tools. Otto von Bismarck, first chancellor of the 
German empire of 1871, described diplomacy as the 
never-ending negotiation of reciprocal concessions 
between states. If that is the case, then today we face 
the question of the purpose of such a time-consuming 
art of managing international relations. 
In early 2016, the Working Group Diplomacy in 
the 21st Century was established at the Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik – German Institute for Inter-
national and Security Affairs (SWP), with the financial 
support of the German Foreign Ministry and the ZEIT-
Stiftung. The group is composed of diplomats, ob-
servers, and researchers from Germany, Australia, 
Canada, China, Denmark, France, Great Britain, India, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the 
United States (U.S.). In contrast to the 2014 ‘Review’1 
of the German Foreign Ministry, which examined 
German foreign policy and the structures of the Ger-
man Foreign Office, the research approach of the 
SWP is narrower. Its insights into modern diplomacy, 
however, concern not only Germany. The central 
question for the practitioners and researchers of the 
 
1 After beginning his second term as Foreign Minister at 
the end of 2013, Frank-Walter Steinmeier initiated a year-
long public debate among German and non-German experts 
and interested observers about the goals and instruments of 
Germany’s foreign policy, concluding with the decision to 
make a number of major structural changes in the ministry. 
See Auswärtiges Amt, ed., Review 2014. Crisis – Order – Europe, 
Berlin 2014, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/692042/ 
cef1f6308ebdb0d2d7c62725089c4198/review2014-data.pdf 
(accessed 3 May 2018). 
working group was whether global changes of the 
21st century necessitate changes at the very core of 
diplomacy in order for it to function effectively and 
efficiently, as well as to preserve its legitimacy as a 
foreign policy tool of governmental action. The essays 
in this volume from participants of the working 
group reflect a broad spectrum of analyses. We ar-
ranged them according to (1) personal, (2) instrumen-
tal, (3) institutional as well as (4) global elements. 
* 
Beyond Bismarck’s simple description of diplomacy, 
things become complicated. Therefore, the working 
group of the SWP restricted itself to a rough defini-
tion of diplomacy as the touchstone for its discussion 
(not necessarily incorporating every member’s indi-
vidual definition): a pragmatic approach to manage 
the relations between states and other institutions in 
the intergovernmental space with the aim of arriving 
at peaceful conflict resolutions. Sascha Lohmann ap-
proaches the problem of a definition in his chapter 
when he describes modern diplomacy employing 
economic instruments and turning markets into a 
new ‘battlefield’. Changes in the structure of the 
international community have made continual 
adaptations in diplomacy tactics necessary. An exam-
ple of change to diplomatic organization is the 15th 
century shift from temporarily posted legations by 
governments to the establishment of permanent 
residing ambassadors. Similarly far-reaching adapta-
tions might be required again today, since there is not 
only a greater public interest in diplomatic activity, 
but also growing demand by publics to participate in 
matters that have traditionally been under the pur-
view of diplomats and governing bodies. Additionally, 
new communication devices and a growing number 
of state and non-state actors influence foreign policy. 
Volker Stanzel 
Introduction: Following the Wrong Track or 
Walking on Stepping Stones – Which Way 
for Diplomacy? 
Volker Stanzel 
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1. The Personal Element 
Diplomats are bureaucrats of sorts, and certain traits 
of their personalities play significant roles in their 
specific professional activities. Negotiations in general 
possess an official character, but informal communi-
cation between persons through expressions of behav-
iour reflect the complexity of the negotiations, the 
need for confidentiality, and discretion ranging from 
formality to informality determines the degree of its 
effectiveness. Charm, persuasion, or restraint may 
seem like clichés; however, they constitute essential 
features of communicative behaviour and correlate 
more with a person’s character than one’s training. 
In today’s secular and pluralistic societies, moral 
standards likewise depend more on a person’s char-
acteristics than on specific training. Due to immigra-
tion and globalization today, diverse cultures that 
were once bounded by oceans and continents inter-
weave more than in the past; people of diverse back-
grounds now find themselves in the same public 
spaces, and there are simply more stimuli to person-
ally witness and reflect on, problems such as unequal 
treatment of people based on gender, age, race, or 
other ascribed characteristics. Increasing social diver-
sity can make moral conflicts matters of conscience 
more readily than in the more homogenous societies 
of the past. Individual civil servants can feel obligated 
to resist their superiors’ instructions – in the case 
of Germany in accordance with Article 20 of German 
Basic Law2 – and become a whistleblower. 
Today, this social diversification, and in some ways 
even fragmentation, reaches far. Language skills are 
more widespread, and to ‘digital natives’ the opera-
tion of new technologies comes naturally, while the 
functionaries of the past struggle to make sense of 
and use new communication pathways. The compre-
hension of gender equality and the values of private 
family life come from but also influence individuals’ 
outlooks on and participation in society generally. 
And these are only a few examples. All in all, per-
sonal values constitute a diplomat’s ‘message’, which 
informs the image of his country as well as the 
reactions of his host country. While the recruitment 
of future diplomats should follow precise criteria, one 
question remains on which Christer Jönsson elaborates 
 
2 Basic Law (i.e. Germany’s constitution) Article 20 (4): 
“All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seek-
ing to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy 
is available.” 
in his chapter: to what degree can today’s diplomats 
as individuals still satisfactorily represent their ever 
more heterogeneous societies? 
In a society that asks how bureaucracies can fulfil 
their task of supporting political decisions meaning-
fully by rationally applying information and knowl-
edge, there is some temptation for political leaders to 
stigmatize the traditional civil service as old-fashioned 
and inherently error-prone. Andrew Cooper analyses 
this question further in his chapter. At the same time, 
decisions made at the top of the hierarchy may be 
adapted to what they regard as the requirements of 
society by civil servants even at the lower operational 
level. Hierarchy and bureaucratization have always 
been the means to restrict accumulation of power. 
However, the high level of external influences besides 
the government or even outside of the state reduces 
the influence of individual diplomats. This imbalance 
might even threaten the democratic principle of the 
responsibility of governmental action. 
2. Instrumental Level: Digitization 
The improvements of modern communication tech-
nology have complex effects on diplomatic action. 
Corneliu Bjola points out in his chapter that digitiza-
tion “is likely to penetrate the deep core of the diplo-
matic DNA.” This can promote creativity, but also 
destroy existing structures of communication and its 
organization. Emillie V. de Keulenaar and Jan Melissen 
argue that existing ‘analogue’ diplomacy is not merely 
superimposed onto technologies now shaping an 
environment that is facilitating digitally native prac-
tices. Their analysis gives recommendations for diplo-
matic practitioners who still look at new technologies, 
including social media, as merely open and freely 
available ‘services’. Amongst all the ‘instruments’ of 
diplomacy we will focus specifically on digitization 
by looking at three key factors: unprecedented time 
restraints for decision-making; the necessity to distil 
a high volume of incoming information responsibly; 
and the integration of social media. 
(1) The timeframe to respond to an incident is 
continually shortened due to the increasingly rapid 
transmission of information between embassies 
abroad and foreign ministries, as well as between 
other foreign policy actors. Consequently, this rapid-
ity places an increasing burden on the persons acting 
at the top of a hierarchy and in positions where pro-
posals for decisions are worked out. This burden can 
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be quantified as the period of time available for the 
receipt of an item of information and subsequent 
consultation about it: the less time there is, the 
greater the pressure on the decision maker. Due to 
accelerating information transmission, only a limited 
range of issues reach the level of the responsible deci-
sion makers. Therefore, tensions arise between the 
expectation for quick action on the basis of compre-
hensive information on the one hand, and the neces-
sity to act conscientiously on the basis of deliberated 
information on the other. Physical factors such as 
lengthy nightly conferences, travel across multiple 
time zones, and overloaded schedules only add to the 
strain. Despite the rising number of people responsi-
ble for the distillation of information and tactics for 
reducing the information to be taken into account, 
no solution has been found to reduce pressure on the 
decision-making process. Therefore there is a greater 
risk that wrong decisions will be made, not due to an 
erroneous comprehension of the known facts (a risk 
always at hand given the imperfection and incom-
pleteness of human knowledge), but because time is 
restricted for the processing of and reflection on facts 
and possible courses of action. 
(2) Information frequently travels on non-diplo-
matic paths, such as in social media. This gives op-
portunities to actors such as large corporations or 
civil society organizations competing with govern-
ments in some areas to act independently of and 
possibly earlier than a government. Therefore, instead 
of only gathering information, diplomacy must also 
distil it usefully and competently. Among other 
things, diplomacy involves the “provision of knowl-
edge.”3 However, today, diplomacy has to be more the 
distillation of knowledge – and in real time. Trans-
cending mere knowledge distillation is the only way 
to process information into reasonably argued pro-
posals for actions for political decision makers. The 
danger is that decision-making is integrated into 
the technological procedures without undergoing a 
thorough examination to see if the information can 
be made available quickly and avoid being super-
ficial – which is essential. Modern digital diplomatic 
communication strives to make it possible to react to 
events in real-time. However, digital communication 
has to balance efficiency enhancement through 
increased speed, and effectiveness enhancement 
 
3 See Iver B. Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a 
European Foreign Ministry (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2012), 7. 
through calculability. This balance, if successfully 
reached, enhances trust on the side of the ‘consumer’ 
of foreign policy. Hence, the ‘cultivation of trust’ is 
also a fitting description of modern diplomatic activity. 
(3) Currently, governmental action is under con-
stant scrutiny by the public. Social media did not 
trigger this scrutiny, but they transport it and the pur-
suant conversations. Thus, social media are them-
selves instruments of diplomatic action. These actions 
are not, as in the past, soliloquized ‘public relations 
work’. However, they strive to promote dialogue with 
domestic and international publics. Therefore, modern 
diplomats are unavoidably under pressure to use 
social media. This means that they are approachable 
and open to public criticism via digital platforms. 
Social media exchange with official dialogue partners 
and interested publics creates a far-reaching network 
of connections with known and unknown, influential 
and powerless actors, observers, and participants. 
Simultaneously this exchange has to adapt to the lin-
guistic and formal character of the new media. Inde-
pendent of their actual added value for the workings 
of diplomacy, social media impact on all those actors 
in a general manner – when for example malice is 
directed toward a politician – as well as in specific 
cases – when their users, for example, ask about cer-
tain foreign policy activities. Due to their influence 
on publics, which can be expedited by commercial-
ized or in other ways motivated sensationalism, dis-
torted reporting or fake news (therefore not much 
different from that of the traditional media), social 
media even have the strength to create pseudo-crises, 
some of which may waste substantial resources. 
A deeper risk of the use of social media by diplo-
mats is that it might reorient itself toward the pub-
lic’s opinions about foreign policy matters. Currently, 
politics must be presentable and comprehensible for 
many publics. The need to communicate quickly and 
effectively with diverse publics results in oversimpli-
fied explanations that fail to reflect the true complex-
ities of the matters at hand. That oversimplification 
to the detriment of complexity in turn risks affecting 
actual politics: decisions may be made only so that 
they are more easily comprehensible – leading to 
difficult ethical questions. Crisis management is prob-
ably most susceptible to this risk because it is where 
measures of foreign policy concern the lives of indi-
viduals most directly. Yet the impacts of social media 
are strongest on the formulation and conception of 
diplomacy and foreign policy, where the danger for 
the publics’ trust in decision-makers is greatest. 
Volker Stanzel 
SWP Berlin 
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3. Institutional Aspects 
Essentially, diplomacy operates in the framework of 
a community within completely sovereign nation 
states. Nevertheless, with the reality of the dissolution 
of sovereignty on the one hand and the necessity to 
solve global problems on the other, new forums of 
(conference) diplomacy were established and more 
international and supranational organizations cre-
ated. The European Union (EU) is an excellent exam-
ple. It possesses instruments that are normally only 
at the disposal of nation states. Nevertheless, in all 
matters that are of major concern for member states, 
the EU is guided by the intergovernmental working 
institutions. These mechanics have an impact on the 
diplomacy between the member states of the EU. The 
European External Action Service operates alongside 
the national foreign services and provides collective 
knowledge resources for the smaller member states 
in particular. Thus the need for global management 
has produced diplomacy and diplomats that represent 
their national interests and supranational aims at the 
same time. 
Diplomacy can also be understood as the media-
tion of societies in a broad discourse4 – not neces-
sarily in a friendly conversation, but sometimes pre-
cisely the opposite. Whether it is the application of 
hard power, coercive measures, soft power, the power 
of institutions, or symbolic power, governments and 
other international interacting actors today feel obli-
gated to explain their actions not only to their official 
dialogue partners, but also often to their own publics, 
as well as to non-state observers and actors outside 
their own borders. In his chapter Hanns W. Maull 
points out which dangers can arise, considering the 
technological advances and increasing expectations 
that could even lead to ‘foreign policy autism’. 
Contrary to the hopes of national-populist move-
ments’ that nation states will win back their former 
status as sovereign actors, in reality, the process of 
dissolution of physical and non-physical borders 
continues at great speed. While states attempt to 
preserve their formal status as the last legitimate 
source of national and international governmental 
leadership, avenues are opening up for non-diplo-
matic, internationally active governmental institu-
 
4 A thought by Michael Koch, “Wozu noch Diplomaten?”, 
in Auswärtiges Amt: Diplomatie als Beruf, ed. Enrico Brandt and 
Christian Buck (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2002), 350–59 
(357). 
tion, parliaments, internationally active companies, 
media, non-governmental organizations, and organ-
ized crime. All of these attempt to influence a society 
or the community of states. Karsten D. Voigt analyses 
some of these processes in his chapter concerning the 
EU. Companies’ interest in shaping conditions abroad 
leads them to use their leverage over governments, 
which in turn aim to attract investments and create 
new jobs. The politics of nominally sovereign states 
depend on a flow of activities, which are mostly sub-
ject to governmental control and which cross tradi-
tional borders. Official politics is reduced to attempts 
to manage the situations that result from incidents 
outside their sphere of influence. Political participa-
tion takes place across borders, and not only in times 
of crises and wars. The discourse about foreign policy 
amongst elites and publics dissolves its borders at 
the same time. Thus grey areas are created, which 
are concerned with foreign policy to varying degrees. 
Here, foreign ministries are hardly poised to moder-
ate negotiations anymore. Diplomatic institutions 
are rather more like diplomacy’s ‘face’ to the out-
side than actual movers of the world. The variety 
of elements of modern diplomatic activity creates 
a problem of coherence for diplomatic work in the 
foreign ministries and embassies. This difficulty is 
aggravated by the increasing number of ‘attachés’ of 
other governmental institutions, or institutions with 
their own agendas and priorities in the embassies. 
Diplomatic bodies, which are confronted with such 
difficult-to-control tasks, could be tempted to retreat 
to technocratic procedural modes and become con-
tent with working results that are just ‘good enough’. 
As Andrew Cooper argues, the effort to avoid respon-
sibility under the pressure of the latest developments 
could begin to drain sources of diplomatic strength 
and influence. 
Presumably, civil society is only occasionally aware 
of the full impact of globalization on international 
events. However, once a public recognizes that im-
pact, it demands foreign policy measures that are out-
side the range of political possibilities. Thus, not only 
politicians, but also diplomats are forced to suggest 
actions that promise satisfactory solutions to publics. 
At least modern conference diplomacy still succeeds 
in following Bismarck’s notion and thus often manages 
to avoid conflicts for as long as possible. However, 
civil society or other actors regularly attempt to take 
things into their own hands – usually through the 
institutionalization and organization of publics. This 
sometimes makes it possible to accomplish aims that 
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had been abandoned by traditional diplomacy. The 
achievements of the Paris Climate Conference in 
2015, as R. S. Zaharna points out, would not have been 
possible (and the conference might not have taken 
place at all) without the lobbying of highly active 
NGOs, which worked together for a long period with 
politicians and diplomats. In turn, many of the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals need the commit-
ment of transnationally active companies. 
However, civil society’s demands may also be at 
the root of movements that do not help to solve 
global problems, but rather aggravate them. The anti-
Islamic Pegida movement in Germany is one exam-
ple. In many cases, however, the question of whether 
a civic movement has a positive or negative impact 
depends on the political attitude of the observer, as is 
the case in the conflict over the activities of foreign 
NGOs in China. Diplomacy, which adapts to this new 
reality, has to balance its own aims as the democrati-
cally legitimate representation of the overall popu-
lation of a country with the individual interests of 
civic organizations. Through such endeavours, and 
confronted with more complex operative tasks and 
greater public expectations than ever before, diplo-
macy will be less administrative activity and more 
‘politics’. This means that publics will treat diplo-
macy as politics too – which can result in mistrust. 
4. Global Aspects 
Like any other form of governance, diplomacy strives 
to be successful. Its achievements are measured along 
predetermined guidelines and are judged on the 
value of the aims it achieved or failed to realize. For-
eign policy can conceivably be successful despite 
diplomatic failures. The definition of diplomatic ‘suc-
cess’ must therefore encompass global conditions and 
future prospects as well as management of expecta-
tions caused by international requirements. However, 
some parts of national publics still identify with the 
nation-states of the past. They expect successful for-
eign policy from their governments. They expect that 
they will be represented by them and accept that the 
representation of their interests may lead to substan-
tial conflict with other nation-states. This dynamic 
can lead to a strong emotional impact by the govern-
mental use of diplomatic instruments. R. S. Zaharna 
addresses emotionality as a determining dynamic 
element of foreign policy in her chapter. The prob-
lem here is the public’s expectations directed at the 
nation-state conjoined with the need for the govern-
ment to represent the interests of a nation in a world 
of interdependencies. 
The question of whether the present societal and 
global changes will be the catalyst for homogeniza-
tion or heterogenization of diplomacy remains 
unanswered in this volume. States learn from one 
another, and today they also learn from new inter-
national institutions. At the same time, their own 
intellectual traditions play an additional role. The 
United States and Europe are impacted by their ad-
herence to various forms of market liberalism. In 
Russia and China the communist-led government 
traditionally influenced diplomacy through the prin-
ciple of ideology over pragmatism. As Kim B. Olsen 
explains, having these various politico-economic 
heritages in mind, states (unaware of the influence 
of non-governmental actors in their national pursuit 
of transforming economic power into diplomatic 
influence) lack the fundamental understanding of 
today’s geo-economic strains in diplomatic activity. 
The role of diplomacy in the 21st century is less 
clearly defined than in the past. Its influence on the 
organization of the international order is decreasing. 
Diplomacy is caught in the continuous dispute be-
tween new technical demands and opportunities 
coupled with the expectations of new actors and pub-
lics as well as internal societal changes. At the same 
time, the diplomacy of a nation-state has to pursue, 
due to its traditional foreign policy pragmatic ration-
alism,5 effective, efficient, and (legal as well as moral) 
legitimate strategies in the international environ-
ment. The question of a new normative framework 
for this kind of significantly changed diplomacy, and 
whether this is even possible, remains unanswered 
for the Working Group of the SWP. An answer will 
eventually be determined by whether the governmen-
tal activity of democracies can gain or re-establish the 
indispensable trust of citizens in the representative 
institutions of foreign policy. 
 
5 See John Robert Kelley, “The New Diplomacy: Evolution 
of a Revolution”, Diplomacy & Statecraft 21, no. 2 (June 2010): 
286–305 (286). 
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Diplomats have been closely involved in the threat 
and actual use of economic sanctions – a manifes-
tation of the “capacity to interrupt commercial inter-
course.”1 However, the central role of diplomats in 
wielding this particular instrument of economic force 
has not yet received systematic scrutiny. On the one 
hand, diplomatic practitioners usually deal with 
broader issues of war and peace in their autobiogra-
phical accounts, and, if they discuss particular cases 
in which they relied on economic sanctions as a 
means to extract concessions, they do so in a rather 
anecdotal fashion. On the other hand, scholars com-
monly employ various theoretical perspectives and 
empirical evidence in order to generalize across 
different contexts, thereby offering little practical 
insights into how to deal with concrete cases. 
Equipped with only an impressionistic body of 
practical knowledge about the use of economic force, 
diplomats from the United States and the member 
states of the European Union (EU) are struggling to 
keep up with an increasing reliance on ever more 
sophisticated economic sanctions in the pursuit of 
national security and foreign policy objectives. Until 
now, there exists not a single official American or 
European doctrine that could provide guidance for 
the use of economic force. This lack of systematic 
thinking contrasts sharply with the elaborated mili-
tary doctrines that lay out principles governing the 
use of armed force by specifying the triggering con-
ditions, applicable procedures, and responsible actors 
tasked to carry it out. This intellectual imbalance can 
hardly be justified given that military and economic 
power occupy opposite sides of the same coin.2 At a 
 
1 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 76. 
2 “Power is indivisible; and the military and economic 
weapons are merely different instruments of power.” Edward 
H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to 
time when the selective and comprehensive impo-
sition of trade as well as financial sanctions has 
emerged as the go-to option for decision-makers on 
both sides of the Atlantic, addressing a constantly 
growing number of perceived foreign policy and 
national security threats emanating from state and 
non-state actors alike, what has previously figured 
merely as a lamentable lacunae may soon turn into 
a strategic liability. 
Against this backdrop, I assess the changing role of 
diplomats in the use of economic sanctions by draw-
ing on empirical evidence from foreign and national 
security policy of the United States and the EU. This 
chapter proceeds as follows: in the first section, I briefly 
discuss the causes of the increasing prominence of 
the use of economic sanctions after World War II, and 
its adverse consequence of contributing to the side-
lining of diplomats in contemporary diplomacy. In 
the second section, I briefly review how the existing 
political science literature has inadequately theorized 
the relationship between diplomats and the use of 
economic force. In the third section, I conclude by 
suggesting why the role of diplomats in the use of 
economic sanctions should be strengthened and offer 
some practical steps in that direction. 
Progressing Practice 
When conducting political intercourse beyond 
their borders, rulers had used economic sanctions to 
restrict trade and financial interactions well before 
the term diplomacy entered into the French and Eng-
lish dictionaries in the late 18th century.3 Until the 
 
the Study of International Relations (Edinburgh: R. & R. Clarke, 
1946), 119. 
3 Halvard Leira, “A Conceptual History of Diplomacy”, in 
The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. Costas M. Constantinou, 
Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp (London: SAGE, 2016), 28–38. 
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first half of the 20th century, these measures had over-
whelmingly complemented the use of armed force 
among the consolidated political communities in 
North America and Europe, either in the form of 
land-based sieges or naval blockades.4 Consequently, 
monitoring and enforcing the respective restrictions 
required physical inspection such as interdicting 
cargo transported via train or ships, a task carried out 
by members of the armed forces.5 Diplomats came to 
replace soldiers as agents of the use of economic force 
when the newly created international institutions, 
first the League of Nations and later the United Na-
tions, as well as individual nation states acting alone 
or together, gradually substituted the use of armed 
force with that of economic force beginning in the 
second half of the 20th century. 
Markets have become one of the 
main battlefields at the beginning 
of the 21st century. 
This shift away from the use of armed to economic 
force was mainly driven by three technological and 
societal developments: firstly, the development of 
nuclear weapons led to a rapid decline of the utility 
of armed force, since its actual use among major 
powers would have assured their mutual destruction. 
Later on, armed force also turned out to be a rather 
blunt and therefore ineffective instrument to cope 
with unconventional threats posed by limited or 
collapsing statehood, transnational violent extrem-
ism, and organized crime. This is not to say that 
armed forced completely ceased to be used, as the 
continuation of covert operations and other types of 
limited use of armed force such as drones or cyber 
warfare amply demonstrates to this day. Secondly, 
the unilateral threat and actual use of armed force 
became morally shunned and legally relegated to 
being an ultima ratio that could be legitimately applied 
under the Charta of the United Nations only as a 
measure of self-defence or pursuant to a collective 
authorization by the Security Council. Finally, the 
use of economic sanctions was further elevated by 
 
4 “[T]he struggle to secure and deny supplies is a common 
feature of ancient as well as modern warfare.” Michael 
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations (London: Allen Lane, 1977), 170. 
5 Lance E. Davis and Stanley L. Engerman, Naval Blockades 
in Peace and War: An Economic History since 1750 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
the emergence of post-heroic societies across Western 
countries where the associated post-material values 
would henceforth provoke almost allergic reactions 
to casualties on the battlefield.6 Without having to 
send troops into harm’s way, the use of economic 
sanctions allows contemporary decision-makers in the 
United States and Europe to inflict equally substantial 
political and economic costs on adversaries in order 
to influence their decision-making. Due to its com-
paratively high utility vis-à-vis other policy instru-
ments, the use of economic force has also frequently 
been applied by the Chinese and Russian govern-
ments.7 Due to this change in the pattern of the appli-
cation of force, markets have become one of the main 
battlefields at the beginning of the 21st century.8 
This shift in statecraft has been most pronounced 
in the United States; here the Department of the 
Treasury now occupies a central role in foreign policy 
and national security policy-making, overseeing a vast 
regime of unilateral economic sanctions employed 
against state and non-state actors around the world. 
Whereas the Department of State was instrumental in 
building strong financial and trade relationships with 
other nations and through international institutions 
after World War II, the Department of the Treasury 
has increasingly manipulated these relationships as 
a way to generate pressure on adversaries and allies 
alike. Within the Department of the Treasury, the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is the lead 
agency that implements and enforces financial and 
trade sanctions under national emergency powers 
granted by Congress to the president pursuant to two 
key statutes: the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977. 
Every U.S. president since Franklin D. Roosevelt has 
utilized these economic sanctions to conduct U.S. for-
eign and national security policy. Under the George 
W. Bush administration, the use of financial sanc-
tions was elevated to a primary instrument in the 
‘Global War on Terrorism’. At the same time, mem-
 
6 Herfried Münkler, Der Wandel des Krieges: Von der Symmetrie 
zur Asymmetrie (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2006), 
310–354. 
7 William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial 
Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2016); Adam N. Stulberg, Well-Oiled Diplomacy: 
Strategic Manipulation and Russia’s Energy Statecraft in Eurasia 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007). 
8 Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other 
Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: The Bel-
knap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016). 
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bers of Congress re-inserted themselves into foreign 
policy-making by using economic sanctions as a legis-
lative vehicle, forcing the administration’s hand by 
broadening designation criteria and constraining 
executive power to lift and terminate the use of eco-
nomic sanctions, as in the cases of Iran and Russia. 
The increasing reliance on trade and financial 
sanctions elevated senior officials from the Depart-
ment of the Treasury to pursue diplomatic missions 
to garner support for, and offer warnings about, non-
compliance with unilateral U.S. economic sanctions 
in foreign capitals and corporate headquarters ab-
road.9 These increasingly frequent missions further 
undermined the leadership position of diplomats in 
conducting U.S. foreign and national security policy. 
Whereas the threat of being side-lined by other 
bureaucratic and non-state actors in the conduct of 
diplomacy had been feared by diplomats in the past, 
the current marginalization of the Department of 
State is truly unprecedented.10 Although less pro-
nounced, the side-lining of diplomats also takes place 
within the EU, where an equally increasing use of 
economic sanctions is ultimately decided by the heads 
of governments in the European Council and even-
tually implemented by bureaucrats in the European 
Commission and national governments, with diplo-
mats playing mainly a supportive role at both stages 
of the policy circle. As a matter of fact, the ever-
growing importance of the EU’s ‘restrictive measures’ 
over the last two decades in furthering the objectives 
of its Common Foreign and Security Policy has not 
been matched by the number of diplomats working 
in the Sanctions Unit of the European External Action 
 
9 Juan C. Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing a New Era of 
Financial Warfare (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013). Previously, 
officials from finance ministries and especially central banks 
provided issue-specific expertise in multilateral negotiations 
over the provision of public goods through international 
institutions. Since the 1920s, it had been utilized by govern-
ments to deal with a growing number of topics. See Eric 
Helleiner, “Financial Officials as Diplomats: Evolving Issues, 
Actors, Techniques since the 1920s”, in The Oxford Handbook 
of Modern Diplomacy, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and 
Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
160–75. 
10 Dean Acheson, “The Eclipse of the State Department”, 
Foreign Affairs 49, no. 4 (July 1971): 593–606; George F. 
Kennan, “Diplomacy without Diplomats?”, Foreign Affairs 76, 
no. 5 (March 1997): 198–212; Ronan Farrow, War on Peace: 
The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2018). 
Service. Given the encroachment of other bureaucratic 
actors on diplomats’ traditional prerogative to con-
duct foreign affairs, it was no coincidence that mostly 
economic and finance ministers were in attendance 
when the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 2253 on December 17, 2015, which added 
the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) to the exist-
ing multilateral financial sanctions regime against 
Al-Qaeda. 
Trailing Theory 
The soaring use of economic sanctions by U.S. and EU 
decision-makers to pursue a growing number of for-
eign and national security objectives correspondingly 
required expertise about how financial markets and 
the global trading system function. This expertise 
mostly resided in finance or trade ministries, central 
banks, and the private sector. In the United States, the 
demand for this specialized economic knowledge has 
been supplied and operationalized by a new bureau-
cratic cast whose members are neither diplomats nor 
soldiers. Notwithstanding, they take on tasks that 
used to be assigned exclusively to diplomats, such as 
negotiating with foreign governments and their home 
companies about cooperating on the design, imple-
mentation and enforcement of economic sanctions. 
In doing so, its members have directly targeted state 
and non-state adversaries and their respective sup-
porters since the early 1990s, engaging in what can 
be described as economic warfare without an offi-
cial declaration of war.11 The members of this new 
bureaucratic cast can accordingly be described as 
financial warriors. 
The rise of these financial warriors has so far only 
been documented in autobiographical accounts of 
former protagonists.12 This development has other-
 
11 Keith Kendrick, “In Economic Battle, Soldiers Fight 
on Carpet”, The Washington Post, 19 September 1990, https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/09/19/in-
economic-battle-soldiers-fight-on-carpet/1c39d1e6-93c8-43aa-
a129-eec28d15fe83/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2f43f51e7abd 
(accessed 18 July 2018). 
12 John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story 
of International Finance in the Post 9/11 World (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2007); Orde F. Kittrie, “New Sanctions 
for a New Century: Treasury’s Innovative Use of Financial 
Sanctions”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 
30, no. 3 (Spring 2009): 789–822; Juan C. Zarate, “Harness-
ing the Financial Furies: Smart Financial Power and National 
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wise gone largely unnoticed in the existing literature 
on diplomacy and economic sanctions. One reason 
for this could be the persistent misconception by prac-
titioners and scholars of international relations that 
economics would pertain to ‘low’ politics while the 
conduct of foreign and national security policy would 
occupy the throne of ‘high’ politics, the latter thought 
to be firmly in the hands of diplomats. This question-
able analytical separation between ‘low’ and ‘high’ 
politics might be a path-dependent result of the dis-
dain for economic issues that had featured promi-
nently during the 19th century among the diplomatic 
corps. Traditionally, its members were mainly com-
prised of aristocrats who viewed the emancipation of 
the merchant middle class with utter disdain.13 Alter-
natively, this analytical separation might also be a 
consequence of the dominance of the liberal school 
of thought in the academic study of economics and 
politics, and the apparent contradiction posed by the 
use of economic sanctions, which violates two of its 
basic premises: firstly, that markets operate inde-
pendently from state interference, and secondly that 
economic interdependence reduces conflict. Having 
dethroned mercantilism as a dominant paradigm of 
international political economy, liberal ideas exerted 
a lasting impact on decision-makers, as evidenced in 
the words of former U.S. Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull, who proclaimed that “if trade crosses borders, 
soldiers won’t.” Regardless of its cause, the analytical 
separation of supposedly low and high politics in the 
study of international relations and diplomacy runs 
contrary to empirical evidence. In particular, the use 
of economic sanctions stretches back as far as the city 
states of ancient Greece. Later, economics and diplo-
macy evolved hand-in-hand as foreign trade missions 
were both causes and consequences of the establish-
ment of official diplomatic ties among governments 
throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. 
In the past, scholarship overwhelmingly neglected 
the economic means available to diplomats. Instead, 
scholars extensively scrutinized the intimate involve-
ment of diplomats in the use of armed force (what 
Carl von Clausewitz had called the ‘other means’ and 
 
Security”, The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2009): 43–59. 
For a critique see Ibrahim Warde, The Price of Fear: Al-Qaeda 
and the Truth behind the Financial War on Terror (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2007), 14. 
13 As the prime example of the low regard for economics 
vis-à-vis the ‘high’ politics involving war and peace, see 
Werner Sombart, Händler und Helden: Patriotische Besinnungen 
(München: Duncker & Humblot, 1915). 
what its academic acolytes nowadays discuss as ‘co-
ercive diplomacy’).14 Some scholars working in the 
sub-discipline of Diplomatic Studies have recently 
begun to theorize the economic ends of foreign and 
national security policy as “economic diplomacy.”15 
This rather blurry concept encompasses myriad 
efforts, sometimes also labelled commercial or trade 
diplomacy, which relate to the promotion and sup-
port of business interests abroad, the negotiation of 
trade agreements and international institutions of 
economic governance,16 as well as foreign aid and 
other types of monetary assistance.17 However, this 
literature largely neglects the economic means avail-
 
14 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1966), 3; Alexander L. George, Forceful 
Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washing-
ton, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991); 
Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits 
of Coercive Diplomacy, 2
nd
 ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); 
Christer Jönsson, “Diplomacy”, in Encyclopedia of Power, ed. 
Keith M. Dowding (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2011), 188–
90; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Coercive Diplomacy”, in The SAGE 
Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. Constantinou, Kerr and Sharp 
(see note 3), 476–86; Tarak Barkawi, “Diplomacy, War, and 
World Politics”, in Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics, 
ed. Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 55–79. 
15 Maaike Okano-Heijmans, “Conceptualizing Economic 
Diplomacy: The Crossroads of International Relations, Eco-
nomics, IPE and Diplomatic Studies”, The Hague Journal of 
Diplomacy 6, no. 1–2 (January 2011): 7–36; Idem, “Economic 
Diplomacy”, in The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. Constan-
tinou, Kerr and Sharp (see note 3), 552–63. For an early 
effort, see John Pinder, “Economic Diplomacy”, in World 
Politics: An Introduction, ed. James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. 
Thompson and Gavin Boyd (New York: Free Press, 1976), 
312–36. 
16 Leonard Seabrooke, “Economists and Diplomacy: Profes-
sions and the Practice of Economic Policy”, International Jour-
nal 66, no. 3 (September 2011): 629–42 (641); Idem, “Diplo-
macy as Economic Consultancy”, in Diplomacy and the Making 
of World Politics, ed. Sending, Pouliot and Neumann(see note 
14), 195–219. 
17 Donna Lee, “The Growing Influence of Business in U.K. 
Diplomacy”, International Studies Perspectives 5, no. 1 (February 
2004): 50–54; Donna Lee and David Hudson, “The Old and 
New Significance of Political Economy in Diplomacy”, Review 
of International Studies 30, no. 3 (July 2004): 343–60; Paul 
Sharp, Diplomatic Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 222–42; Olivier Naray, 
“Commercial Diplomacy: An Integrative Framework”, Inter-
national Journal of Diplomacy and Economy 1, no. 2 (2012):  
119–33. 
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able to diplomats in the pursuit of foreign policy and 
national security objectives.18 
While the theory of power under the condition of 
economic interdependence has been a central theme 
of the realist school of thought,19 we still lack system-
atic inquiries into the use of economic force by diplo-
mats. David A. Baldwin came fairly close, although he 
ultimately shied away from connecting his seminal 
analytical framework of economic statecraft to the 
particular role of diplomats, arguing that such a move 
“broadens the concept of ‘diplomacy’ so much that 
it makes it difficult to think in terms of diplomatic 
alternatives to economic techniques.”20 This proves 
to be highly unfortunate as his book has significantly 
improved our thinking about the possibilities and pit-
falls of the use of economic sanctions. 
Bridging the Gap 
In order to demonstrate their continuing relevance 
for diplomacy in the 21st century, diplomats need to 
come to terms with the profound shift from the use 
of armed to economic force, which is threatening to 
further side-line them vis-à-vis other bureaucratic 
actors in the implementation of foreign and national 
security policy in the United States and the member 
states of the EU. Due to their vast body of specialized 
and general knowledge, acquired through systematic 
education and training, diplomats must continue to 
play a central role in the design, implementation, and 
enforcement of economic sanctions. Although there 
exists neither an agreed-upon epistemic canon within 
the sphere of public policy of what economic state-
craft entails, nor is there an institutionalized struc-
ture in most Western countries geared to facilitating 
its most effective application, admittedly diplomats 
 
18 Nicholas Bayne and Stephen Woolcock, “What Is Eco-
nomic Diplomacy?”, in The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-
Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations, 
ed. Nicholas Bayne and Stephen Woolcock, 4
th
 ed. (Abing-
don: Routledge, 2016), 1–15 (2–5). 
19 Jonathan Kirshner, “The Political Economy of Realism”, 
in: Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War, 
ed. Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), 88–102; Rawi Abdelal 
and Jonathan Kirshner, “Strategy, Economic Relations, and 
the Definition of National Interests”, Security Studies 9, no. 1 
(1999): 123–62. 
20 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), 35. 
are uniquely suited to act as primary agents of the use 
of economic sanctions. This is because of their ability 
to weigh competing policy objectives in the pursuit 
of diplomacy, according to their short- and long-term 
implications. Their comprehensive view, grounded in 
profound contextual knowledge gained through con-
stant exposure to different cultural conditions, distin-
guishes them from their colleagues in financial and 
trade ministries who tend to myopically pursue nar-
rower policy objectives. With respect to the use of eco-
nomic sanctions, this may entail increasing economic 
pressure and ensuring universal compliance by rigor-
ous enforcement without considering what exactly 
the other sides want and why. As Sir Robert F. Cooper 
has pointed out, “Diplomacy is partly Newtonian phys-
ics – power, pressure and leverage – but it is also 
about what people want.”21 Thus, the benefit of diplo-
macy sometimes may be to buy additional time for ne-
gotiations and for necessary social change to happen. 
A second career path with a focus on 
specialized training for tasks such as 
designing and implementing trade 
and financial sanctions could be a 
viable solution. 
In order to strengthen their role in the use of eco-
nomic sanctions, especially within governments of 
EU member states and particularly in Germany, the 
career path of diplomats should not only lead to the 
education of generalists who can adapt to any task. 
The current practice of having the entire diplomatic 
corps rotate mandatorily for fixed terms creates im-
mense opportunity costs because individual diplo-
mats must acquire the highly technical knowledge 
required for the use of economic sanctions at every 
turn. Instead, a second career path with a focus on 
specialized training for highly specific tasks such as 
designing and implementing trade and financial sanc-
tions could be a viable solution. In the United States, 
former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton 
initiated similar steps as part of her Economic Statecraft 
Initiative between late 2011 and 2012. Although re-
ceiving only scant attention at the time, her initiative 
lead to lasting organizational changes within the 
bureaucracy of the Department of State, which were 
 
21 Robert Cooper, “Ukraine and Iran Vindicate Ashton’s 
Deft Diplomacy”, Financial Times, 12 December 2013, https:// 
www.ft.com/content/a4baf248-5ea9-11e3-8621-00144feabdc0 
(accessed 18 July 2018). 
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based on an appreciation of the crucial role of eco-
nomic force for U.S. diplomacy.22 As specialists on 
the use of economic force, diplomats could become 
orchestrators directing other bureaucratic actors 
within their own governments to contribute the 
requisite specialized knowledge, instead of being 
sidelined by them in the pursuit of diplomacy. 
 
 
22 Hillary R. Clinton, “Economic Statecraft”, Speech at 
the Economic Club of New York, New York City, 14 October 
2011, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/ 
rm/2011/10/175552.htm (accessed 24 July 2018). 
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The challenge to diplomacy for numerous Western 
countries has become domestic in nature. Although 
serious tensions exist concerning the global insti-
tutional architecture, these do not constitute the 
existential threat of the 1930s. Unlike in that earlier 
era, there has been no outright abandonment of 
international organizations (IOs), as punctuated by 
the failure of the League of Nations. Rather than 
disappearing, IOs have proliferated, albeit with a bias 
towards informal self-selected forums including the 
G20 and the Financial Stability Board. Nor does the 
world’s geo-political environment include a cluster 
of totalitarian states bent on territorial expansion by 
military means. In many ways, liberal international-
ism continues to hold sway, at least as judged by the 
degree of complex interdependence. Instead of the 
hold of autarchy (with large national champions 
having exclusive authority in zones of control), it is 
the image of hyper-globalization that defines the 21st 
century. Massive corporations are not the only victors 
from this situation, since large NGOs (Oxfam, MSF) 
and philanthropic bodies (The Gates Foundation) have 
benefited as well. Moreover, reflecting this kind of 
pluralism, it is no longer a hegemonic or unipolar 
era. Rather there is ample space particularly for big 
state actors beyond the West (above all the BRICS, 
including China, India, Brazil, and South Africa as 
well as Russia) and outside the traditional establish-
ment of the G7/8 to exert influence. Indeed, at the 
recent 2018 BRICS summit in Johannesburg, the 
BRICS positioned themselves as defenders of the 
multilateral economic order. 
At the core of the current dilemma is 
that diplomacy and its institutions 
are contested and stigmatized 
domestically by populist forces. 
At the core of the current dilemma is not whether 
diplomacy (and diplomats situated in foreign minis-
tries) is in the process of disappearing on the global 
stage but rather that these forms of institution and 
machinery are contested and stigmatized domestically 
by populist forces. Akin to the challenge confronting 
other institutions, diplomacy is viewed as being a 
constraining instrument, part of a self-serving and 
controlling establishment. From the theoretical tra-
dition associated with Ernesto Laclau,1 the populist 
logic may be contrasted with nationalists in one 
fundamental dimension. Whereas nationalists dif-
ferentiate horizontally between those in and outside 
(the other) the nation state, populists differentiate on 
a down/up basis with antagonism between the elite 
and ‘the people’ as underdog. 
This anti-diplomatic/foreign ministry sentiment 
is most noticeable in the Brexit campaign with its 
aversion to insiders and communities of sentiment 
and interest beyond the national. However, this 
type of contestation can be located in multiple sites 
beyond the UK as well. In various sections of the 
European populist movements, forces rail against 
considerations of diplomatic solidarity, above all on 
the migration issue. On top of all this, of course, is 
the concerted challenge to contemporary diplomatic 
culture that U.S. President Donald Trump presents. 
On one level, to be sure, Trump can be depicted as a 
return to an older type of diplomacy. Privileging ad 
hoc processes as a means to circumvent all forms of 
institutionalization whether formal (UN, IFIs, WTO, 
NATO) or informal (G20, contact groups etc.). On an-
other level, the operational style of President Trump 
is focused on personalism, detachment from any 
fixed ideology, a winner take-it all approach to nego-
tiations, the use of bilateral one-on-ones, constant 
surprises, and direct communication with ‘his’ sup-
porters combined with an erratic use of Twitter 
 
1 Ernesto Lacula, “Populism: What’s in a Name?”, in Popu-
lism and the Mirror of Democracy, ed. Francisco Panizza (Lon-
don: Verso, 2005), 32–49. 
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Thus this accumulated challenge to diplomacy and 
foreign ministries in particular comes not from the 
periphery of the global system where it might be ex-
pected. After all, small states were among those that 
experienced the heaviest diplomatic casualties of the 
global financial crisis. Additionally, small states have 
been left out of the new institutions, not only in terms 
of the G20 but also the BRICS-states and the MIKTA2 
partnership. Furthermore, space for normatively 
driven diplomatic initiatives, which was led in some 
considerable part by small states, for example at the 
International Court, has been curtailed. 
That the contested view of diplomacy and diplo-
mats is most robust in countries at the core of the 
international system, is a dynamic that can only be 
understood in the context of a backlash against a 
wider segment of established institutional culture. 
Such an adverse reaction at least to some degree re-
flects the ascendancy of celebrity culture, which puts 
the onus on personalistic spectacle rather than a cul-
ture of achievement. What is new and different is 
the connection between celebrity status and populism 
rather than an institutional connection. Whereas 
celebrities such as George Clooney, Angelina Jolie, or 
for that matter, Bill Gates or Ted Turner, were asso-
ciated with the United Nations and/or global initia-
tives aimed at delivering global public goods,3 celeb-
rity politicians, notably Donald Trump – or indeed 
Boris Johnson and Beppe Grillo (the former leader 
of the Five Star Movement in Italy, who focused in-
ternally to appeal to large domestic constituencies) – 
are closer connected with populism. 
Foreign ministries have become more fragile in 
their standing across a wide spectrum of countries. 
The view that diplomats/foreign service officers have 
a unique ability to interpret the national interest is 
strongly embedded, accentuated by the legacy of a 
distinctive culture that highlights the separation of 
diplomats not only from other components of govern-
mental bureaucracy but citizens at large. Diplomacy 
evolved to “function [as intermediator] between states 
and societies separated by institutions, law, culture, 
economics, and language.”4 Therefore, as long as for-
 
2 BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa, while MIKTA is an informal partnership between 
Mexico, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Turkey and 
Australia. 
3 Andrew F. Cooper, Celebrity Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Para-
digm Publishers, 2007). 
4 Georg Haynal, DOA: Diplomacy on the Ascendant in the Age 
of Disintermediation (Cambridge, MA: Weatherhead Center for 
eign ministries had a special status (with the ability 
to some considerable extent to act as the primary 
conduit for external relations) the ‘guild’ system vis-à-
vis diplomacy imparted some considerable strengths. 
However, increasingly stirred up and mobilized 
citizens push to circumvent this component of the 
establishment, as they also do in the contest between 
representative and participatory democracy. 
Through this type of framework, therefore, it is not 
surprising that diplomacy and diplomats have faced 
challenges of even a more formidable nature beyond 
the West when a combination of celebrity status and 
populism completely captures a state. Venezuela 
under President Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) fits this 
model with its mixture of charismatic leadership and 
so‐called ‘diplomacy of the peoples’ (diplomacia de los 
pueblos). According to Cardozo the deterioration of 
professional diplomacy in favor of personal relations 
and the “diplomacy of microphones” meshed with 
the “definition of diplomacy in terms of support for 
the regime”,5 rather than having any professional 
basis. As Serbin and Serbin Pont put it: 
“The Foreign Service was restructured in 2000 and 
2005. Changes included the modification of the 
Pedro Gual diplomatic academy so that profession-
als entering the diplomatic service would also have 
to do social service and experience personally the 
structure of the Bolivarian social missions and to 
acknowledge their effects on the revolution.”6 
The populist challenge highlights the disconnection 
between a perceived entrenched elite and ‘the people’ 
embracing hyper-empowered individuals as their 
champions. Personalism is no longer restricted to the 
leaders of distinctive political parties. The cult of celeb-
rity owes no loyalty to established patterns of perfor-
mance. Even the most cynical citizens are drawn to 
 
International Affairs, Harvard University, 2002), https:// 
programs.wcfia.harvard.edu/files/fellows/files/haynal.pdf? 
m=1357530295 (accessed 7 May 2018). 
5 Elsa Cardozo, “La política exterior del gobierno bolivariano 
y sus implicaciones en el plano doméstico”, Caracas: Instituto 
Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales (ILDIS), Oficina 
en Venezuela de la Fundación Friedrich Ebert, August 2010, 
3–4, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/caracas/08796.pdf 
(accessed 8 August 2018). 
6 Andrés Serbin and Andrei Serbin Pont, “The Foreign 
Policy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: The Role 
and Legacy of Hugo Chávez”, Latin American Policy 8, no. 2 
(December 2017): 232–48. 
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the aura of autonomous individuals who are the 
contradistinction of what diplomatic culture repre-
sents. 
Making the challenge even more formidable is the 
ability of these hyper-empowered individuals to rep-
resent themselves as flag bearers for the frustrations 
of ordinary citizens. They operate through loose net-
working as outsiders rather than using the closed 
clubs of insiders. All of this is not to say that the back-
lash extended through the process of disintermedia-
tion dismisses all diplomacy and diplomats as not 
fit for purpose. On the contrary, what stands out is 
the contrast between the generalized contestation 
of diplomacy and the high value placed on specific 
diplomats, as witnessed by the tributes to Ambassador 
Chris Stevens and others killed in the 2012 Benghazi 
attack. In the UK, it is an open question whether 
attacks on diplomacy by populist politicians such as 
Nigel Farage are authentic or simply a response to 
the willingness of some diplomats such as Sir Ivan 
Rogers to speak ‘truth to power’ about Brexit. After 
all, Farage revelled in meeting Trump in an unofficial 
capacity, particularly as the idea was floated by Trump 
that Farage would make a ‘great’ British ambassador 
to the United States. 
Even with these caveats, nonetheless, the challenge 
to diplomacy and foreign ministries is a serious one. 
Given the power of the disintermediation, an oppor-
tunistic set of ascendant political leaders – even those 
located at the core of the international system – have 
considerable incentive to diminish ‘their’ own diplo-
mats as part of a wider campaign to stigmatize the 
traditional establishment. 
Under this intense pressure there is a logic in 
diplomats demonstrating their value. Some modes of 
operation could well be downplayed in this process: 
for example, the high-profile efforts of ambassadors 
and missions to engage in public campaigns to criti-
cize or even destabilize autocratic regimes. The efforts 
of Michael McFaul, the then U.S. Ambassador to 
Russia (2012–2014), on Twitter with a following of 
60,000, falls into this category. So does the effort 
of U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford to Syria, who was 
already reaching out in 2011 (at the beginning of the 
Syrian crisis) to opposition forces and who visited 
cities under siege by the Assad government’s security 
forces. 
Facing the challenge of populism, 
diplomacy and diplomats need to be 
far more reactive. 
Facing the challenge of populism, diplomacy and 
diplomats need to be far more reactive. In these dis-
ruptive times, the most instrumentally attractive 
approach is one in which the institutions and 
machinery of diplomacy are geared towards delivery 
in the service of citizens. Again, this is not a com-
pletely novel strategy, but it is one that needs to be 
implanted into the mantra of ‘public’ diplomacy di-
rected domestically. At every opportunity diplomacy 
and diplomats should counter the image of ‘denation-
alis[ation]’ – originally put forward as a concern by 
Sir Harold Nicolson in the interwar years;7 but it is 
a concept which under current turbulent conditions 
must return to the fore of thinking and practice. 
 
7 See Derek Drinkwater, Sir Harold Nicolson and International 
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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Representation, in terms of standing and acting for 
others, is a core function of diplomacy. Historically, 
diplomats represented individual rulers; today they 
represent states. Their representative role hinges on 
the predominance of states in international relations. 
“When states become weaker, so do those who 
represent and derive authority from them. As the 
trend continues towards global decision-making 
for the big global issues on the one hand, and 
greater localisation and individualisation on the 
other, where does a state’s representative fit in?”1 
Representing states diplomatically in the 21st century 
is far from unproblematic. In the first part of this 
chapter, I will attempt to identify some contemporary 
and future challenging issues of state representation 
through diplomats. Moreover, in the 21st century 
actors other than states make claims to diplomatic 
representation. The second part of my chapter will 
therefore discuss the implications and challenges 
of broader diplomatic representation. 
State Representation 
From Antiquity to the Middle Ages, diplomats repre-
sented sovereign rulers in the sense that they were 
perceived to embody their sovereigns when they pre-
sented themselves at foreign courts. While such a 
view is alien to modern thought, today’s principle of 
diplomatic immunity has deep roots in notions of 
personal representation. Early envoys were inviolable 
for the reason that they were to be treated “as though 
the sovereign himself were there.”2 Today, the status 
 
1 Tom Fletcher, The Naked Diplomat: Power and Statecraft in the 
Digital Century (London: William Collins, 2016), 14. 
2 Grant V. McClanahan, Diplomatic Immunity: Principles, Prac-
tices, Problems (London: Hurst, 1989), 28. 
of diplomatic representatives, standing for someone 
or something other, is understood as symbolic repre-
sentation. The diplomat is then a representative in 
the same sense that a flag represents a nation. 
Representation implies not only 
status (standing for others) but also 
behaviour (acting for others).  
Representation implies not only status (standing 
for others) but also behaviour (acting for others). 
Economists and political scientists analyse such rela-
tionships between representatives and those repre-
sented in terms of principals and agents. Principal-
agent relations arise whenever one party (principal) 
delegates certain tasks to another party (agent). Diplo-
mats and elected politicians are obvious examples of 
agents, who have been entrusted with certain tasks 
from their principals (governments/voters). Due to 
conflicting preferences and information asymmetry, 
agents may pursue other interests than those of the 
principal. Delegation is therefore usually combined 
with control mechanisms, such as monitoring and 
audits. 
The proper behaviour of a representative is a 
matter of intense debate, especially in the literature 
on representative democracy. At issue is whether 
agents have an “imperative mandate”, being strictly 
accountable to their principals, or a “free mandate”, 
being authorized to act on behalf of their principals.3 
It implies an appraisal of whether accountability or 
authorization is the key term to characterize the rela-
tionship between representatives and principals. 
At first sight, diplomats as civil servants would 
seem to have a restricted or ‘imperative’ mandate 
 
3 Marek Sobolewski, “Electors and Representatives: A Con-
tribution to the Theory of Representation”, in Representation, 
ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: 
Atherton Press, 1968), 95–107 (96). 
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compared to the freer mandate of elected politicians. 
However, this is a simplification. While varying in 
restrictions, the instructions and bargaining mandate 
of diplomats often allow room for initiative within 
the given frames. Diplomatic representation rests on 
two-way communication and mutual influence. Using 
their diplomatic talent in interaction with their own 
foreign ministry, diplomats have influence over the 
instructions they receive which may give them con-
siderable leeway. 
In short, standing and acting for others entails per-
ennial dilemmas and issues concerning diplomats’ 
symbolic role and the balancing act between the im-
perative and free mandate extremes. Are there, then, 
specific issues of diplomatic representation in the 21st 
century? Hereafter, I will identify some changes and 
trends, and raise questions concerning their implica-
tions. As for symbolic representation, I will discuss 
the change from immunity to vulnerability and the 
question of whether diplomats ought to mirror the 
society they represent. In addition, I will identify 
three interrelated issues concerning principal-agent 
relations and diplomatic behaviour: what are the sig-
nificant differences in representing a democratic or 
an authoritarian state? How can diplomats represent 
divided societies? And what problems are associated 
with representing a populist regime? 
From Immunity to Vulnerability 
For centuries, the fact that diplomats represented 
venerable principals – from powerful monarchs to 
established states – guaranteed their protected and 
privileged status. Whereas long-standing rules of 
diplomatic immunity and privileges by and large 
continue to be upheld in interstate relations, popular 
perceptions of diplomats have changed in recent 
decades. To the extent that diplomats are perceived 
as symbols of disliked countries, religions or ‘-isms’, 
the quality of standing for others has been trans-
formed from a rationale for diplomatic immunity to 
a rationale for political violence. No longer being 
inviolable symbols, diplomatic representatives have 
increasingly become highly vulnerable symbols. 
In a polarized world diplomats and diplomatic 
facilities have become soft targets for terrorist attacks. 
For instance, of all terrorist attacks targeting the United 
States between 1969 and 2009, 28 percent were di-
rectly against U.S. diplomatic officers. In 2012 alone 
there were 95 attacks against various diplomatic insti-
tutions, of which more than one-third targeted UN 
personnel.4 As a consequence, embassy security has 
become an overriding concern. Some embassies today 
have the appearance of fortresses or penitentiaries, 
with barbed wire atop and alongside high walls with-
out windows. CCTV surveillance, turnstiles, metal 
detectors and crash proof barriers are only a few 
examples of security devices at embassies and con-
sulates. One veteran U.S. diplomat speaks of “creep-
ing militarization”, as embassy security has become 
influenced by military priorities and requirements.5 
The military connection is also reflected in the fact 
that embassies and diplomats representing govern-
ments with ongoing military operations are particu-
larly vulnerable. 
This raises the question of whether there are non-
militarized approaches to restoring the protection 
and security of diplomats that have been a hallmark 
of diplomacy throughout centuries. The tendency 
toward increasing insecurity and vulnerability not 
only impedes diplomatic tasks but also threatens to 
render the recruitment process of qualified personnel 
more difficult. 
Mirroring Society 
Standing for others can be understood in another, 
more literal, sense. To what extent do diplomats need 
to mirror the social and ethnic composition of the 
societies they represent? For most of recorded history, 
diplomatic envoys have represented individual rulers 
rather than whole communities and have not neces-
sarily come from the same country as their rulers. 
Well into the 19th century diplomats were aristocrats, 
who could easily change from one monarchical em-
ployer to another. The idea that diplomats should be 
an accurate reflection or typical of the society they 
represent is quite recent. With increasing migration, 
many – if not most – states will have a multiethnic 
and multicultural character in the 21st century. 
In countries with substantial immigration, such as 
Sweden, governments have recently made efforts 
to influence recruitment policies in such a way that 
diplomatic corps better mirror the multiethnic char-
acter of these societies. 
 
4 Muhammad-Basheer A. Ismail, Islamic Law and Transnational 
Diplomatic Law (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 139. 
5 James L. Bullock, “Keeping Embassy Security in Perspec-
tive”, The Foreign Service Journal 92, no. 4 (May 2015): 33–38, 
http://www.afsa.org/keeping-embassy-security-perspective 
(accessed 25 March 2018). 
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The standard objection to taking measures to safe-
guard representativeness in this sense is that diplo-
mats are supposed to represent national policies and 
values rather than the social and ethnic composition 
of the society they come from. However, the question 
needs to be raised how important the symbolic value 
of accurately reflecting their society might be in the 
perceptions of relevant audiences. Another considera-
tion concerns the potential value of individuals with 
multiple cultural backgrounds and understandings in 
diplomatic negotiations with relevant counterparts. 
For instance, could diplomats recruited from the Mus-
lim population in Germany or Sweden play a con-
structive role in negotiations with Arab countries? 
Gender is another debated dimension of representa-
tiveness. In many diplomatic establishments around 
the world there is an ongoing quest to end formal 
and informal barriers and bring about gender parity, 
which will no doubt pervade the 21st century. Despite 
positive developments in recent years, diplomatic 
infrastructures still tend toward masculinized norms, 
homo-social environments and gendered divisions of 
labour.6 
Democratic vs. Authoritarian States 
as Principals 
The nature of the principal is one important factor 
determining the nature of diplomatic representation. 
Specifically, it matters whether the diplomatic agent 
has a single principal or receives instructions from 
a collective body. Principal-agent theory heeds the 
problems of collective or multiple principals, pecu-
liarly to the increased autonomy agents may enjoy as 
a result of competing preferences among principals. 
The unequivocal instructions from a single sovereign 
in earlier times left less leeway for diplomats than the 
frequently vague instructions resulting from negotia-
tions among different actors and agencies in modern 
democracies. And whereas democratic states place 
diplomats at the end of multiple chains of principals 
and agents, diplomats representing contemporary 
authoritarian states, with one clearly identifiable 
principal, have more restrictive mandates. 
 
6 See Karin Aggestam and Ann E. Towns, eds., Gendering 
Diplomacy and International Negotiation (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018). 
We need to think harder about 
differing parameters of diplomatic 
representation between democracies 
and autocracies and the possible 
consequences of this. 
The changing balance between democratic and 
authoritarian states in the 21st century constitutes 
quite a change from the optimistic predictions of the 
final victory of liberal democracies after the end of 
the Cold War. This ought to make us think harder 
about differing parameters of diplomatic representa-
tion between democracies and autocracies and what 
consequences these might have. For instance, demo-
cratic methods of arriving at agreement by civilized 
discussion rather than coercive dictation have a bear-
ing on diplomacy as well. The use of digital platforms 
by autocracies for info warfare represents a new facet 
of 21st century diplomacy. On the other hand, digital 
diplomacy offers an effective tool for democratic states 
to bypass the controlled media in authoritarian 
states.7 
Representing Divided Societies 
A specific case of representation dilemmas in the 21st 
century occur in divided societies. Two prominent ex-
amples are Great Britain after the Brexit referendum 
and the United States after the election of Donald 
Trump as president. These countries are politically 
split into two halves of similar strength, with oppos-
ing views on issues that diplomats have to deal with. 
On the one hand, this would seem to grant diplomats 
more leeway. But, on the other hand, the lack of firm 
and consistent policies, standpoints and instructions 
complicates life for diplomats significantly. 
The lack of a firm consensus can be a serious lia-
bility in international negotiations, as the other side 
may try to exploit internal divisions and opposing 
standpoints. One common dynamic, well-known from 
repeated Cold War occurrences, is that hard-liners of 
both sides tend to reinforce each other’s position. The 
Brexit negotiations will be a significant test case for 
whether old patterns hold in the new 21st century en-
vironment. This unique situation of an encounter 
between a deeply divided society and a coalition of a 
large number of dissimilar states makes for interest-
 
7 Eytan Gilboa, “Digital Diplomacy”, in The SAGE Handbook 
of Diplomacy, ed. Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr and 
Paul Sharp (London: Sage, 2016), 540–51 (542). 
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ing observations concerning representation in the 
contemporary world. 
Representing Populist Regimes 
Another specific difficulty concerns the rise of popu-
list regimes. Populism yields a democratic representa-
tion problem. Populists claim to represent ‘the real 
people’ or ‘the silent majority’. By implication, those 
who do not share the populists’ views and notion of 
‘the people’ are not legitimate members of society. 
Populism is essentially anti-pluralist, which is in con-
tradiction to the norm of coexistence − to ‘live and let 
live’ – on which both democracy and diplomacy rest. 
The question is how to represent a 
principal who distrusts you. 
The controversial conception of democratic repre-
sentation domestically translates into an external dip-
lomatic representation problem. Exploiting growing 
mistrust and suspicion among voters, populist leaders 
target diffuse and undefined forces, such as ‘the estab-
lishment’ or ‘experts’ who have ostensibly under-
mined the democratic system. Along with journalists, 
diplomats are typically included in these categories. 
The fact that xenophobia is often a component of 
populism does not make the situation easier for dip-
lomats. This raises the question of how to represent a 
principal who distrusts you. The U.S. under President 
Trump is a case in point. The president has openly 
declared his lack of confidence in the State Depart-
ment and his budget proposal for 2018 cuts its budget 
significantly. Furthermore, a number of important 
ambassadorial appointments have been postponed 
including countries such as Mexico, Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey. Among U.S. diplomats there is widespread 
distress, and many have chosen to leave the service. 
As this current example illustrates, the problem 
of representing populist regimes is interrelated to 
the issue of differing principal-agent interests as well 
as the difficulty of representing divided societies. 
Non-State Representation 
Diplomatic recognition is a “ticket of general admis-
sion to the international arena”,8 which has been 
 
8 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Prin-
ceton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 16. 
granted to states or state-like entities, and not to 
other influential international entities, such as multi-
national corporations or financial actors. Will the 
state-centric pattern of diplomatic recognition and 
representation persist in the 21st century, or are there 
signs of potential change? 
One recent noteworthy exception to the state-
centred pattern is the recognition of the EU as a diplo-
matic persona. This raises the question of whether this 
‘supranational challenge’ heralds the introduction of 
other regional organizations on the diplomatic arena. 
Insofar as cities are increasingly making claims to 
becoming represented in the international arena, one 
may speak of a ‘subnational challenge’ as well. Most 
important, however, is the ‘transnational challenge’ 
from organizations and groups which act beyond na-
tional borders yet are not controlled by governments. 
Supranational Representation 
The EU is the prime example of a supranational actor 
in today’s world. With the entry into force of the Lis-
bon Treaty in December 2009 the EU as such, not just 
the Commission, acquired a diplomatic persona. The 
EU ‘foreign minister’, the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, is assisted by the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). The recruit-
ment process has not been unproblematic. Some 
1,600 officials were transferred to the EEAS from the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat on 1 January, 
2011. In addition, staffs are recruited among member-
state diplomats. The representational function of EU 
delegations is well established and EU diplomats take 
an active part in the local corps diplomatique. Yet sev-
eral organizational questions are yet to be solved.9 
One set of challenges concerns the ‘double-hatted’ 
character that the service shares with its foreign 
minister. Sceptics wonder how the two sets of career 
streams in the Commission and the Council Secretariat 
can be fused. Additionally, the recruitment of mem-
ber-state diplomats adds to the heterogeneity and po-
tential tensions. Another problematic aspect of supra-
national European diplomacy concerns the persistence 
of traditional, national diplomatic representation 
 
9 See Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj, eds., The Euro-
pean Union as a Diplomatic Actor (Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2015); Petar Petrov, Karolina Pomorska and Sophie 
Vanhoonacker, “The Emerging EU Diplomatic System: Op-
portunities and Challenges after ‘Lisbon’”, The Hague Journal 
of Diplomacy 7, no. 1 (January 2012): 1–9. 
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among the member states. The emergence of the EU 
as a diplomatic persona has not replaced, but merely 
added a new layer to, traditional diplomacy. To repre-
sent a conglomerate of states, which all have indi-
vidual diplomatic representation, is no easy matter. 
Nor are there indications that other supranational 
entities than the EU will be granted similar diplomatic 
status and representation in the foreseeable future. 
Subnational Representation 
Traditional diplomacy presupposes centralized con-
trol of interaction across state boundaries. Regions 
and cities are then not recognized as diplomatic 
personae with representation of their own. Nor are 
constituent states in federal governments. However, 
there is an increased activity of subnational units. 
To refer to these cross-border activities sometimes 
the terms ‘micro-diplomacy’ and ‘para-diplomacy’ 
are sometimes used. 
Today, some authors speak of a renaissance of 
cities as international actors.10 The “governments 
of large cities and urban areas increasingly engage 
directly in diplomatic activities, opening representa-
tive offices in foreign capitals and other major world 
cities and sending their mayors on ever more fre-
quent ‘state’ visits to their foreign counterparts.”11 
City governments engage in a variety of international 
activities and receive increasing recognition for this 
role. The increasing engagement by local govern-
ments in peaceful areas or countries to support their 
counterparts in more troubled regions received spe-
cial attention at the First World Conference on City Diplo-
macy in The Hague in 2008.12 City governments have 
become organized themselves in one general NGO, 
United Cities and Local Governments, which has observer 
status with the United Nations. 
 
10 See Janne E. Nijman, “Renaissance of the City as Global 
Actor”, in The Transformation of Foreign Policy, ed. Gunther 
Hellmann, Andreas Fahrmeir and Miloš Vec (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 209–41. 
11 Geoffrey Allen Pigman, Contemporary Diplomacy (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 2010), 47. 
12 Alexandra Sizoo and Arne Musch, “City Diplomacy: 
The Role of Local Governments in Conflict Prevention, Peace-
Building and Post-Conflict Reconstruction”, in City Diplomacy, 
ed. Arne Musch, Chris van der Valk, Alexandra Sizoo and 
Kian Tajbakhsh (The Hague: VNG International, 2008), 7–25 
(7), http://bibalex.org/baifa/Attachment/Documents/480503. 
pdf (accessed 25 March 2018). 
Subnational levels of federal nations constitute a 
special case. U.S. states ranging from California and 
Florida to New York and Massachusetts have represen-
tations in various foreign capitals, as do Canadian 
provinces, such as British Columbia, Quebec and 
Ontario. Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and Bavaria are 
other examples of regional diplomatic representation. 
Public diplomacy, treaty-making, transnational part-
nerships and participation in multilateral organiza-
tions and networks are examples of diplomatic activ-
ity by federated entities.13 
While the diplomatic representation of subnation-
al actors is still relatively marginal, it is not farfetched 
to anticipate that their role will be enhanced in 21st 
century diplomacy, considering their critical role in 
the global economy. 
Transnational representation 
Given their enhanced role, transnational actors (TNAs) 
of various kinds – NGOs or civil society organizations, 
advocacy networks, party associations, philanthropic 
foundations, multinational corporations – have be-
gun to claim, and are increasingly granted, represen-
tation in various diplomatic forums. For instance, 
some 3,000 NGOs now have consultative status with 
the Economic and Social Council of the United Na-
tions (ECOSOC), as compared to 41 in 1948. The open-
ness toward NGOs has subsequently spread to other 
parts of the UN system, generating a pattern where 
few or no UN bodies remain entirely closed to TNAs.14 
States and international institutions are engaging 
TNAs as policy experts, service providers, compliance 
watchdogs, and stakeholder representatives. A dataset, 
containing information on formal TNA access to 298 
organizational bodies of 50 international organiza-
tions during the time period 1950–2010, shows that, 
while hardly any of these organizations were open in 
1950, more than 75 percent provide access in 2010.15 
 
13 See David Criekemans, “Regional Sub-State Diplomacy 
from a Comparative Perspective: Quebec, Scotland, Bavaria, 
Catalonia, Wallonia and Flanders”, The Hague Journal of Diplo-
macy 5, no. 1 (January 2010): 37–64; Pigman, Contemporary 
Diplomacy (see note 11), 47. 
14 See Jonas Tallberg and Christer Jönsson, “Transnational 
Actor Participation in International Institutions: Where, 
Why, and with What Consequences?”, in Transnational Actors 
in Global Governance, ed. Christer Jönsson and Jonas Tallberg 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 1–21. 
15 See Jonas Tallberg, Thomas Sommerer, Theresa Squatrito 
and Christer Jönsson, The Opening Up of International Organi-
Christer Jönsson 
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In addition to gaining access to diplomatic forums, 
TNAs can enact diplomatic roles by means of infor-
mal networking. Prominent examples of networking 
between states, NGOs and international organizations 
include the processes leading to the Ottawa Treaty 
in 1997 banning landmines and the creation of the 
International Criminal Court in 2002. In global health 
governance the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has 
emerged as a major player. Actors behind popular 
digital platforms, such as Google and Facebook, have 
a considerable political impact by how they organize 
our access to information. While they have not 
become actively involved in diplomatic processes thus 
far, their central position in today’s world will in-
evitably draw them into the diplomatic realm before 
the end of the century. However, in a passive way, 
these platforms already impact the way diplomacy is 
conducted as well as the international standing of 
diplomats. 
In sum, one may speak of a 
transnational turn in diplomacy. 
In sum, one may speak of a transnational turn in 
diplomacy. Senior diplomats admit that traditional 
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy has been “pro-
gressively supplemented by transnational issues 
which may or may not involve government-to-govern-
ment activity.”16 However, TNA representation is 
problematic. Whereas TNAs typically claim to repre-
sent a ‘global civil society’, a disproportionate num-
ber of them are based in North America or Europe. 
“As of 2007, 66 per cent of the then 3,050 NGOs with 
consultative status at the ECOSOC came from North 
America or Europe.”17 This imbalance seriously re-
duces the legitimacy of their claims to represent the 
underprivileged and give voice to the voiceless. The 
crucial question is whether TNAs from the poor half 
of the world will acquire the necessary resources to 
be represented in international forums in the 21st 
century. 
 
zations: Transnational Access in Global Governance (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
16 Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of 
Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration, 2
nd
 ed. (Lon-
don and New York: Routledge, 2011), 267. 
17 Charlotte Dany, Global Governance and NGO Participation: 
Shaping the Information Society in the United Nations (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2013), 8. 
Conclusion 
Representation is not a simple and static concept, 
but a complex and dynamic one. Changes in the para-
meters of diplomatic representation in the 21st cen-
tury warrant reflection among practitioners and stu-
dents alike. In this chapter, I have pointed to some, 
but by no means all, contemporary issues of represen-
tation. I have raised questions, but have not provided 
any answers. My point is that subtle shifts in the non-
technological foundations of diplomacy need to be 
noted along with the more dramatic changes in infor-
mation technology when discussing the evolution of 
diplomacy in the 21st century. 
As symbolic representatives of states, diplomatic 
agents face challenges in terms of increased vulner-
ability and demands for reflecting multiethnic soci-
eties. The problems of acting for others, discussed 
here, pertain to the changing nature of principals: 
the difference between democratic and authoritarian 
states; and the specific complications associated with 
divided states and populist regimes. 
As for non-state representation, the uncertain 
future development of the EU will determine the 
significance of the supranational challenge, with no 
rival regional diplomatic actors in sight. Subnational 
representation will, in all likelihood, remain of mar-
ginal importance, unless states abandon their diplo-
matic role. For example, the United States’ withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement triggered individual U.S. 
states to become more active in the international cli-
mate regime. The transnational challenge, on the 
other hand, has transformative potential by eroding 
the exclusive cross-border authority of states. 
Representation, in sum, is best understood as a 
process rather than a static relationship. It is a process 
of mutual interaction between principals and agents.18 
Some authors have suggested that the notion of “plas-
tic control”, introduced by Karl Popper to describe the 
relation between two interacting and indeterminate 
systems, may help us to understand this mutual rela-
tionship, at the same time as it points to the difficul-
ties in defining representation in more precise terms.19 
 
18 Sobolewski, “Electors and Representatives” (see note 3), 
106–07. 
19 J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, “Preface”, 
in Representation, ed. Pennock and Chapman (see note 3), 
xiii–xv (xiv). 
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The most fascinating aspect of technological disrup-
tion is its remarkable capacity for both destruction 
and creation. By marginalising or even eliminating 
ways in which people do their work in a specific field 
of activity, new technologies create pervasive con-
ditions for active and enduring resistance against 
them. On the other hand, by laying the groundwork 
for new economic or social opportunities, they also 
stimulate new thinking and innovative practices that 
reinforce and sustain these technologies in the long 
term. The ability of disruptive technologies to en-
trench themselves in society depends, therefore, on 
how the balance between the trends and counter-
trends that they abruptly unleash is ultimately decided. 
This observation may prove particularly valuable for 
understanding the evolution of digital diplomacy and 
the extent to which the recent adoption of digital 
technologies by Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) 
will be able to substantially change the way in which 
diplomacy is practiced, or whether it will have only a 
marginal effect on its mode of operation. 
Two opposing mega-trends are particularly impor-
tant to consider when examining the transformative 
potential of digital technologies on diplomatic rela-
tions. The first mega-trend actively encourages digital 
adoption and is driven by the dual process of rapid 
acceleration of technological disruption, on the one 
hand, and the MFAs commitment to thrive in an 
increasingly competitive environment, on the other 
hand. While it took the telephone 75 years to reach 
100 million users worldwide, the mobile phone and 
its most popular app, Facebook, needed only 16 and 
4 ½ years respectively to pass this milestone.1 Tech-
 
* A Spanish translation of this chapter was published as 
“Diplomacia digital 2.0: tendencias y resistencias” in Revista 
Mexicana de Política Exterior, no. 113 (May–August 2018):  
35–52. 
1 Ralf Dreischmeier, Karalee Close and Philippe Trichet, 
“The Digital Imperative” (The Boston Consulting Group, 2 
nological acceleration thus puts significant pressure 
on MFAs to develop strong capacities for understand-
ing the potential of digital technologies in their 
activity and for devising strategies for mainstreaming 
and tailoring them to short and long-term foreign 
policy objectives. The failure to do so, risks exposing 
MFAs to the problem of not being able to maintain 
their ability to meaningfully influence policy out-
comes in the international arena. Three areas should 
be analysed closer by MFAs as the rate of technologi-
cal disruption accelerates: the context, the process, 
and the structure of the digital diplomatic transfor-
mation. 
Context: From Institutional-based to 
Ecosystem Approaches 
From an institutional perspective, the MFA’s organi-
sational culture constitutes a critical interface for 
digital adaptation and can make a big difference as 
to whether diplomats would perceive digital technol-
ogies as a threat or as an opportunity in their work.2 
However, as the success or failure of technological 
innovations is also dependent on the quality of the 
broader ecosystem that supports them, MFAs would 
also need a better understanding of the technological 
context in which they operate in order to figure out 
which digital trends to follow and which not. The 3G 
mobile technology made possible, for instance, the 
 
March 2015), https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/ 
articles/digital_economy_technology_strategy_digital_ 
imperative/ (accessed 18 July 2018). 
2 Corneliu Bjola, Adapting Diplomacy to the Digital Age: 
Managing the Organisational Culture of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Working Paper, Project “Diplomacy in the 21
st
 Century” 
(Berlin Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2017), 
https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ 
arbeitspapiere/WP_Diplomacy21_No9_Corneliu_Bjola_01. 
pdf (accessed 22 June 2017). 
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development and spread of social media networks. 
The 5G technology, which is due to arrive in just a 
few years, will likely usher in a whole new level of 
technological disruption, which could lead to the mass 
adoption of an entire range of tech tools of growing 
relevance for diplomacy, such as virtual reality (VR) 
and augmented reality (AR) in public diplomacy or 
artificial intelligence in consular services. 
In fact, as Sandre points out, the future is already 
here.3 For example, in May 2016, the Italian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation an-
nounced that it had joined the Google Art Project – 
an online technology platform developed by Google 
to promote and protect culture – to open its art 
collection and virtually display 176 works of art.4 In 
July 2016, NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response 
Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and Romania, with 
support from the Joint Health Agriculture and Food 
Group (JHAFG) and the Civil Protection Group (CPG), 
partnered to organize a disaster response exercise 
using VR to simulate a large-scale emergency situa-
 
3 Andreas Sandre, “2016 in Review: Virtual Reality 
for Digital Diplomacy”, Digital Diplomacy, 2016, https:// 
medium.com/digital-diplomacy/2016-in-review-virtual-
reality-for-digital-diplomacy-b461ac2ff16 (accessed 4 Sep-
tember 2017). 
4 Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Collezione Farnesina”, 
2016, https://artsandculture.google.com/partner/ministero-
affari-esteri (accessed 4 September 2017). 
tion with multiple casualties and the evacuation of 
a large number of people.5 AR has been somewhat 
slower than VR to catch on with the public, but the 
technology is advancing fast6 and should be able to 
generate a steady flow of apps, including for diplo-
macy, relatively quickly. 
The success of the second wave of 
technological disruption will greatly 
depend on the reliability of the eco-
system in which embassies operate. 
Immersive AR systems could prove useful, for in-
stance, for creating highly interactive public diplo-
macy campaigns or for tailoring consular services 
to individual needs, possibly in combination with 
iBeacon technology.7 Artificial intelligence (AI) is also 
making steady progress in consular affairs. At the 
lower end of the complexity scale, chat-bots now 
assist with visa applications, legal aid for refugees, 
and consular registrations.8 More sophisticated algo-
rithms are being developed by MFAs to either advance 
the spread of positive narratives or inhibit online dis-
information and propaganda.9 In sum, the second 
 
5 “Romania Hosts NATO Exercise in a Virtual World” (NATO, 
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dZ3S4OpKlFs& 
feature=youtu.be (accessed 3 September 2017). 
6 Tim Perdue, “Applications of Augmented Reality”, 
Lifewire (updated 20 June 2018), https://www.lifewire.com/ 
applications-of-augmented-reality-2495561 (accessed 18 
July 2018). 
7 Beacons are buttons or links to the physical world: in 
the same way that web pages rely on buttons as a primary 
way for user interaction, beacons are used by apps to trigger 
events and call actions, allowing users to interact with digi-
tal or physical things, such as door locks, discounts, auto-
mation systems or simple notifications. See details at “What 
Is iBeacon?” (Beecon, 2016), http://www.beaconsandwich.com/ 
what-is-ibeacon.html (accessed 1 September 2017). 
8 “Immigration Attorney 2.0” (Visabot, 2016), https:// 
visabot.co/ (accessed 1 June 2017); Elena Cresci, “Chatbot 
That Overturned 160,000 Parking Fines Now Helping Refu-
gees Claim Asylum”, The Guardian, 6 March 2017, https:// 
www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/06/chatbot-
donotpay-refugees-claim-asylum-legal-aid (accessed 7 Sep-
tember 2017); “Most Singaporeans Do Not E-register before 
Travelling”, Channel New Asia, 3 March 2017, http://www. 
channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/most-singaporeans-do-
not-e-register-before-travelling-mfa-8775352 (accessed 6 Sep-
tember 2017). 
9 Simon Cocking, “Using Algorithms to Achieve Digi-
tal Diplomacy”, Irish Tech News, 19 September 2016, http:// 
What’s the difference between  
AR, VR, and MR? 
Augmented reality (AR) adds digital elements to a live 
view often by using the camera on a smartphone. Exam-
ples of augmented reality experiences include Snapchat 
lenses and the game Pokemon Go. Virtual reality (VR) 
implies a complete immersion experience that shuts out 
the physical world. Using VR devices such as HTC Vive, 
Oculus Rift or Google Cardboard, users can be transported 
into a number of real-world and imagined environments 
such as the middle of a squawking penguin colony or 
even the back of a dragon. 
In a mixed reality (MR) experience, which combines 
elements of both AR and VR, real-world and digital ob-
jects interact. Mixed reality technology is just now start-
ing to take off with Microsoft’s HoloLens being one of 
the most notable early mixed reality apparatuses. 
 
Source: see https://www.fi.edu/difference-between-ar-vr-
and-mr 
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wave of technological disruption is already under 
way, but its success will greatly depend on the reli-
ability of the ecosystem in which embassies operate: 
superfast broadband availability, clear strategic 
vision, strong demand for digital services, cost effec-
tiveness, and skilled personnel. 
Process: From Re-action to Pro-action 
Staying ahead of the technological curve will likely 
require a cognitive shift from following to anticipat-
ing and possibly pushing new trends. By reacting to 
the rise of social media, MFAs have managed, for in-
stance, to leverage the power of these tools for max-
imising their role in public diplomacy, crisis com-
munication and diaspora engagement. However, by 
anticipating new trends, they could better operate in 
an increasingly competitive digital environment and 
set the rules and standards of digital practice before 
others have the chance to do it. Pushing new trends 
could also prove highly beneficial, as the ‘first mover’ 
advantage could help digital pioneers to secure extra 
recognition and influence, thus boosting their ‘soft 
power’ credentials as diplomatic leaders and inno-
vators. 
‘Going pro-active’ could happen horizontally, 
when successful digital practices are extended from 
one diplomatic area to another (e.g., by transferring 
techniques of digital listening and engagement used 
in public diplomacy to crisis communication) or ver-
tically, when the input/output value of digital tech-
nologies is maximised (e.g., by making better use of 
big data via predictive analysis and algorithms). For 
example, by mining open-source data from social 
media, satellite imagery and blogs, the Embers project 
sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research 
Projects Activity (IARPA) has generated, since 2012, 
highly accurate forecasts of influenza-like illness case 
counts, rare disease outbreaks, civil unrest, domestic 
political crises, and elections.10 Big data analytics could 
thus become an indispensable tool for embassies for 
getting a comprehensive, in-depth and reliable under-
standing of the local conditions in which they operate 
 
irishtechnews.ie/using-algorithms-to-achieve-digital-
diplomacy-a-conversation-with-elad-ratson-director-of-rd-at-
ministry-of-foreign-affairs/ (accessed 8 September 2017). 
10 “Embers” (Discovery Analytics Center at Virginia Tech, 
2016), http://dac.cs.vt.edu/research-project/embers/ (accessed 
9 September 2017). 
in real-time, which in turn could help them better tai-
lor and fine-tune their bilateral diplomatic approach. 
Structure: From Centralisation to 
‘Network of Networks’ 
A dense digital environment, with a high rate of tech-
nological innovation, favours and rewards creativity 
and experimentation over hierarchy and procedures. 
This means that in order to adapt more effectively to 
technological challenges, MFAs would need to relax 
the constraints of institutional centralisation and 
instead encourage forms and modes of digital inter-
action tailored to the specific profile of its constitu-
tive diplomatic networks. As noted by the authors of 
the Future of Diplomacy Report, the nature of the national 
diplomatic environment is changing from one that 
privileges the role of the MFAs to one which places 
it within a broader construct – that of the national 
diplomatic system (NDS), which covers the complex 
network of governmental and non-governmental 
institutions that inform and shape a country’s inter-
national policy objectives.11 Building on this insight, 
one could argue that MFAs’ digital architecture could 
be best captured by the concept of a digital diplomatic 
system (DDS), which refers to the ‘network of net-
works’ of embassies, consulates, think tanks, private 
companies, international organisations and civil 
society groups that contribute and shape the digital 
diplomatic profile of a country. 
DDS consists of three key layers. The first layer is 
demand driven and connects institutional actors, 
groups and stakeholders that directly benefit from 
digital diplomatic programs. It may include diaspora 
groups in need of good digital consular services, 
embassies in critical spots facing public diplomacy 
challenges, and think tanks providing consultancy to 
MFAs on digital matters. The second layer is functional 
and task-oriented. Diplomatic missions to international 
organisations would benefit, for instance, from close 
collaborative efforts aimed at exploring and testing 
the potential of digital technologies in multilateral 
contexts. Similarly, embassies and consulates based in 
 
11 Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, Shaun Riordan and Paul 
Sharp, Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy for the 21st 
Century (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2012), 53, https://www.clingendael. 
org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20121030_research_melissen.pdf 
(accessed 3 May 2018). 
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conflict-risk regions could share experiences and best 
practices regarding the use of digital technologies 
in crisis situations. The third layer is tech-oriented and 
practice-oriented and seeks to advance digital inno-
vation and dissemination of good practices of digital 
diplomacy. Digital pioneers working in embassies, 
academics researching digital diplomatic practices 
and private IT companies are the most likely nodes 
in this network. The three DDS layers have flexible 
configurations and they may occasionally intersect or 
clash, but they can offer MFAs a much-needed boost 
of forward-thinking creativity and ambition to their 
digital diplomacy objectives and strategies, in a man-
ner that does not require a fundamental rewriting of 
their institutional structure. 
Paradoxically, the success of digitiza-
tion may plant the seeds for the rise of 
a powerful counter-trend to MFAs’ 
efforts to further integrate and insti-
tutionalise digital technologies in 
their work. 
The second mega-trend works in a different direction 
by building resistance against the use of digital tech-
nologies. Unlike the case above, where MFAs are con-
cerned about the risk of missing out on potential op-
portunities created by technological breakthroughs, 
this counter-driver raises questions about whether 
the costs of ‘going digital’ may not actually exceed 
its benefits. Paradoxically, the success of digitization 
may plant the seeds for the rise of a powerful counter-
trend to MFAs’ efforts to further integrate and insti-
tutionalise digital technologies in their work. Emo-
tional contagion, algorithmic determinism and stra-
tegic entropy are three ways in which this counter-
trend is more likely to manifest itself. 
Post-truth: From Fact-based Reasoning to 
Emotional Commodification 
Diplomatic engagement requires a minimum level of 
shared understanding and mutual openness in order 
to work. Such possibility arguably dissipates when 
emotions overwhelmingly frame and dominate the 
discourse by which opinions are formed online, and 
when facts are pushed into a secondary or marginal 
position. Emotional commodification (i.e., deliberate 
amplification of emotional content in the online dis-
course) has become a regular pattern of engagement 
on social media platforms as it helps digital influ-
encers control the scope and direction of the online 
conversation. Posts connected with high-arousal emo-
tions, whether positive or negative, have greater viral 
potential than those containing low-arousal emo-
tions.12 At the same time, emotional valence (i.e., the 
degree of positivity or negativity of an emotion) can 
trigger, by over-exposure, desired reactions from the 
audience.13 Emotional commodification has negative 
implications for digital diplomacy for two reasons. 
First, it enables the formation of echo-chambers, 
whereby MFAs and embassies end up “preaching 
to the choir” of sympathetic online followers, thus 
failing to reach constituencies outside the self-re-
inforcing “digital bubble” of like-minded followers.14 
Second, it favours a ‘post-truth’ environment in which 
‘fake news’ and disinformation thrive, thus making 
more difficult for digital diplomats to articulate their 
message and engage with their audience or to defend 
themselves against defamatory claims. 
As the connection between emotions and social 
media becomes stronger and more sophisticated, the 
question of how digital diplomats can adapt to an 
emotionally charged form of social communication 
can no longer be ignored. The concept of digital emo-
tional intelligence (DEI) might offer a solution. First 
developed by Salovey and Sluyter, DEI covers four 
distinct dimensions, namely, the ability: 
1. To perceive or experience emotions accurately, 
2. To use emotional information to facilitate thought 
and action, 
3. To understand the meaning and significance of 
emotions, and 
4. To manage emotions in one’s self and others.15 
 
12 Neil Davidson, “What Are the Key Emotional Triggers 
for Online Video?” (MWP Digital Media, 4 December 2013), 
https://mwpdigitalmedia.com/blog/key-emotional-triggers-
online-video/ (accessed 18 July 2018). 
13 Emilio Ferrara and Zeyao Yang, “Measuring Emotional 
Contagion in Social Media”, PLOS ONE 10, no. 11 (November 
2015), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/ 
journal.pone.0142390 (accessed 18 July 2018). 
14 Corneliu Bjola, “Digital Diplomacy and the Bubble 
Effect: The NATO Scenario” (Los Angeles: USC Center on 
Public Diplomacy, 8 March 2016), http://uscpublicdiplomacy. 
org/blog/digital-diplomacy-and-bubble-effect-nato-scenario 
(accessed 17 June 2017). 
15 Peter Salovey and David J. Sluyter, Emotional Development 
and Emotional Intelligence: Educational Implications (New York: 
Basic Books, 1997). 
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DEI cannot prevent the formation of echo-cham-
bers or the dissemination of digital propaganda, but 
it can help social media users to better cope with 
them. For example, DEI can help digital users better 
discriminate between genuine vs. false emotional ex-
pressions, facilitate a better understanding of how 
emotions affect their thinking, enable them to recog-
nise the sources and implications of their emotions, 
and regulate their level of detachment or engagement 
to an emotional trigger in a particular situation. Pay-
ing close attention to how genuinely and intensely 
people feel about a particular situation in their online 
communication can help avoid embarrassing moments 
with potentially disruptive implications for bilateral 
relations. In short, DEI could facilitate careful digital 
navigation through emotion-laden situations and 
steer the conversation back on a path informed by 
fact-based reasoning. MFAs and governments should 
therefore invest in the education of their staff to be 
better equipped to navigate this digital environment. 
Automation: From Relationship-building 
to Robo-trolling 
MFAs’ interest in digital technologies primarily lies 
with their capacities to reach out to online influencers 
and develop multiple networks of engagement with 
and across a variety of constituencies. By ‘going digi-
tal’, the once secretive and exclusive domain of the 
elite has also gone public, requiring diplomats to 
regularly look outside their once closed doors, and 
perhaps more importantly, for the first time, allowing 
citizens to look in.16 Being able to reach out to mil-
lions of people, directly and in real-time thus repre-
sents a remarkable opportunity for MFAs to redefine 
themselves in the Digital Age, including by building 
strong relationships with foreign publics. This ability 
could nevertheless be severely tested and even com-
promised by the growing use of algorithms as instru-
ments of conversation monitoring, agenda setting and 
message dissemination. Recent studies have shown 
that up to 15 percent of Twitter accounts are in fact 
bots rather than people, and this number is bound to 
increase in the future.17 One could safely argue that 
 
16 Corneliu Bjola and Jennifer Cassidy, “Gone Digital: Digi-
tal Diplomacy at the University of Oxford”, Border Crossing 1, 
no. 2 (2015): 10–12 (10). 
17 Michael Newberg, “As Many as 48 Million Twitter 
Accounts Aren’t People, Says Study”, CNBC, 10 March 2017, 
whenever AI entities overtake humans in the popu-
lation of digital users, the possibility of MFAs and 
embassies to develop meaningful relationships with 
online publics drastically decreases. 
Furthermore, it is not only the presence of algo-
rithms that may hinder digital diplomatic inter-
actions, but also the purpose for which they are used. 
Intriguingly, the ‘dark side’ of digital technologies 
(e.g., disinformation, propaganda and infowar tactics) 
has proved to be the most fertile ground for the pro-
liferation of bots. A recent report produced by the 
NATO’s Strategic Center of Excellence in Latvia has 
found, for instance, that the ‘Twitter conversation’ 
about NATO-related news is mainly bots talking to 
other bots, bots promoting third-party content and 
bots incrementally building more believable pro-
files.18 Some also fear that AI could soon make it 
easier for adversaries to divide and dishearten alli-
ances, for example, by undermining trust among 
countries fighting on the same side and by discredit-
ing their intelligence.19 While these developments 
have a predominant intelligence and military profile, 
they nevertheless have important diplomatic reper-
cussions, as their use is mainly tailored to tearing 
down political institutions and diplomatic relation-
ships, not building them up. 
It is also important to remind 
ourselves that digital diplomacy is 
not supposed to be an end in itself, 
but rather to inform and serve 
foreign policy objectives. 
Robo-trolling (i.e., use of algorithms for content 
promotion and/or disruption) is now part of the digi-
tal landscape and without new rules by which the 
anonymity of social media users can be removed, it 
is likely to remain so. Digital diplomats may not be 
therefore able to prevent AI from disrupting their 
 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/10/nearly-48-million-twitter-
accounts-could-be-bots-says-study.html (accessed 12 Septem-
ber 2017). 
18 Donald N. Jensen and Michal Harmata, “What to Expect 
when You’re Expecting Bots?” (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
European Policy Analysis, 2017), http://infowar.cepa.org/EN/ 
what-to-expect-when-youre-expecting-bots (accessed 9 Sep-
tember 2017). 
19 Tomáš Valášek, “How Artificial Intelligence Could Dis-
rupt Alliances” (Carnegie Europe, 31 August 2017), https:// 
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relationship building activities, but they may contain 
some of its negative ramifications. The “Three A’s” 
(activity, anonymity, and amplification) – techniques 
of bot and botnet discovery and identification20 – 
should, for instance, be widely disseminated through 
the digital diplomatic system to increase awareness 
and resistance against possible sources of manipu-
lation. At the same time, MFAs may deploy AI tools 
themselves, such as Google’s Perspective as a way of 
reducing the pressure on their limited resources for 
mapping and filtering abusive comments that disrupt 
their online conversation.21 In more serious situa-
tions, when the robo-trolling crosses the threshold 
of disinformation into aggressive propaganda and 
infowar, more sophisticated measures of digital con-
tainment would need to be considered. The goals 
would be supporting media literacy and source criti-
cism, encouraging institutional resilience, and pro-
moting a clear and coherent strategic narrative 
capable of containing the threat from inconsistent 
counter-messaging.22 
Strategic Entropy: From Digital Outputs 
to Policy Outcomes 
It is also important to remind ourselves that digital 
diplomacy is not supposed to be an end in itself, but 
rather to inform and serve foreign policy objectives. 
The disruptive character of technological break-
throughs may lead, however, at least in the initial 
stage, to a decoupling of digital diplomacy from for-
eign policy. Quick adoption of digital tools without 
an overarching strategy of how they should be used 
in support of certain foreign policy objectives is likely 
to create problems of policy coordination and imple-
mentation. Digital enthusiasts working in embassies 
may seek to push ahead with experimentation and 
 
20 Ben Nimmo, “#BotSpot: Twelve Ways to Spot a Bot” 
(Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, 2017), 
https://medium.com/dfrlab/botspot-twelve-ways-to-spot-a-bot-
aedc7d9c110c (accessed 11 September 2017). 
21 Jigsaw, “Perspective”, 2017, https://www.perspectiveapi. 
com (accessed 11 September 2017); Murgia Madhumita, 
“Google Launches Robo-tool to Flag Hate Speech Online”, 
Financial Times, 23 February 2017, https://www.ft.com/ 
content/8786cce8-f91e-11e6-bd4e-68d53499ed71 (accessed 
11 September 2017). 
22 Corneliu Bjola and James Pamment, “Digital Contain-
ment: Revisiting Containment Strategy in the Digital Age”, 
Global Affairs 2, no. 2 (2016): 131–42. 
innovation, especially in public diplomacy, and with 
varying degrees of success. At the same time, MFA 
‘mandarins’ facing budgetary and bureaucratic pres-
sures to demonstrate ‘value for money’ may seek to 
slow down the process of digital adoption and to align 
it to the pace of foreign policy making. The risk for 
MFAs entailed by the ‘tug of war’ between digital 
enthusiasts and sceptics is to find themselves either 
running underfunded digital campaigns with no clear 
direction or strategic compass, or uncritically embrac-
ing rigid ‘diplometric’ models, predominantly quanti-
tative, for designing and assessing the success of digi-
tal activities. In both cases, the result is likely to be 
the same: a middle-ground approach that would 
neither promote innovative digital outputs as favoured 
by enthusiasts nor reliably inform foreign policy out-
comes as advocated by sceptics. 
One way in which this tension could be mitigated 
is by drawing on the output vs. outcome distinction in 
public policy analysis so as to separate means (what 
digital diplomacy does) from results (what digital dip-
lomacy accomplishes).23 Outputs reflect on-going con-
sequences of digital activities, while outcomes cover 
broader influences of the digital outputs on policy 
objectives. As argued elsewhere, it makes sense to 
prioritise the impact of digital outputs at the expense 
of policy outcomes, when digital activities involve 
complex operations, large audiences, and lengthy 
periods of implementation, as it may often happen 
in digital public diplomacy.24 In such cases, if quanti-
tatively strong outputs (content, reach, engagement) 
are generated in a consistent fashion, then one would 
expect positive policy outcomes (e.g., perception 
changes in the target audience) to follow as well at 
some point. On the other hand, digital engagements 
are more conducive to informing outcome-based 
strategies, when they involve conventional opera-
tions, with small or medium-size audiences, requiring 
short periods of implementation. Consular crisis com-
munication is particularly amenable to this approach 
since the goal of assisting nationals in times of terror-
ist attacks or natural disasters with timely and accu-
rate information (output) about how to protect them-
selves from harm during crises (outcome) is a relatively 
 
23 Peter Knoepfel, Corinne Larrue, Michael Hill and 
Frédéric Varone, Public Policy Analysis (Bristol: Bristol Uni-
versity Press, 2011), 11. 
24 Corneliu Bjola, “Getting Digital Diplomacy Right: What 
Quantum Theory Can Teach Us about Measuring Impact”, 
Global Affairs 2, no. 3 (2016): 345–53. 
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straightforward strategy in which digital outputs 
are informed by and assessed against tangible policy 
goals. In sum, managing strategic entropy is a matter 
of understanding how to prioritise and balance digital 
outputs vs. policy outcomes. 
To conclude, the future of digital diplomacy lies 
within the ability of MFAs to exploit the opportuni-
ties generated by technological disruption, while 
guarding itself against the potential pitfalls that its 
early success might create. If technological accelera-
tion will be seen as an opportunity for ecosystem-
based, pro-active, and network-oriented adaptation, 
then digital diplomacy is likely to penetrate the deep 
core of the diplomatic DNA. If, on the other hand, 
digitization fails to restrain emotional contagion, 
algorithmic determinism and strategic entropy, then 
MFAs will likely slow down their efforts to integrate 
digital technologies in their work. 
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A debate on the impact of digitization on diplomatic 
practice is currently taking place in most of the world’s 
diplomatic services. This debate serves as a reminder 
of how important it is to continue discerning the 
political significance of digital technologies in diplo-
macy and to confront the emerging reality of diplo-
matic engagement in a digitized world, rather than 
focusing exclusively on applying digital tools to 
existing practices. In 2016 and 2017, illicit electronic 
intervention in democratic elections and referenda in 
Europe and the United States has turned the issue of 
digital diplomacy’s ‘weaponization’ into headline 
news. In just a couple of years the dominant tone in 
the narrative on digital diplomacy has transformed 
from one of optimism about social media’s mobiliza-
tion potential and a boost for democratization, to one 
of gloominess about ‘fake news’ and the stealthy 
intrusion in social media conversations by bots and 
trolls controlled from authoritarian countries. U.S.-
based tech giants are accused of ethically question-
able trade in personal data harvested from social 
networking sites, whilst the influence operations 
of the UK-based company Cambridge Analytica have 
caused alarm about the commercial behaviour of 
web developers in the social and political realm. More 
than five years after the social media optimism asso-
ciated with the Arab Spring, some ministries of for-
eign affairs (MFAs) that wanted to be seen as early 
social media adopters may wonder whether they have 
rushed into the social media domain without suf-
ficient critical reflection. 
Rather than joining current affairs commentary on 
the impact of social media in international politics, 
we will, in this chapter, first turn to literature that 
can help throw a light on underlying issues. We take 
a close look at new media studies to add to our under-
standing of the role of digital technologies as media 
and infrastructures to current diplomatic processes. It 
is our aim to inform the study of diplomacy as well as 
diplomatic practice with relevant theoretical insights 
and conceptualizations from this field. We conclude 
with general policy recommendations for MFAs. 
Technology and Diplomatic Practice 
Agreement on essential terminology and a shared 
understanding of core concepts matters – and is not 
just relevant for academics. Reminiscent of references 
to ‘soft power’ in the past 25 years, by politicians and 
diplomats as much as scholars, basic terminology in 
the digital diplomacy debate is used rather loosely. In 
this context of changing practices, we need to reflect 
on the depth and extent of digital technology, first 
as a new medium for states and other international 
actors to communicate and conduct relations, and 
secondly as a condition. The digital age is increasingly 
permeating the way in which new generations experi-
ence their life and work. 
Before arriving at conclusions about the impact of 
technological change in the practice of international 
relations, it is worthwhile to continue reflecting on 
the capacities of these new technologies. It is safe to 
suggest that many MFAs’ initiatives aimed at encour-
aging the use of social media have been insufficiently 
grounded in an analysis of digital technologies in 
terms of what they bring to modern literacy and to 
the conditions in which diplomacy is now practiced. 
Comprising these conditions are the underlying tech-
niques that constitute digital technologies, whether 
they are referred to generally as algorithms or to other 
types of computational systems, including search 
engines, recommenders or newsfeeds. Benefitting 
from the mediatory capacity of digitization and data-
fication practices, these techniques have become 
ubiquitous access points to culture, politics and eco-
nomic activities. Designing these and other pieces of 
software grants tech actors a powerful political im-
pact in how they formalize, organize and repurpose 
information and cultural capital today. 
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This invites the field of digital diplomacy to inter-
rogate how digital technologies go about redesigning 
one’s access to processes relevant to diplomacy. Just 
as Facebook may have altered one’s access to social 
life, political action and the marketplace of ideas, 
other tech actors and their platforms have leverage 
in redesigning several processes that constitute inter-
national relations. The potential of new technologies 
to assist knowledge management combined with the 
potential of big data concerning intricate issue areas 
and for the purposes of forecasting, are bound to have 
a great impact on diplomacy’s chief function: inter-
national negotiation. Human decisions will remain 
as important as ever and data do not speak; but acting 
upon how data and the ideas they constitute are or-
ganized by important algorithmic systems and plat-
form affordances may add to ‘the art of negotiation’ 
and involve a great deal of complexity management. 
In this sense, we see in the broader realm of cul-
tural relations how digital culture impacts on trans-
national exchange and conditions for the creation of 
new ideas in ways that interplay with international 
and domestic public consensus. New warfare tactics 
used by Russian military intelligence during the U.S. 
2016 presidential elections have in fact directly 
tapped into this question by interplaying with popu-
larity and attention metrics as they distributed sen-
sational, ‘fake’ news to feed into partisan divide on 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. The influence of 
digital platforms in the fields of culture and social 
relations may equally mean that they are of greater 
relevance to increasingly ‘societized’ diplomatic 
practices, ones that include diverse stakeholders 
and address a variety of non-traditional issues on the 
international agenda. Concretely, such societized 
diplomacy results in new dynamics in government-
society relations and, arguably, more domestically 
oriented MFAs. 
Many international challenges of our time have 
acquired some kind of digital dimension, such that 
their corresponding technologies provide a platform 
for social, political and economic activities that could 
be understood as being computationally formalized. 
It is one thing to assess Facebook as a vector of diplo-
matic messages. Another aspect would be to assess 
the self-same politics partly as products of the plat-
form mechanisms that process and organize them as 
data – or indeed to assess platform mechanisms and 
other algorithms as political processes in their own 
right. Doing so may invite diplomats to locate various 
issues relevant to foreign policy within their respec-
tive technical context. For example, to what extent 
do information filtering systems such as YouTube’s 
recommender follow EU guidelines to distribute 
and ‘recommend’ videos in a pluralistic and diverse 
fashion? Possible answers to this question touch 
directly upon how the systematic organization of in-
formation through algorithms constitutes the means 
through which political solutions may be applied. 
Facebook and Google have already been attempting to 
tackle problems such as filter bubbles and fake news 
from a technical standpoint – yet, they may greatly 
benefit from the perspective of those specialized in 
interpreting and resolving the nature of such issues, 
such as conflict and misinformation. Diplomats are 
in a unique place not just to offer their expertise, but 
also to formulate their own political philosophy of 
computational foreign policy by moulding values, 
strategies and processes proper to their field into 
information and information-organizing systems. 
Such initiatives may come across as naïve for ex-
pecting too much of companies driven by private 
gains and peculiar platform business models. But it is 
this very problem that pushes public policy makers 
to balance the public responsibility of tech actors and 
their patented systems, both widely originating from 
the United States, precisely by inviting the actors that 
design them to share a continuous, collaborative 
responsibility with foreign, public counterparts. This 
collaborative responsibility would be facilitated 
by diplomats attuned to the technical and political 
dimensions of the issues that such systems reproduce. 
Digital Literacy and Awareness 
in Diplomacy 
As mentioned above, pessimism and the extent to which 
misuse of social media complicates international rela-
tionships seem to have become dominant in recent 
debates about digital diplomacy. We maintain never-
theless that, because they provide one with additional 
capacities to put ideas and policy into (technical) prac-
tice, digital technologies should above all be recog-
nized as a source of creativity for diplomats. Their 
relevance comes above all from their capacities as 
media, and, in this sense, as grounds for new litera-
cies. They can be more than simply using available 
devices and services such as email, Twitter or Face-
book. Digital technologies can be compared to writing 
and speech in that they allow users or ‘writers’ to col-
lect, organize and repurpose information on various 
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aspects of reality, whether it be data about or from 
individual users, objects, institutions, or from more 
complex processes. Digital literacy would then range 
from engaging with ready-made software as a user all 
the way to coding it, gaining leverage over how users 
shall access it and what it allows one to do with it. 
The so-called ‘digital divide’ may then not be just 
one between populations that have or lack the means 
to access these technologies, but also one between 
more or less ‘digitally literate’ citizens and govern-
ance. Big powers, small non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and diplomatic actors of any kind could 
employ programming languages as tools to opera-
tionalize data by way of realizing certain interests 
and objectives in the form of usable software for 
public usage or techniques designed for internal pur-
poses, whether they be for reference (for example, 
with data analysis), communication or other pro-
grammable purposes. In the same way that certain 
companies conceive of sociality, transportation or 
marketing in terms of information and information 
systems, digital diplomacy would invite policy to 
conceive of entities, processes, strategies and values 
relevant to diplomacy at least partly as computational 
entities. Digital literacy would then also refer to the 
ability to take on computation as a form of govern-
ance attuned to contemporary instruments of power, 
such as software. Adopting these means to digital 
literacy is what allows an institution such as diplo-
macy to exercise active decision-making with tech-
nical actors and towards the programs and data that 
touch upon their craft. 
One of the challenges lies in conceiv-
ing of ways to mediate the interests of 
tech actors and public actors. 
Thus, digital literacy would equally amount to the 
individual ability to make an informed assessment 
of how these technologies are designed, and in what 
terms diplomats can approach those that design 
them: tech actors. The value of approaching them lies 
in gaining access to information about how their sys-
tems work, what they do with data tied to issues at 
stake for MFAs, and in negotiating ways to alter their 
systems, the collection and curation of platform-
owned data in ways favourable to all actors affected 
by those issues. One of the challenges, here, would lie 
in conceiving of ways to mediate the interests of tech 
actors, whose primary goal is to think in terms of 
product design, and public actors, who would in most 
cases advance the causes of several normative ques-
tions. Ultimately, combining essentially technical and 
political rationales is what the deliberative process 
of digital diplomats could come down to. Part of this 
process entails proposing how tech actors could for-
malize the normative values that drive the agenda 
of diplomacy as computational values – an exercise 
that may well invite diplomats and their tech actors 
into a joint deliberation. 
MFAs have therefore started thinking about the 
fundamental implications of digital transformation 
for the physical structures of their headquarters and 
embassies. Following the private sector and other gov-
ernment departments, they are currently enhancing 
their capacity to take advantage of big data analysis 
in the interests of foreign policy-making. A challenge 
for foreign policy bureaucracies steeped in centuries 
of diplomatic tradition is that they lack the intuitive, 
post-disciplinary, ‘native’ character of some NGOs and 
companies that are thriving with the investment and 
management of data. What may lie further ahead is 
that MFAs re-conceptualize diplomacy as the manage-
ment of complexity as much as the management of 
international relations. 
The Softwarization of Diplomatic Practice 
Many practitioners appear to see ‘digital diplomacy’ 
almost uniquely as an extension of public diplomacy. 
Within this restricted understanding of the purposes 
of digital diplomacy, the decreasing trust in informa-
tion, the privacy concerns of internet users, and 
the mobility across platforms of young generations 
amount to new challenges for MFA communication 
departments. There is however the need to take a 
broader look and analyse digital technologies as me-
diating political processes. Diplomatic engagement 
with digital technologies and the utilization of soft-
ware for diplomatic purposes is thus to be based on 
an understanding of the political significance of tech-
nicality. The relationship between individual diplo-
mats and digital technology suggests a different his-
tory than the way in which predecessors have adopted 
the use of the telephone (to call), the typewriter (to 
write), the telegraph (to send encrypted messages) and 
the personal computer (to write, store, organize and 
send information). 
To be sure, the advent of social media has shown 
entirely new dynamics in the relationship between 
diplomacy and technology. Over the past years, many 
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MFAs have invested a great deal in introducing them-
selves to the social media phenomenon and have 
started making use of its potential in more and more 
areas of foreign policy. Following the Arab Spring, a 
variety of international crises between 2011 and 2015 
were major learning opportunities for governments. 
In a relatively short time span, social media have 
become indispensable in the delivery of key MFA 
functions such as public diplomacy and assistance 
to nationals abroad. 
The way in which digital technologies are currently 
used is often fundamentally similar to the incorpora-
tion of various types of ‘machines’ in 19th and 20th 
century diplomatic practice: diplomats use what tech-
nology offers and is designed to do. Yet, as previously 
mentioned, part of understanding the digital dimen-
sions of diplomacy today is to make use of digital 
technologies as metamedia: media that can be used 
actively and imaginatively to create yet more media, 
such as software. They offer ready-to-use products 
such as computers and other hands-on devices, but 
they also provide the means to create software that 
is tailored to internal or proactive diplomatic needs. 
This seems to be the case with what Uber does for 
transportation, Airbnb for the hospitality industry, 
Google for documentation, YouTube for filmmaking, 
Spotify for music, and Facebook and Twitter for per-
sonal relations, political careers and political activism. 
The influence of these platforms resides partly in 
their organizing and systematizing of digitized data 
and the transnational mediation of content, whether 
it is in the form of culture, ideas, knowledge, rela-
tions or capital. Such is the power of the daily bread-
and-butter in the ‘walled gardens’ of Google (using 
its PageRank algorithm), Twitter (selling algorithms 
to private-sector clients doing business in personal 
data with governments), YouTube (the second largest 
engine on the web) and Facebook (at the centre of the 
debate about the ethical practices of commercial tech 
giants and the need to tame the influence of the cor-
porate sector). There is now growing awareness that 
the mediation capacity of these platforms as controlled 
informational environments is as relevant to the 
world of diplomacy as it is to the commercial sector. 
One important consequence of these fast-moving 
developments is that the governance of the digital 
realm needs to catch up. Although not analysed here, 
reigning in undesirable practices is a collective respon-
sibility of national governments, digital platforms 
and end-users, which requires innovative forms of 
governance. 
More than a Search for Attention Online 
In terms of the kinds of skills needed by foreign 
policy actors, there is little doubt that the multifaceted 
nature of the digitization of diplomatic practice 
amounts to the largest upskilling exercise in the his-
tory of diplomacy. For many future diplomats the 
most important learning will consist of critical knowl-
edge and the use of software and other technical, but 
no less political, elements constituting digital technol-
ogies. From user-friendly interfaces to codes and algo-
rithms, it is this design that they need to examine, 
critique, and improve in the interests of enhancing 
policy capacity. 
The technical aspects of everything 
digital are profoundly political. 
The technical aspects of everything digital are 
profoundly political, as debates about foreign inter-
ference in the 2016 and 2017 U.S. and European elec-
tion campaigns and the 2018 public outrage about 
Cambridge Analytica’s practices have made abun-
dantly clear. Much more remains hidden in the ex-
panding realm where diplomacy and intelligence 
increasingly overlap. Common sense in the digital 
age therefore dictates that diplomats should remain 
critical of real-life actors behind software, of their 
intentions and of how they pursue their aims, and to 
what effect. Politics happens at the earliest stages of 
the design of software used in the context of inter-
national relationships. In recent years, some western 
governments have lost their relative innocence. They 
follow the lead of more astute countries – ranging 
from Russia to Sudan and Israel to Iran – as well as 
non-governmental actors working in the interests of 
a better world, or engaged in violent action and with 
contested motives, such as terrorist groups or rebel 
movements. 
Individual diplomats need concepts 
to critique and comprehend tech-
nicality as a medium for diplomatic 
strategy and policy implementation. 
Digital diplomacy is then not so much an active 
and continuous search for attention online, as it is 
in a lot of public diplomacy. The practices of digital 
communication and outreach to foreign and domestic 
audiences do in fact seem to have disrupted public 
diplomacy to an extent that deserves urgent examina-
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tion. As to critical digital diplomacy: it constitutes 
diplomatic engagement with how culture, informa-
tion and relations are systematized in software, such 
as with the counteracting of algorithms that do not 
work in one’s favour. Mechanisms constituting digital 
technologies can be actively used as tools to opera-
tionalize political and diplomatic interests. The chal-
lenge for MFAs is thus to explore all of this and put 
it into practice. Individual diplomats are in need of 
concepts to critique and comprehend technicality as 
a medium for diplomatic strategy and policy imple-
mentation. After all, contemporary diplomacy is al-
ready enacted in rapidly changing landscapes where 
new technological tools impact on the nature of inter-
national relationships. 
Five Policy Recommendations 
1. Diplomats should realize that digital diplomacy 
constitutes engagement with how culture, informa-
tion and relations are systematized in software, such 
as with the counteracting of algorithms that do not 
work in one’s favour. 
2. As diplomacy is increasingly enacted in a digital 
environment, diplomats should be critical of real-life 
actors behind software, of their intentions and how 
they pursue their aims, and to what effect. 
3. MFAs that have the capability to create software 
for diplomatic purposes but do not yet do so are at a 
disadvantage in comparison with more astute 
counterparts and non-governmental actors. 
4. Mechanisms constituting digital technologies 
can be used as a medium to operationalize political 
and diplomatic interests. 
5. Diplomats may act as mediators between plat-
form actors and all others affected by platform sys-
tems and data, honing a capacity to invite a dialogue 
between technical and normative interests. 
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The number of organized and institutionalized actors 
actively participating in the international sector is 
steadily increasing. Synchronously (although the pub-
lic was not traditionally concerned with foreign policy) 
sections of the public interconnect on national and 
international levels.. In addition, new partly-, pseudo- 
or quasi-governmental actors have come along. I 
will make six observations, drawing mainly from the 
German experience. The expansion of the diplomatic 
sphere predominantly relates to the foreign policy 
of the European member states. This is not a coinci-
dence, since particularly intense communication is 
taking place between member states of the European 
Union (EU). Via this communication, the boundaries 
between domestic and foreign policy as well as be-
tween national, intergovernmental and international 
politics begin to blur. Thus this communication acts 
as an agent of continuous change for diplomacy, per-
haps more so than elsewhere. 
1. New Forms of Communication 
The way foreign policy is conducted needs to adapt 
continuously. Situations involving crisis and conflict 
in particular require intense communication among 
all involved parties. In such situations, a daily ex-
change of ideas between the capitals implicated in 
reaching a solution is the rule rather than the excep-
tion. Which capitals will be involved in the commu-
nication depends on the relevance of the individual 
states and their leaders to the solution of the prob-
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lem. In Europe, Berlin will very often be one of the 
involved capitals. 
Due to Germany’s weight, Berlin will in the future 
communicate even more with other capitals as well 
as with EU institutions. However, simply because 
of time constraints, it will not always be possible to 
equally inform all member states of the EU. German 
diplomacy is aware of this problem and therefore 
endeavours to include particularly the smaller EU 
member states during the process, or at least after-
wards. This inclusive effort mitigates the problem of 
asymmetrical influence between larger and smaller 
states, but is not enough to solve it. 
New forms of communication such as email, video 
calls, and direct messaging, the overall reinforced in-
tensity of communication, as well as time constraints 
all lead to an increase in verbal exchange outside 
of formal reporting channels, especially in times of 
crisis. The availability of new communication path-
ways changes the mode of operation within foreign 
ministries and with the chancellery as well as among 
other ministries. Within the EU it changes in particu-
lar the role of embassies. During immediate and time-
sensitive cases, communication increasingly takes 
place directly between capitals. Consequently, bi-
lateral embassies in EU member states have become 
ever more marginalised participants in these pro-
cesses, or are not involved at all. This leads to a change 
in the functioning of embassies within the EU: on 
the one hand, they increasingly accompany direct 
negotiations between governments, on the other 
hand, they partially undertake what traditionally has 
been staff work. In this way, they prepare the talks 
contentwise, as was previously done by the minis-
tries’ bureaus. 
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2. New Competencies at the Top 
Operational Level 
Within the EU, heads of government, foreign minis-
ters, and specialized ministers meet frequently. Not 
merely the formal meetings of heads of government 
or specialized ministers, but also the numerous other 
formal and informal bi- and multilateral meetings. At 
these meetings opinions are expressed and agreements 
are reached that relativize the coordinating function 
of the foreign ministries in European affairs. Whether 
a transfer of the coordinating role of the foreign min-
istry to the chancellery would solve the problem or 
only relocate it needs to be determined in the future. 
It is conceivable that as a result, work on substance – 
particularly in the most politically important areas – 
will also be drawn into the realm of the chancellery. 
3. Interministerial Exchange in the 
European Union 
In addition, all relevant federal ministries in Germany 
have established task forces concerning international 
and European policy aspects of their ministries. Staff 
members in these task forces are often ‘borrowed’ 
from the foreign ministry. However, the fact of hav-
ing personnel from the foreign ministry does not 
prevent individual ministries from developing direct 
working relations with their partners in other Euro-
pean capitals and at the EU level. This influences the 
substantive work as well and complicates the effec-
tiveness of national coordination of the European 
policy by the foreign ministry. Official representation 
of federal states at the EU is functioning similarly. 
4. The Impact of European 
‘Party Families’ 
All parties represented in the German Bundestag 
belong to European associations of similar and/or 
like-minded parties. In the case of the newly created 
Alternative for Germany (AfD) Europe-wide coordination 
of anti-European parties has only just begun. Many of 
these parties belong to parliaments or governments 
on national levels. Often, members of the European 
Commission proclaim their affiliation to one of these 
‘party families’. Most parties in the European Parlia-
ment regard themselves as a parliamentary arm of 
such a ‘party family’. 
The role of party associations on the European 
level is significantly weaker than the role of national 
parties. However, party associations are effective as 
transnational networks and as instruments giving 
still predominantly national politics a transnational 
frame. They particularly influence personnel deci-
sions at the European Commission and other Euro-
pean institutions. In that respect, national and 
European politicians can exert influence in this area. 
Thanks to their functions in their parties, heads of 
government, foreign ministries, and leading opposi-
tion politicians are frequently involved in these Euro-
pean networks. Diplomats are often affected by the 
agreements thus made, but are seldom involved and 
sometimes insufficiently informed. Although the 
politicization of civil service can thereby (rightly) be 
avoided, it may happen that diplomats learn too late 
about such agreements, and so miss out on knowl-
edge essential for their analyses, reports, and recom-
mendations. Due to the informal nature of these 
kinds of meetings and agreements, so far very few 
studies have examined their role. 
5. The ‘Nebenaußenpolitik’ 
(Parallel Foreign Policy) of Parties 
In Germany, in the context of the conflict concerning 
the NATO Double-Track Decision in the decade before 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a public dispute 
regarding what was then called ‘Nebenaußenpolitik’ 
(parallel foreign policy) by the Social Democratic Party. 
This referred to the cooperation between Social 
Democratic Parties in Scandinavia, the Benelux coun-
tries, and Germany (so-called Euro-Lux or Scandia-
Lux), among other things. It served as a coordinating 
platform for the parties’ position regarding the NATO 
Double-Track Decision, and subsequent negotiations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Trans-
national coordination of foreign and security policy 
through parties is often at odds with the political 
intentions of respective national governments. How-
ever, such transnational processes may be considered 
part of the logic of an increasing and a legitimate con-
vergence between member states of the EU. With the 
decreasing role of large political parties and the dis-
solution of party affiliation amongst the electorate in 
general, the ‘Nebenaußenpolitik’ by parties seems to 
be replaced more and more by a similar process with 
other actors such as NGOs (for example, their role 
concerning the U.N. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
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Development). Therefore, ‘Nebenaußenpolitik’ in a 
much wider sense might well be a future-orientated 
element of German and European foreign policy, 
which corresponds with the multiplication of actors, 
who all exert their influence on foreign policy. 
6. The Influence of National Parliaments 
Finally: Foreign policy is traditionally seen as the 
prerogative of the executive branch. Academically, 
the influence of parliaments is often assessed with 
reference to the division between executive and legis-
lative branches along the lines prescribed by state 
constitutions. The prerogatives of parliaments consti-
tute their ‘hard power’.  
Beyond their own competences, 
parliaments also possess soft power. 
However, beyond that they also possess ‘soft power’: 
their influence on political opinion-building. This is 
true of the German Bundestag and also applies to 
the still undervalued European Parliament. It even ex-
tends to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, although that still has limited competences. 
There is only one institution in the transatlantic 
relationship whereby members of parliament on both 
sides of the Atlantic can regularly meet for an intense 
dialogue regarding foreign and security policy issues: 
the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO. It has no com-
petences, but might be used in the future for influ-
encing political opinion-building in the parliaments 
of the member states of NATO – a role it has occa-
sionally assumed in the past. 
One outstanding concrete example demonstrates 
how the Parliamentary Assembly can exert influence. 
Several years before the German Federal Government 
and the U.S. Administration agreed upon the enlarge-
ment of NATO to the East, and long before a majority 
for it emerged in the U.S. Congress and the German 
Bundestag, Volker Rühe and others endorsed the NATO 
enlargement to the East. All of them campaigned for 
it in Europe and in the United States, creating a task 
force focusing on the substance of a concept for NATO 
enlargement, and drafting different models of NATO, 
including the question of the deployment of troops 
and nuclear weapons. It was sent to all relevant par-
liaments in Eastern Europe, including Russia, which 
surprisingly responded. A discussion continued in 
this way for several years, pre-empting later decisions 
by the concerned governments, and impacting on 
much later decisions by governments, parliaments, 
and even parties, in relevant if not measurable ways. 
The strengthening role of national parliaments in the 
diplomacy of their countries is thus something new, 
and governments benefit from contributions coming 
from different perspectives. 
* 
Diplomacy needs to recognize problems and courses 
of action early on while also seeking creative and tar-
get-oriented ways to develop tools for shaping foreign 
policy. Today, this can be achieved by actors, at least 
within the scope of the EU, who previously hardly 
touched foreign policy: national parliaments, parties, 
new European ‘party families’, other ministries beside 
the foreign ministry, heads of state and governments 
(who take responsibilities from the ministries of for-
eign affairs) – and, although less and less, the embas-
sies within the European states. 
The parties involved in this process of shaping for-
eign policy – predominantly bureaucrats and politi-
cians – are not yet completely aware of this develop-
ment. It is possible that diplomats are thus not yet 
adequately prepared for these changes. But one thing 
is certain: the foreign ministries must prepare for the 
consequences of an emerging need to deal with new, 
increasingly influential actors when they revise their 
structures and procedures. 
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The strategic utilisation of economic, monetary or 
financial capabilities to advance their own geopoliti-
cal objectives has, in historic terms, been a defining 
aspect of almost every geographical entity’s foreign 
policy behaviour.1 For diplomatic practitioners, the 
interplay between governments and markets, and its 
impact on the former’s room for manoeuvre on the 
international stage, remains a fundamental tenet 
that is of analytical importance. For scholars of inter-
national political economy, economic statecraft, eco-
nomic foreign policy and the like, the relationship 
between wealth and power is a core driver of theo-
retical debate and innovation. In light of the remark-
able structural fluidity that defines the 21st century’s 
‘multipolarised’ global economy2 – where unprece-
dented levels of inter-connectedness and rapid re-
distributions of wealth from traditionally prosperous 
Western states to the Global South has resulted in the 
economic empowerment of an increasing number of 
major global powers – even broader foreign affairs 
audiences have recently developed interest in how 
the sphere of macroeconomics directly affects con-
ditions of modern foreign policy making. Particular 
interest lies with how economically powerful states 
instrumentalise sources of economic power as incen-
tivising or coercing measures to foster their foreign 
policy interests. Such targeted use of economic capa-
bilities, or geoeconomic instruments, range from 
economic sanction regimes, to trade and investment 
policies over financial and monetary policies, to 
politically driven economic assistance, to policies gov-
erning energy and commodities, as well as some 
 
1 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Prin-
ceton University Press, 1985). 
2 Oliver Stuenkel, Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers 
Are Remaking Global Order (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2016). 
forms of cyber instruments.3 Diplomats, both in 
Europe and beyond, thus find themselves increasingly 
exposed to a diplomatic field that can be described 
as geoeconomic diplomacy, which is understood as the 
realm where a government is willing and able to 
employ national economic capabilities to preserve 
and realise its national interests when conducting 
relationships with other international actors.4 
In the field of geoeconomic diplo-
macy money alone cannot 
secure influence. 
If modern foreign policy making is shaped by 
states’ abilities to mobilise economic resources as a 
pertinent source of power, one could be tempted to 
argue that Europe’s position as a ‘military dwarf but 
an economic giant’ per se should give it a competitive 
advantage in the geoeconomic playing field. This chap-
ter warns against such premature conclusions, and 
suggests that the existence of material wealth does 
not in itself suffice for a government’s ability to trans-
late its economic capabilities into tangible foreign 
policy and diplomatic tools. In short, in the field of 
geoeconomic diplomacy money alone cannot secure 
influence. 
In this chapter, I therefore argue that any govern-
ment’s ability to employ geoeconomic instruments is 
 
3 Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other 
Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: The Bel-
knap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016). 
4 The notion of geoeconomics presented here is inspired 
by the one presented by Blackwill and Harris, War by Other 
Means (see note 3), and thus sides with the first of two ‘tra-
ditions’ in the geoeconomics literature: i) the effects of eco-
nomic policies on national power and geopolitics (‘the flag 
follows trade’) or ii) the economic consequences of the pro-
jection of national power (‘trade follows the flag’) (Sanjaya 
Baru, “Geo-economics and Strategy”, Survival 54, no. 3 [June 
2012]: 47–58). 
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not merely a function of means (a state’s economic 
resources) and ends (the advancement of its national 
interests), but heavily depends on its diplomats’ 
ability to work in concert with various influential 
domestic governmental and non-governmental actors. 
This is particularly important in liberal market econo-
mies, where a plethora of mostly non-governmental 
actors often hold or influence substantial parts of 
those national economic resources that governmental 
foreign policy makers might want to instrumentalise 
for foreign policy purposes. At the same time, these 
actors operate largely independently from direct gov-
ernmental control. In the context of EU foreign policy 
making, this perspective shows us how Europe’s geo-
economic impact is not only limited by the daunting 
task of finding alignment between the national inter-
ests of 28 member state governments, but also the 
challenges governments face to continuously operate 
and collaborate with non-governmental actors at the 
domestic level. 
A nuanced understanding of such structural con-
ditions becomes even more important when consider-
ing that recent global redistributions of material wealth 
has in the meantime exposed and emphasised certain 
ideational variations among powerful states – i.e. the 
‘multiple poles’. China, India and (to a lesser extent) 
Russia have been among the last decades’ most suc-
cessful competitors in the global race to align eco-
nomic wealth with geopolitical objectives. These ris-
ing powers also represent governance models where 
governments have significant influence over national 
economic assets or hold substantial ownership stakes 
in major domestic companies – leverage that in turn 
can be utilised for strategic foreign policy purposes, 
e.g. by directly interfering in strategically vital eco-
nomic sectors of rivalling major economies.5 This 
global return of ‘state capitalism’6 thus highlights 
 
5 Joshua Kurlantzick, State Capitalism: How the Return of 
Statism Is Transforming the World (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 9; Maaike Okano-Heijmans, “Conceptualizing 
Economic Diplomacy: The Crossroads of International Rela-
tions, Economics, IPE and Diplomatic Studies”, The Hague 
Journal of Diplomacy 6, no. 1 (January 2011): 7–36. 
6 The somewhat bold contrast between ‘state capitalism’ 
and ‘liberal market economies’ depicts ideal types of varying 
modes of economic governance rather than nuanced em-
pirical descriptions of state-market relations. Though most 
powerful economies will find elements of both models in 
their everyday governance structures (depending on the eco-
nomic sector in question), governments’ general understand-
ing of proper levels of state-market independence does vary 
another pivotal challenge for European diplomats 
engaged in quests of transposing the interplay be-
tween governments and markets to the arena of 
geopolitics. 
These substantial points have so far been largely 
neglected by the geoeconomic literature, since it has 
failed to acknowledge that the mere existence of a 
country’s economic power does not automatically 
translate into the applicability of specific geoeconomic 
instruments in a state’s diplomatic practice. As sug-
gested by Sascha Lohmann in this volume, the role 
of diplomats in applying geoeconomic instruments, 
such as sanctions, remains significantly understudied. 
In addressing these theoretical fallacies, this chapter 
argues that a network-based analytical approach 
can help to obtain more nuanced understandings of 
the domestic relationships and challenges European 
diplomats and ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) face 
in the geoeconomic sphere. Such a refined perspec-
tive could help to better assess – and ultimately im-
prove – European governments’ engagements in one 
of the early 21st century’s most critical diplomatic 
playing fields. 
From Sanctions to Free Trade Agree-
ments: Geoeconomics on the Rise in 
EU Foreign Policy Making 
A strengthened debate about the conditions for Euro-
pean geoeconomic diplomacy is paramount in the 
current context, where central aspects underpinning 
the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
are driven by the utilisation of economic capabilities. 
Prominent examples include the strategic use of eco-
nomic integration agreements (EIAs)7 and economic 
sanction regimes – both of which in recent years 
have been among the most popular instruments in 
the EU’s foreign policy toolbox – to foster wider geo-
political interests. 
 
substantially enough to utilise this juxtaposition for analyti-
cal purposes. 
7 Defined as a common term for partial or full free trade 
agreements (FTAs), preferential trade agreements (PTAs), or 
customs unions. 
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Cases illustrate, how negotiations 
on free trade and customs unions 
often hold broader strategic, 
geopolitical dimensions. 
Firstly, the extensive and growing list of European 
EIAs with third countries does not only reflect the 
EU’s economic ambitions in the realm of international 
trade, but also, as various recent cases illustrate, how 
negotiations on free trade and customs unions often 
hold broader strategic, geopolitical dimensions. The 
rapid deterioration of trade negotiations between the 
EU and the United States moving from near finali-
sation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP) in 2016 – envisaged by some policy 
makers as an ‘economic NATO’8 – to recent announce-
ments by President Trump in spring 2018 of imposing 
tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium, has led to 
widespread concerns over a looming ‘trade warfare’ 
on both sides of the Atlantic. 
A similar link between trade and geopolitical an-
tagonisms was pivotal in the EU’s negotiations about 
Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehen-
sive Free Trade Areas (AA/DCFTA) with the Eastern 
Partnership (EP) countries. Even as EU officials per-
sistently downplayed geopolitical objectives as a 
driver for bringing EP countries closer to the EU’s 
internal market, the Russian government’s overtly 
sceptical and aggressive reactions to the final nego-
tiation stages between the EU and, particularly, 
Ukraine in late 2013 – and the events that led to 
the ‘Ukrainian crisis’ – suggest that this benign 
view of Brussels was not shared in Moscow. 
Secondly, the EU-Russian spat over Ukraine like-
wise constitutes an arena for the EU’s use of economic 
sanctions, another ‘popular’ geoeconomic instru-
ment. European preference for utilising this geoeco-
nomic instrument has been on the rise since the so-
called ‘sanctions decade’ of the 1990’s, resulting in 
a situation where the EU currently upholds around 
35 sanctions regimes ranging from asset freezes and 
travel bans against listed individuals to trade embar-
gos and financial restrictions against targeted coun-
tries.9 Following the Russian annexation of Crimea 
 
8 Jennifer M. Harris, “America, Europe and the Necessary 
Geopolitics of Trade”, Survival 58, no. 6 (December 2016): 
63–92. 
9 Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, “Signal, Constrain, and Coerce: 
A More Strategic Use of Sanctions”, in The New European Secu-
rity Initiative, ed. Ulrike Esther Franke, Manuel Lafont Rap-
in spring 2014 and the downing of flight MH17 over 
Ukraine (allegedly by Russian-backed rebels) in sum-
mer 2014, EU member states responded with a com-
prehensive listing of individuals and commercial en-
tities with links to the government in Moscow. Russia 
was thereby added to the list of countries targeted by 
European sanctions for geopolitical purposes; a list 
that already features the nuclear programmes of Iran 
and North Korea as other prominent examples in this 
category. 
Interestingly, more conceptually driven discussions 
about the intersection of economic power and foreign 
policy goals, and how to cope with them in organisa-
tional terms, have reached Brussels where the notion 
of a European ‘economic diplomacy’ has lately been 
making its rounds.10 Though such discussions mostly 
aim at the use of political power to foster European 
economic interests than vice-versa, it is encouraging 
that the strategic focus on the state-market nexus is 
gaining attention. In institutional terms, such discus-
sions could – and should – also translate into more 
strategic debates and coordination between various 
EU council formats relating to international affairs. It 
is for instance telling that coordination between the 
Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and its economic ‘sister 
councils’, FAC Trade and FAC Development, still re-
mains rather rudimentary according to practitioners 
in the field. 
The Neglected Foreign Policy Role of Non-
Governmental Agency in Europe’s Liberal 
Market Economies 
Scrutinising the role of domestic structures in shap-
ing governments’ room for manoeuvre in the geo-
economic diplomatic realm seems particularly impor-
tant in the European context. Here Blackwill and 
Harris have interestingly noted that indeed “today’s 
form of geoeconomics comes with not only new op-
 
nouil and Susi Dennison (London: European Council on 
Foreign Relations, December 2017), 28–30. 
10 Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, Shaun Riordan and Paul 
Sharp, Whither Foreign Ministries in a Post-Western World?, Clin-
gendael Policy Brief, no. 20 (The Hague: Netherlands Insti-
tute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, April 2013); 
Maaike Okano-Heijmans and Francesco Saverio Montesano, 
Who Is Afraid of European Economic Diplomacy?, Clingendael 
Policy Brief (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of Inter-
national Relations ‘Clingendael’, April 2016). 
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tions but also new diplomatic tools.”11 However, 
the real significance of this observation lies in their 
subsequent caveat stating that “some of these [geo-
economic] instruments are […] largely unavailable 
to U.S. and Western leaders.”12 Though the authors 
do not substantiate their claim further, this unavail-
ability relates to the relative independence of market 
actors from direct governmental interference in 
liberal market economies, where economic power 
is largely in the hands of private actors. The use of 
geoeconomic instruments thereby differs greatly from 
that of military instruments, which are under the 
control of civilian governmental and military actors 
alone. These specificities of the geoeconomic playing 
fields potentially offer far reaching consequences 
for European diplomacy, particularly because similar 
structural limitations do not seem as pertinent for 
governments in countries with stronger state capi-
talist structures. 
Particularly in the European context 
such certain non-state actors play 
pivotal roles in determining the 
foreign policy options that diplomats 
enjoy at the international level. 
In sum, European leaders and diplomats’ limited 
access to the economic capabilities that could be 
instrumentalised for geopolitical purposes therefore 
arises either because diplomats do not themselves 
possess the economic lever needed to set the given 
geoeconomic instrument in play, or that they are 
dependent on non-governmental or international 
organisations to implement it. The former situation, 
for example, arises when governments seek to impose 
instruments by adopting legal frameworks that im-
pact trade relations through EIAs or sanctions. Such 
legal frameworks will only be efficient if they are 
loyally implemented by businesses actors and other 
government representatives. The latter situation, for 
example, relates to states’ instrumental use of eco-
nomic assistance – ranging from short-term stabili-
sation funds to long-term development assistance – 
where implementation often can only be properly 
executed with significant assistance from implement-
ing partners on the ground (United Nations, NGOs, 
companies etc.). What adds to the complexity is that 
 
11 Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means (see note 3),  
9–10. 
12 Ibid. 
many of such non-governmental actors often have 
their own capacities to perform independently at the 
international level; such agency potentially acts in 
a manner that undermines a government’s foreign 
policy agenda. Particularly in the European context 
such non-state actors therefore play pivotal roles in 
determining the foreign policy options that diplomats 
enjoy at the international level. Academic and policy-
oriented discussions about the future of diplomacy 
will have to take this dynamic into account in a sys-
temised and serious manner. 
The Fallacies of Structuralism for 
Understanding Geoeconomic Diplomacy 
Looking at the recent scholarly debate about geoeco-
nomics, however, it is striking that such actor- and 
organisational-level perspectives are rarely taken 
properly into account in a literature that is overtly 
dominated by structuralist approaches which largely 
neglect the relationalism inherent in everyday diplo-
macy, and thereby prevents in-depth thinking about 
the diplomatic aspects of geoeconomics.13 Much of this 
literature is centred around system-level assumptions 
– with an intellectual legacy from both neorealism 
and neomercantilism – that seeks to remind us that 
states’ increased use of economic means in an inher-
ently unstable multipolar international system more 
often leads to inter-state antagonism and conflict. 
Therefore, current scholarly debate about geoeconom-
ics remains limited in its scope, since it often rests 
on the un-nuanced assumption that governments are 
able to translate economic wealth into international 
power through rational interest maximisation.14 
This analytical insensibility towards the nuts and 
bolts of the geoeconomic field also bears normative 
consequences. Structuralist accounts over-emphasise 
how governments’ sheer use of geoeconomic instru-
ments leads to the ‘weaponisation of economies’ or 
 
13 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Conclusion: Relationalism 
or Why Diplomats find International Relations Theory 
Strange”, in Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics, ed. Ole 
Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 284–308. 
14 Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means (see note 3); 
Mikael Wigell, “Conceptualizing Regional Powers’ Geoeco-
nomic Strategies: Neo-Imperialism, Neo-Mercantilism, and 
Liberal Institutionalism”, Asia Europe Journal 14, no. 2 (June 
2016): 135–51. 
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even ‘wars by other means’.15 The gloomiest of such 
accounts was expressed by Luttwak in his (in)famous 
dictum describing geoeconomics as “the logic of con-
flict with the grammar of commerce.”16 While such 
theoretical warnings are not necessarily futile, this 
chapter questions the determinism embedded in 
these structural approaches and calls for more nu-
anced reflections on how diplomats’ relationships 
with various domestic actors can affect a govern-
ment’s ability to utilise the geoeconomic instrument 
it might seek to. 
In solely analysing the geoeconomic playing field 
at the structural level, current debates fall short of 
understanding the politico-economic conditions and 
limitations that European policy makers face, and 
hence tend to underestimate the impact of actor-
specific relationships on governments’ interests, nego-
tiating positions and outcomes. If these conditions are 
not carefully analysed in relationship to the specific 
state-market context, as well as the particular geoeco-
nomic instrument in question (sanctions, EIAs, eco-
nomic assistance etc.), scholarly debates about Euro-
pean geoeconomics will remain detached from a 
realistic understanding of the conditions diplomats 
face in the geoeconomic field. 
Shifting Perspective: From ‘Diplomatic 
Systems’ to ‘Diplomatic Networks’ 
Considering in a systemised way the role of domestic 
actors in foreign policy making, such as is prevalent 
in a great deal of literature on Foreign Policy Analysis 
and diplomacy studies, is in itself obviously far from 
being a novel approach. Works on ‘multi-stakeholder 
diplomacy’,17 ‘national diplomatic systems’,18 and 
 
15 Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means (see note 3); 
Mark Leonard, “Introduction: Connectivity Wars”, in Connec-
tivity Wars: Why Migration, Finance and Trade are the Geo-Economic 
Battlegrounds of the Future, ed. Mark Leonard (London: Euro-
pean Council on Foreign Relations, January 2016), 13–27. 
16 Edward N. Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geo-Eco-
nomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce”, The 
National Interest 20 (Summer 1990): 17–23; David Crieke-
mans, “Where Geoeconomics and Geostrategy Meet: The 
Troubled Relations between the European Union and the 
Russian Federation”, in Advances in Geoeconomics, ed. J. Mark 
Munoz (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 113–20. 
17 Brian Hocking, “Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Forms, 
Functions, and Frustrations”, in Multistakeholder Diplomacy – 
‘network diplomacy’19 have been particularly helpful 
in highlighting the importance of treating the behav-
iour and interests of domestic actors as vital aspects 
of modern diplomacy. Some of these contributions 
furthermore echo the ‘second image’ IR debates from 
the 1970–90s where scholars such as Katzenstein, 
Putnam and Moravcsik proposed various rationalistic 
explanations for the importance of domestic actors 
and structures in forming a state’s foreign policy 
interests and negotiation behaviour at the European 
or international level.20 Yet neither these classic 
studies, nor more recent ‘updates’ of their analytical 
frameworks, present coherent tools for the careful 
scrutiny of relationships between ‘traditional’ MFA 
diplomats with other governmental and, particularly, 
non-governmental actors in the geoeconomic field. 
As such, they do not provide insights into how the 
everyday practices that form relationships with these 
domestic actors influence a state’s diplomatic behav-
iour at the international level. 
Instead of understanding the relationship between 
the government and domestic actors as a rational bar-
gaining game21 at the domestic level, which then deter-
 
Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Jovan Kurbalija and Valentin 
Katrandjiev (Geneva: DiploFoundation, 2006), 13–29. 
18 Brian Hocking, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the National Diplomatic System”, in Diplomacy in a Globalizing 
World: Theories and Practices, ed. Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey 
Wiseman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013),  
123–40. 
19 Jorge Heine, “From Club to Network Diplomacy”, in The 
Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, 
Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 54–69. 
20 Peter J. Katzenstein, “International Relations and 
Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced 
Industrial States”, International Organization 30, no. 1 (Winter 
1976): 1–45; Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic 
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International Organi-
zation 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427–60; Andrew Moravcsik, 
“Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoin-
der”, Journal of Common Market Studies 33, no. 4 (December 
1995): 611–28. 
21 The idea of bargaining games (a central tenet of e.g. 
Putnam and Moravcsik’s theorising) implies that negotiators 
are a priori aware of their priorities and win-sets, even 
though these can be said to develop in the process of domes-
tic consultation and international negotiation – a process 
that furthermore may not be sequential. With reference to 
the notion of “circum-negotiation” (Harold Saunders, “Pre-
negotiation and Circum-negotiation: Arenas of the Peace Pro-
cess”, in Managing Global Chaos, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen 
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mines a government’s position at the international 
level (and vice versa), I propose thinking about these 
relationships as a plethora of social ties linked via 
networks that in various degrees influences a govern-
ment’s diplomatic behaviour. Hocking has pointed in 
this direction by introducing the notion of a ‘National 
Diplomatic System’ (NDS) that emphasises how the 
internationalisation of national ministries and gov-
ernmental agencies has for some time challenged the 
roles of MFAs as their government’s diplomatic face.22 
While there is certainly plenty of empirical evidence 
supporting this development, I argue that the specific 
nature of geoeconomic diplomacy necessitates ana-
lytical frameworks that (1) also encompass the sub-
stantial roles played by domestic non-governmental 
actors and (2) allows for greater sensibility towards 
how the involvement of such actors changes from 
case to case and thus for a less static understanding 
of unfolding relationships and cooperation than 
Hocking’s notion of ‘systems’ calls for. 
I argue that insights from the rapidly growing 
literature on network theory in IR could serve as a 
viable bridge in building such analytical frameworks. 
While space does not permit elaborating extensively 
on these ideas here, a first analytical move could be 
to place the MFA as a central node in networks con-
stituted through its multiple relationships with gov-
ernmental and non-governmental actors. Analysing 
the practices within such networks could help to 
identify domestic actors that either strengthen or 
weaken the MFA’s ability to utilise a given geoeco-
nomic instrument.23 Even if the placement of the 
MFA as the central network actor is not necessarily 
an accurate empirical reflection of an MFA’s cen-
trality in all aspects of a state’s foreign relations, this 
 
Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall [Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1996], 419–32), one should 
be aware that diplomats and other actors may change their 
interests in the context of unfolding domestic and interna-
tional relationships and, critically, in the course of negotia-
tions. 
22 Hocking, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs” (see note 18). 
23 Following the seminal definition of Hafner-Burton et al., 
I understand networks as any set or sets of ties between any 
set or sets of nodes. Network analysis, then, “concerns rela-
tionships defined by links among nodes (or agents) [and] ad-
dresses the associations among nodes rather than the attri-
butes of particular nodes” (Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles 
Kahler and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Network Analysis for 
International Relations”, International Organization 63, no. 3 
[July 2009]: 559–92 [562]). 
analytical move would help to better determine how 
‘traditional’ MFA diplomats relate to relevant govern-
mental and non-governmental actors – and how 
these relations impact a country’s abilities to operate 
in the geoeconomic diplomatic field.24 
Making European Sanctions Work? 
The Role of German Domestic Networks in 
the EU’s Sanction Regime against Russia 
The aforementioned European economic sanctions 
against Russia serve as an illustrative case for the 
practical implications that such a network-based 
approach could have for unpacking the domestic 
challenges European diplomats face in the geoeco-
nomic playing field. In spring and summer 2014, the 
EU adopted substantial sanction regimes in response 
to Russia’s illegal annexation of the Crimean Pen-
insula and the downing of flight MH17 over Ukraine. 
While the former Russian move led to asset freezes 
and visa bans for individuals, the latter incident 
resulted in general economic sanctions adopted by 
the EU Council in July 2014, essentially banning 
much economic activity with the Russian banking, 
energy and military sectors. 
Analysts have described how the potentially divi-
sive question of imposing significant, strong economic 
sanctions against Russia has yet not torpedoed EU 
consensus on the matter. At the same time, pro-sanc-
tion advocates, such as Germany and France, were yet 
again faced with significant opposition by member 
states less inclined to follow the hardnosed approach 
against Moscow.25 
This intergovernmental bargaining dynamic is a 
well-known characteristic of EU foreign policy mak-
ing. The importance of these state-to-state negotia-
tions notwithstanding, the realm of geoeconomics 
invites for an expanded and nuanced understanding 
 
24 By granting the state a central role in my analytical 
framework, my approach differs from that of the emerging 
research agenda on transnational, cross-border networks and 
new forms of global governance in networks beyond the 
national state (Miles Kahler, ed., Networked Politics: Agency, 
Power, and Governance [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009]; 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Chessboard and the Web – Strategies 
of Connection in a Networked World [New Haven, CT, and Lon-
don: Yale University Press, 2017]). 
25 For a good overview see Mitchell A. Orenstein and R. 
Daniel Kelemen, “Trojan Horses in EU Foreign Policy”, Journal 
of Common Market Studies 55, no. 1 (January 2017): 87–102. 
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of the dynamics diplomats need to take into consider-
ation. Using a network-based approach can help to 
shed light on how the European use of economic 
sanctions against Russia has been challenged and 
influenced by various domestic actors – among them 
some that would normally not show overt interest 
in EU foreign policy decisions, as well as those who 
came to see themselves as most negatively affected by 
the sanction-related trade and financial restrictions. 
While space does not permit a thorough analysis of 
the circumstances leading to the formulation, adop-
tion and implementation of the sanctions regime, 
some brief reflections on the domestic challenges 
faced by the German MFA, a leading actor in this pro-
cess,26 will highlight the structural conditions for 
viewing sanctions instruments through a network-
oriented lens. 
From the outset, the Ukraine crisis hit a political 
nerve among Berlin’s policy makers, who were al-
ready troubled by questions over whether the guiding 
principles behind the German Russia policy were still 
adequate.27 Perceiving the German MFA as the net-
work centre helps to identify a wide range of involved 
domestic actors, from other ministries and members 
of both the federal and regional parliaments, to busi-
ness organisations and major companies, to former 
statesmen, who each put pressure on the German MFA 
and influenced its room for manoeuvre when nego-
tiating and implementing the sanctions regime in the 
years 2014 to 2016. Here are some primary examples: 
a) Government agencies: The German MFA was sub-
ject to dual pressure from other leading governmental 
agencies. On the one hand, Chancellor Merkel and 
her Chancellery were actively engaged in the sanction 
negotiations from a very early stage of the conflict, 
while promoting a sturdier and more confrontational 
line towards Moscow than that preferred by the SPD-
led MFA. Although the Chancellery is regularly in-
volved in major foreign policy decisions, the potential 
losses for major German business interests as well 
 
26 Though the EU sanctions regime was unanimously 
adopted by all EU member states, Germany – together with 
France – came to play a pivotal role in the EU’s negotiations 
with Russia and Ukraine in the so-called Normandy Format. 
27 Tuoamas Forsberg, “From Ostpolitik to ‘Frostpolitik’? 
Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy towards Russia”, 
International Affairs 92, no. 1 (January 2016): 21–42; Marco 
Siddi, “German Foreign Policy towards Russia in the After-
math of the Ukraine Crisis: A New Ostpolitik?”, Europe-Asia 
Studies 68, no. 4 (June 2016): 665–77. 
as the geopolitical dimensions at play here raised the 
political stakes significantly. At times the lack of 
policy coherence between the Chancellery and the 
MFA – particularly in the early formulation phase 
of the EU sanction regime – led diplomats from 
other European member states to question whose 
policy line represented the ‘real’ German position. 
On the other hand, the Ministry of Economics, both 
in internal discussions and public statements, repeat-
edly spoke in favour of a progressive dismantlement 
of sanctions at a faster pace than that envisioned by 
the MFA, thereby reflecting demands both from parts 
of the SPD party base and the mood in the German 
business community. This duality continually chal-
lenged the MFA’s role as the unified voice of the Ger-
man government in negotiations with other Euro-
pean partners and the Russian government. 
b) Business community: As a major representative of 
the German business community, the Federation of 
German Industries (BDI) publicly spoke out in favour 
of the sanctions at an early stage, which was helpful 
for Germany’s diplomatic endeavour. Although the 
BDI’s positive stance was challenged internally by 
its sub-federation for large German businesses with 
interest in the Russian and east European markets – 
the German Committee on Eastern European Eco-
nomic Relations (OA) – the BDI’s backing helped 
the MFA to strengthen its network position towards 
a somewhat sceptical German business community 
who feared substantial losses in their trade relations 
with Russia. Although there is little evidence that 
German businesses acted as overt ‘sanction spoilers’, 
cases such as the deliverance of gas turbines from 
the German company Siemens to sanctioned Crimea 
(arguably against Siemens’ knowledge) demonstrate 
how governments’ implementation of sanctions can 
be hampered by legal loopholes and complex produc-
tion and delivery chains. 
c) Regional government level: Another domestic pres-
sure was apparent from the regional government 
level when Bavaria’s Prime Minister Seehofer visited 
Russian President Putin in February 2016. Without 
the direct consent of the German government, See-
hofer promoted a more benign stance on the sanction 
question than the federal government’s official line. 
Seehofer’s visit was most likely a signal to Bavarian 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, who had vocally 
expressed their discomfort at negative exposure to 
the effects of both EU sanctions and Russian counter-
sanctions. The German business community’s impact 
was thus tangible on multiple governmental levels. 
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In sum, while German diplomats found themselves 
placed at the forefront of the EU’s negotiations with, 
and targeting of economic sanctions against, Russia, 
the network perspective helps to highlight how the 
German MFA had to allocate substantial resources 
to navigate a network of domestic actors in order to 
secure coherent access to the economic-based leverage 
so deeply needed in the geoeconomic confrontation 
with Russia. Such continuous and greatly varying 
domestic challenges are tangible examples of the 
complexities facing diplomats that seek to mobilise 
economic instruments which ultimately are not ex-
clusively under their control. 
Concluding remarks 
The competencies that diplomats need to operate at 
the interface between foreign policy, economics and 
business were at the heart of a significant speech by 
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011, when 
she declared that the future would bring great de-
mand for diplomats that can “read both Foreign Affairs 
and a Bloomberg Terminal.”28 Clinton’s essential mes-
sage was clear: understanding and handling the geo-
economic sphere is not only key for diplomats dealing 
with trade negotiations (trade diplomacy) or helping 
domestic businesses to succeed in foreign markets 
(commercial diplomacy), but also for those handling 
‘classic’ security-related and geopolitical issues. 
Analytical frameworks that 
encompass the networked relation-
ship between MFAs with other 
governmental and non-governmental 
actors need to be developed. 
Such reflections on the special nature of geoeco-
nomic diplomacy obviously relate to more general 
discussions about the agency of non-governmental 
actors in modern diplomacy. As the field of geoeco-
nomics becomes ever more important for foreign 
policy makers across the globe, demands for Euro-
pean diplomacy and diplomats are changing rapidly. 
The traditional state-to-state understanding of diplo-
macy is deteriorating, and new analytical frameworks 
 
28 Hillary R. Clinton, “Economic Statecraft”, Speech at 
the Economic Club of New York, New York City, 14 October 
2011, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/ 
rm/2011/10/175552.htm (accessed 24 July 2018). 
that encompass the ‘networked’ relationship between 
MFAs with other governmental and non-governmental 
actors still need to be developed and discussed. 
As shown in the illustrative case of German MFA’s 
domestic challenges when aiming for a common EU 
sanction regime against Russia, economic sanctions 
– unlike other foreign policy tools – can have direct 
economic impacts on domestic business communi-
ties, which not only leads to potential inter-agency 
turf battles, but also gives domestic actors incentives 
for trying to circumvent their own government’s 
policies. This requires diplomats to navigate in highly 
volatile domestic environments – and analysts that 
work in the field of geoeconomics to be sensitive to-
wards the unpredictability and complexity of such 
domestic networks. 
Bagger and von Heynitz advanced a similar view 
when elaborating on the idea of ‘the networked diplo-
mat’ who should be able to integrate external ideas 
as well as interests from a wide range of government 
and non-government actors.29 Fletcher’s ideas about 
the necessity for the modern ‘naked diplomat’ to 
operate in rapidly changing and unforeseeable cir-
cumstances among a plethora of actors in the ‘real’ 
and digital realm moves in a similar direction.30 
While these observations help to sharpen our sensi-
tivity to dynamics on the changing playing field of 
modern diplomacy, they do not suffice as coherent 
answers to key questions in the field of geoeconom-
ics. Some of the most relevant issues for further 
research concern under which circumstances domestic 
actors influence a government’s access to various 
geoeconomic instruments, how these domestic actors 
enact this influence and what this ‘networked reality’ 
means for the leeway that European foreign policy 
making can have on the international stage. In addi-
tion, while this paper has shed light on the domestic 
dynamics that diplomats face in the geoeconomic 
realm, the often complex relationships with inter-
national (non-government) actors should likewise 
receive careful attention when searching for answers 
to these and similar questions – and which will re-
main paramount for diplomats and diplomacy 
scholars in the early 21st century. 
 
29 Thomas Bagger and Wolfram von Heynitz, “Der vernetz-
te Diplomat: Von vernetzter Sicherheit zu einer „netzwerk-
orientierten Außenpolitik”, Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheits-
politik 5, no. 1 (October 2012): 49–61. 
30 Tom Fletcher, The Naked Diplomat: Power and Statecraft in 
the Digital Century (London: William Collins, 2016). 
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In this volume the definition of ‘diplomacy’ has at 
its core the pursuit of the enlightened self-interests of 
politically organized collectives1 in and through their 
interaction with others, as well as with other inter-
national actors, such as non-governmental organiza-
tions or transnational corporations. Diplomacy, as 
the conduct of foreign policy, will therefore be a key 
resource for making world politics – and the world 
itself – sustainably peaceful. Diplomats thus repre-
sent polities; diplomacy concerns politics, in other words, 
the way the international realm is governed; and 
diplomacy must find and implement policies that are 
able to realize specific collective aims and, beyond 
that, the productive co-habitation of all states and 
peoples. 
What Diplomacy Needs to Deliver: 
Changing Demands on Governance 
beyond the State 
Both the conduct of national politics and the capacity 
of states to develop and implement policies within 
an overall framework of orientation (a national ‘grand 
strategy’ or ‘role concept’), appear worldwide to be 
undergoing profound transformations as a result 
of two major forces: the trajectory of technological 
change and the revolution of rising expectations 
among peoples. Technological change, driven by the 
advances of scientific knowledge and their applica-
tion for the practical purposes of problem-solving 
and the gratification of human desires, has produced 
exponential growth in all kinds of social interactions 
within and across borders. We call this ‘globaliza-
tion’. Globalization has deepened the interdepend-
ence between individuals and societies, and will con-
tinue to do so in the future, quite possibly at an even 
more accelerated pace. 
 
1 Usually, this would be states or state-like entities, or 
international organizations that represent states. 
Globalization has also transformed the state and 
will continue to do so: the requirements that an effec-
tive functioning state has to meet are a moving tar-
get which more and more states (having often been 
‘quasi-states’ to begin with)2 now find it difficult to 
meet. As a result, they may become ‘failing’ or even 
‘failed’ states. 
The logic of technological change 
seems to demand governance, and 
therefore international politics, of a 
density and quality that so far has 
been largely confined to politics 
within a state. 
 
That same logic also operates beyond the nation 
state. Enhanced interdependence has transformed 
the requirements for governance beyond the state 
and will continue thus in the future. In fact, the logic 
of technological change seems to demand govern-
ance, and therefore international politics, of a density 
and quality that so far has been largely confined to 
politics within a state. 
At the same time, domestic politics itself is chang-
ing under the transformative impact of globalization. 
In practice, challenges usually take the form of politi-
cal demands addressed by citizens or groups to their 
political leaders. These demands merge into the sec-
ond secular trend affecting diplomacy in the 21st cen-
tury: the revolution of rising expectations. Expectations 
concern material benefits as well as normative or 
ideological aspirations. The dominant forces driving 
collective expectations today are the promise of ma-
terial growth and the ideology of what Yuval Harari 
calls “humanism”: the centrality of the individual in 
 
2 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International 
Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1993). 
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our conceptions of society.3 Both forces are expansive. 
Additionally, there are the growing number of people 
cramming into the world and the rising levels of indi-
vidual empowerment through education and knowl-
edge. Consequently, expectations are rising rapidly, 
and quite possibly exponentially. Again, this puts 
pressure on politics, within and between states. 
What Diplomacy Can Deliver: 
The Constraints of Sovereignty 
The ability of politics to respond to rising needs and 
expectations for governance within and beyond the 
state may have grown in many instances, though 
there have also no doubt been cases of decline and 
regression (e.g. those resulting in state failure). Yet 
there exists a fundamental mismatch between, on the 
one hand, the realities of interdependence and rising 
expectations, and on the other, the capacity for global 
governance within an effective international order. 
Significantly, that mismatch is caused by the notion 
of sovereignty, or more precisely by the way that con-
cept is generally understood and practiced. This tra-
ditional understanding of sovereignty inhibits the 
transformation of international politics to within the 
lines in where it is pushed by the dual dynamics of 
technological change and the revolution of rising 
expectations. 
Diplomacy finds itself at the edge of this cleavage 
between the demands of global governance and its 
supply through national foreign policies: global gov-
ernance, after all, is nothing but diplomacy or, more 
precisely, the outcomes of interactions by national 
diplomacies. As a result of this tension, the outcomes 
of global governance tend to fall short of what is 
needed and expected. This lag, in turn, has two differ-
ent consequences, one direct, one indirect. The direct 
consequence concerns what we discussed above – 
the lag between the demands of international govern-
ance and the existing arrangements by international 
cooperation. Yet the capacity for global governance 
may also be affected by the transformation of national 
politics through its impact on states’ capacity and 
willingness to engage in international cooperation.4 
 
3 Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow 
(London: Harvill Secker, 2016), 220–77. 
4 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From 
the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New 
York: Profile Books, 2014). 
The corrosive impact of this tension by now seems to 
have affected a number of Western liberal democra-
cies. However, it has also been evident in autocracies, 
for example in the People’s Republic of China. There, 
the Communist Party recognized the danger of its 
policies being insufficient to cope with the enormous 
challenges of China’s transformation. It is currently 
trying to respond by installing a system of governance 
that concentrates power at the top in an effort to 
speed up and effectuate China’s governance in line 
with the requirements of technological change and 
rising expectations, and making the fullest possible 
use of information and communication technology 
advances. If successful, the ‘Chinese model’ of tech-
nocratic authoritarian governance may well become 
the yardstick against which the performance of other 
models will be measured. 
The Concept of Foreign Policy Autism 
A victim of this corrosion of national politics 
by tensions between the demand for and supply of 
(global) governance has been foreign policy, in what 
might be described as autistic tendencies in national 
politics. The term “autism” was originally coined by 
the Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler in 1911 to de-
scribe a form of unsocial behaviour by individuals. 
For him, autism was a crucial symptom of schizo-
phrenia: a withdrawal from the outside world into 
one’s own, internal world. Sigmund Freud took up 
the concept and similarly used it to denote certain 
behavioural anomalies in his patients. 
The concept has occasionally been used as a meta-
phor in International Relations (IR) theory.5 There, 
it is based on the analogy drawn between the behav-
iour of individuals and that of states – an analogy 
not without problems, but still used frequently in IR 
theory.6 I am aware of only two reasonably systematic 
efforts to apply the metaphor of autism as developed 
 
5 Stephen Michael Christian, “Autism in International 
Relations: A Critical Assessment of International Relations’ 
Autism Metaphors”, European Journal of International Relations 
24, no. 2 (June 2018; first published March 2017): 464–88. 
6 The critique of the metaphor’s use as developed by Chris-
tian, accusing it of involving a form of “ableism”, seems be-
side the point, given this analogy: while the desire to protect 
individuals from being regarded as ‘unsocial’ and therefore 
in some way ill seems well-intentioned and understandable 
(though not necessarily persuasive), its application by analogy 
to states logically falls into an entirely different context. 
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by Bleuler and Freud to the analysis of foreign policy 
and international relations. The more extensive of 
the two efforts was undertaken by Karl W. Deutsch and 
his German protégé Dieter Senghaas. In a co-authored 
article, they used Freud’s psychoanalytical terminology 
to analyse, in general terms, foreign policy behav-
iour.7 Senghaas took this analogy further in his work 
on nuclear deterrence and “threat policy” in the con-
text of the Cold War; in his work, the concept of 
autism assumed a key role. According to Deutsch and 
Senghaas, governments can be compared to an indi-
vidual’s ego that constantly struggles to reconcile con-
tradictory demands and pressures from within and 
without. Within the individual, the demands are 
made by the “id”, along with its own, emotional and 
instinct-driven inclinations towards the immediate 
gratification of desires, and the “superego”, represent-
ing internalized parental and societal demands. These 
inner demands have to be reconciled by the ego with 
the demands of the “reality principle” – that is, with 
the constraints and opportunities in the individual’s 
real external environment. Senghaas saw deterrence 
and threat policies as autistic: the governments that 
pursued such policies, he argued, constructed their 
own, distorted perceptional images of the reality of 
international relations that surrounded them, and 
then legitimated their actions and their results (for 
example, responses by the “adversary”) in terms of 
those perceptions as conclusive evidence that justi-
fied the initial decisions and encouraged policies that 
doubled down on those decisions.8 
Edward Luttwak is the other author who has used 
the concept of autism. In his book The Rise of China 
versus the Logic of Strategy9 he developed the theory 
that China has been unable to develop and execute a 
grand strategy because it held a grossly simplified and 
misleading view of reality. Luttwak attributes this 
“strategic autism” to the fact that China had been cut 
off from the rest of the world beyond East Asia for 
most of its history. According to Luttwak, China attri-
butes to the U.S. motives and objectives (such as the 
 
7 Karl W. Deutsch and Dieter Senghaas, “Die brüchige Ver-
nunft von Staaten”, in Kritische Friedensforschung, ed. Dieter 
Senghaas, 6
th
 ed. (Frankfurt, 1981), 105–63. 
8 Dieter Senghaas, “Towards an Analysis of Threat Policy” 
(1974), in Dieter Senghaas, Pioneer of Peace and Development 
Research, Springer Briefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice, 
6 (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), 27–71. 
9 Edward N. Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy, 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2012), 12ff. 
urge to expand and dominate others) it would hold 
itself if it were in America’s position, and it is unable 
to look at the world in any other way than through 
an exclusively Chinese lens. As a result, China simpli-
fies reality into very schematic representations, lead-
ing it to fall into opportunism and gamesmanship. 
FPA describes patterns of foreign 
policy behaviour that are 
persistently inappropriate. 
How accurate and useful Senghaas’ views on nu-
clear deterrence during the Cold War or Luttwak’s 
take on China’s grand strategy are is debatable, but 
this does not need to concern us here. I am interested 
in the broader argument that both are making: under 
certain circumstances, states – like individuals – 
may be seriously hampered in their ability to perceive 
and respond to their international environment ad-
equately, a policy deficiency they label autism. I sug-
gest this concept is useful to describe (as in fact does 
the contemporary understanding of autism in psy-
chology) a spectrum of problematic foreign policy 
behaviour patterns by states. For these purposes, I 
define foreign policy autism (FPA) as follows: 
a) FPA describes patterns of foreign policy behav-
iour that are persistently inappropriate (i.e., either too 
ineffective or too disruptive to realize the enlightened 
collective interests of the state and its people). 
b) FPA can result from specific political dysfunc-
tions or from emotionally charged politics. 
c) As an expression of political dysfunctions, FPA 
may result from excessive involvement of organized 
interests in foreign policy decision-making. As Man-
cur Olson has persuasively argued in his The Rise and 
Decline of Nations,10 societies that are economically and 
socially successful over long periods of time will tend 
to suffer a proliferation of vested interests that will 
slow down and constrain policy-making towards low-
est common denominators and short-termism. An-
other dysfunctional aspect of politics may be exces-
sive tactical use of foreign policy decisions in domes-
tic political manoeuvres. (The qualifier ‘excessive’ is 
important here: it implies that those weaknesses are 
‘normal’ if they remain within reasonable limits, but 
‘problematic’ if they become dominant in foreign 
policy behaviour). 
 
10 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic 
Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1982). 
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d) FPA as ‘emotional politics’ results from images 
and perceptions of the world that are grossly distorted 
through emotionally charged collective attitudes – 
feelings such as fear, loathing and a hatred of ‘en-
emies’, guilt over past events, or envy and frustration 
over one’s own current status. As Senghaas and others 
have shown, such dysfunctional perceptions of world 
politics tend towards auto-immunization. They become 
‘closed’, that is, resistant to contradictory observa-
tions. The resulting ‘theory’ or perceptional ‘model’ 
of the world is able to explain any observation what-
soever in ways that support the model. Thus, if 
Beijing is persuaded that it is America’s intention to 
block China’s rise, any American policy and decision 
will be seen as a stratagem arising from that nefari-
ous U.S. desire. 
Freud defined the “id” as a part of the mind, and he 
observed that 
“cut off from the external world [the id] has 
a world of perception of its own. It detects with 
extraordinary acuteness certain changes in its 
interior, especially oscillations in the tension of 
its instinctual needs, and these changes become 
conscious as feelings in the pleasure-unpleasure 
series. […] Self-perceptions […] govern the passage 
of events in the id with despotic force. The id obeys 
the inexorable pleasure principle.”11 
In our analogy, ‘instincts’ would be organized inter-
ests, but also collective emotions, such as nationalist 
fervour. Again, it should be pointed out that we are 
talking here about patterns of behaviour that are 
‘normal’ in principle: any foreign policy will reflect 
organized societal interests to some degree, and will 
depend on a modicum of emotional commitment, 
not only on reasoned support. Thus there is a fine 
line, or perhaps even a grey area, dividing ‘healthy’ or 
‘normal’ from ‘autistic’ foreign policies. Nevertheless, 
to highlight the difference when evaluating national 
foreign policy performances is meaningful – and 
important. 
 
11 Sigmund Freud, “The Unconscious” (1940), 198, quoted 
in The Unconscious: A Bridge between Psychoanalysis and Cognitive 
Neuroscience, ed. Marianne Leuzinger-Bohleber, Simon Arnold 
and Mark Solms (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017). 
The net result of competing ten-
dencies and forces that shape policy 
decisions leads to more complex and 
intractable issues and the compli-
cation of ‘good’ foreign policy design. 
There are several reasons why present circum-
stances may be favouring FPA in both its variants: 
ineffectiveness and disruptive behaviour (‘lashing out’). 
FPA as ineffectiveness could be expected to result from 
decades of increasing wealth and high levels of social 
stability that much of the Western world has experi-
enced since the 1950s. There can be no doubt that 
this has produced a proliferation of organized ma-
terial and ideational interests along the lines of 
Mancur Olson’s theory of growth and decline. This 
trend has been mirrored also at the level of party 
systems. The number of parties represented in par-
liaments has tended to increase over the last decades, 
making the formation of government with stable 
majorities and clear policy profiles more difficult.12 
As globalization has intruded ever more deeply into 
economies and societies, the boundaries between do-
mestic and foreign affairs, and hence between domes-
tic and transnational interests, have become contin-
ually more blurred, aggravating the tendencies for 
foreign policy to be drawn into the domestic political 
arena. Finally, the proliferation of interests and the 
transnationalisation of economies and societies 
through globalization have, of course, been multi-
dimensional and contradictory: there are interests 
that favour globalization because they benefit, and 
those that oppose it, because they lose. Yet as these 
crisscrossing tendencies and forces compete with each 
other in efforts to shape policy decisions, the net 
result will often be to make the issues more complex 
and intractable, and the design and implementation 
of ‘good’ foreign policies therefore objectively more 
complicated and demanding. 
Not all of these factors will necessarily strengthen 
autistic tendencies in foreign policy-making, and 
some may well even work against them. The connec-
tivities between societies that globalization encour-
ages, for example, may undermine the tendencies 
towards closure of perceptions. Yet on balance there 
are still convincing reasons to worry about the capac-
 
12 Majority voting systems, such as those in America, 
Britain and France, have to some extent been formally 
immune to those tendencies, but political positions beyond 
the major parties, supported by many voters, have also 
thereby led to an erosion of the old party systems. 
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ity of the foreign policy process to produce, and of 
governments to implement, policies that are effective 
in meeting the demands for global governance. The 
problems will first surface in individual decisions, but 
as the negative tendencies of gridlock gain momen-
tum, such decisions could become more frequent and 
begin to affect basic foreign policy orientations. 
Disruptive FPA could take the form of a political 
lashing-out of the kind we presently observe in the 
foreign policy decisions and actions of U.S. President 
Donald Trump, or that we saw earlier in the result of 
the referendum on Brexit in the UK. Disruptive FPA 
ultimately reflects the divisive, corrosive impact of 
globalization on (Western) societies. For the last quar-
ter of a century, the dominant narrative of prosperity 
and social stability has only told part of the story. Far-
reaching changes in work and employment patterns 
have produced pervasive stress, increasing social in-
equalities, and closed-off horizons for significant 
parts of our societies, including sections of the middle 
classes that have found themselves under downward 
pressure. The continuing strength of nationalism and 
the rise of populism across the Western world point 
to the strong, increasing ‘oscillations in the tension’ 
within our societies. 
European integration may well 
illustrate what might happen. 
As in its original field of psychology, the concept 
of FPA does not pretend to explain; it offers a dense, 
analytically focused way of describing behaviour. The 
possible value-added of this metaphor lies in identi-
fying behavioural patterns, in this case patterns in 
national foreign policy behaviour, as ‘deviant’ or ‘dys-
functional’. Moreover, the FPA metaphor can identify 
weaknesses in foreign policy decision-making (such as 
the misrepresentation of the external environment in 
a foreign policy or its emotional baggage), and suggest 
ways to address them. Authoritarian polities might 
be more prone to (emotionally charged) disruptive 
FPA, while democracies can be expected to be more 
susceptible to the ineffectiveness type of FPA. Yet 
the United States under Trump and Britain after the 
Brexit referendum are but two examples of the for-
mer type of FPA existing in seemingly consolidated 
Western democracies; on the other hand, authoritarian 
political systems can also fall prey to ineffectiveness 
FPA as a result of gridlock or the dominance of inter-
est groups that block effective foreign policies. 
FPA and the European Union 
European integration may well illustrate what might 
happen with international order, and hence with 
international diplomacy, in the future. The European 
Union (EU) represents a political space within which 
interdependence has assumed a density that makes 
it comparable to interdependence within societies; it 
attempts to organize this space politically on the basis 
of a new concept of sovereignty – ‘shared sovereign-
ty’.13 Unfortunately, in recent years the EU reinforces 
a sceptical perspective on governance beyond the 
nation state. Within the EU, the heightened pressure 
on politics seems to have resulted in a shift of atten-
tion by governments towards domestic politics and 
towards short-term expedience – in other words, 
towards ‘autism’. In fact, FPA seems to have been at 
work at two levels within the EU: at the member-state 
level and at that of the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). 
Political choices will need to be made 
against a backdrop of uncertainty and 
unpredictability. 
Effective governance of the EU will be impossible 
without an approach to politics that gives space to 
mutual empathy, a willingness to compromise and 
accommodate other interests, and a conceptual frame-
work (e.g., an understanding of sovereignty) that is 
compatible with these requirements. Under the con-
ditions of democratic politics, this needs polities that 
are solidly behind by a basic pro-European consensus 
and a commitment to democratic alternance only with-
in the parameters of this consensus. To survive and 
prosper, the EU may therefore be dependent not only 
on effective national governance but also on a certain 
kind of national polity – one with robust public sup-
port for concepts of national identity, sovereignty and 
politics that are compatible with policies which can 
effectively promote the enlightened self-interest of the 
EU’s peoples, individually and collectively. To that 
end, political choices, sometimes bold ones, will need 
to be made against a backdrop of uncertainty and un-
predictability. They cannot be expected only to pro-
 
13 See Anthony Barnett, “Why Brexit Won’t Work: The EU 
is about Regulation Not Sovereignty”, Open Democracy UK, 25 
June 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/anthony-barnett/ 
why-brexit-won-t-work-eu-is-about-regulation-not-sovereignty 
(accessed 23 July 2018). 
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vide benefits, but will also involve costs that need to 
be shared and risks that need to be carried collectively. 
Yet it is far from clear whether such robust political 
support for enlightened policies (and hence for effec-
tive diplomacy) exists in all present member states – 
indeed, in any member state! 
To the extent that the national foundations for 
European politics have become problematic, Euro-
pean diplomacy has already encountered significant 
difficulties in realizing the common good, or indeed 
even the enlightened national self-interest of indi-
vidual member states. For example, has it really been 
in Germany’s enlightened national interest to impose 
its own kind of adjustment on Greek society in the 
Euro crisis? Overall, the constraints on national for-
eign policies imposed by prevalent concepts of sover-
eignty concerning common policies in recent years 
have produced a series of crises in the EU that, taken 
together, threaten its future viability, perhaps even 
its existence “as we know it.”14 At the core of this 
problem lie deficiencies within and deep ideological 
and identity differences between the polities that 
make up the EU. Recently the differences have been 
exacerbated by migration pressure.15 Those crises 
reflect the tensions that have accumulated between 
the forces of globalization and rising expectations, on 
the one hand, and Europe’s collective political efforts 
to channel and domesticate them, on the other. The 
latter bear the hallmarks of FPA in both its forms: 
inefficiency and emotional bias. While the nature of 
the crises may demand major change, it is not clear 
whether the decision-making capacities of the EU are 
capable of such change. Incrementalism on a down-
ward slope towards minimalist policy adjustments 
seems much more likely. A similar picture emerges if 
we consider CFSP: the EU’s ability to hold its own as a 
powerful and influential player, and its performance 
in world politics as a paragon of international order 
leaves (to put it mildly) a lot to be desired. 
This troubling story of European integration over 
the last decade may well offer a glimpse into the 
future of world politics, which faces a comparable 
conundrum (though on a much larger scale) of rap-
idly deepening (if uneven) interdependence, integra-
 
14 Olivier Bouin, “The End of European Integration as We 
Know It”, in Europe’s Crises, ed. Manuel Castells et al. (Cam-
bridge, UK, Medford, MA: Polity, 2017); John R. Gillingham, 
The EU: An Obituary (London and New York: Verso, 2016). 
15 Ivan Krastev, After Europe (Philadelphia, PA: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2017). 
tion and rising expectations set against insufficiently 
responsive governance at the national and (even more 
so) at the international level. What supports this scep-
tical prognosis is that not only the EU, but many other 
international organizations find themselves in crisis, 
starting with the United Nations. International poli-
tics seems to display problems similar to those at the 
national level of politics. Its responses to changing 
material circumstances due to technological advances 
and to rising expectations and demands appear to be 
lagging behind, often with a widening gap. Diplomacy 
may therefore find itself more and more constrained in 
its scope and in its ability to promote change through 
arguments because of problems rooted in FPA. 
One way in which politics at the national level 
has tried to respond to the challenges of the age is to 
amass more power at the top of the hierarchy. Yet 
superior national power is unlikely to bridge the gap 
and compensate for the lag, for several reasons. First, 
the autistic qualities of national politics and policies 
work against the kind of effective international co-
operation that would be needed to mobilize sufficient 
power resources. Second, FPA would work against 
accommodating external demands through effective 
internal adjustments, but instead look for easy alter-
natives by deflecting the burden or ignoring the prob-
lem. Third, faced with such difficulties, international 
cooperation may opt for face-saving pseudo-solutions 
and compromise formulas that fall far short of what 
is necessary. 
Future Implications 
What are the implications of this analysis for diplo-
macy in the 21st century – or, more modestly, over 
the next two decades? If the challenge to diplomacy 
in this new age of globalization is the sustainable and 
peaceful resolution of conflicts about who gets what 
between countries through reasoning and mutual 
adjustment guided by enlightened self-interest, then 
it seems likely to be squeezed badly by the contradic-
tory trends of, on the one hand, rising demands on 
global governance rooted in deepening interdepend-
ence, and on the other, the increasing assertion of 
individual and narrow collective interests that seem 
to be a catalyst for FPA. 
Of course, this definition of diplomacy does not ex-
haust the broad variety of functions that diplomacy 
serves and diplomats carry out. States will continue to 
exist, and probably continue to play the principal role 
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in international politics. Their governments will carry 
on interacting with each other through diplomacy. 
There will no doubt also continue to be circumstances 
in which the domestic context will not constrain or 
even derail prudent and effective foreign policy deci-
sions. While the scope for diplomacy in its essential 
functions may indeed be squeezed by FPA, diplomacy 
and diplomats will continue to operate within the re-
maining political space, and a key element will con-
tinue to be the forging of coalitions.16 Yet diplomacy 
can also expect to be instrumentalised as interpreter 
and megaphone for national concerns and engage in 
posturing, while its role as a constituency of empathy 
for others and for reasoned compromise will likely 
suffer. This, in turn, would affect the recruitment of 
diplomats and their professional ethics. Will it be 
‘right or wrong, my government?’ or will it be ‘helping to 
put my country on a good track?’ 
From the perspective of our autism metaphor, we 
would expect ‘well-governed’ states in this context of 
global governance to behave in ways comparable to 
how a ‘mature’ individual would behave. Thus, they 
would exhibit a capacity to manage the conflicting 
pressures from within and from the outside world in 
ways allowing them to optimize their enlightened 
national self-interests by interacting responsibly and 
empathically with others. Good diplomacy requires 
carefully collected, thoroughly analysed assessments 
of the world, both in terms of the particular external 
environment in which a specific foreign policy deci-
sion, or a policy or a strategy are to unfold, and of 
the stakes involved for its own society and polity. Its 
decisions, policies and strategies need to be emotion-
ally mature and sensitive to biases that might distort 
decisions and render them ineffective or, worse, dan-
gerous. Its implementation requires empathy and per-
suasive skills. This is what the world will need from 
its diplomats. Whether outdated notions of sovereignty 
and tendencies towards FPA will allow them to do 
their job well depends on the capacity of states, and 
specifically of European and Western democracies, to 
take corrective action to re-define their own roles in 
global governance and to overcome those worrying 
tendencies. 
 
16 Sophie Eisentraut, Coalition Building and Compromise Are 
the Future of Global Leadership. Here’s Why, German Marshall 
Fund, 18 September 2017, htttps://outoforder.gmfus.org/ 
coalition-building-and-compromise-are-the-future-of-global-
leadership-heres-why-4d34b2d353dd (accessed 20 September 
2017). 
 Digital Diplomacy as Diplomatic Sites: Emotion, Identity & Do-it-Yourself Politics 
 SWP Berlin 
 New Realities in Foreign Affairs:  
 Diplomacy in the 21
st
 Century 
 November 2018 
 57 
Even as digital diplomacy takes the diplomatic com-
munity by storm, we are still only in the early stages 
of appreciating the broader impact of digital and so-
cial media on diplomacy. To date, ‘digital diplomacy’ 
appears to be an extension of traditional, state-centric 
diplomacy. New media emerge as new tools for meet-
ing state goals and interests. The immediate challenge 
becomes how to master these tools before – or better 
than – rival state and non-state actors. 
This view of digital diplomacy as a diplomatic tool 
satisfies only a first-level analysis. The second-level 
analysis involves apprehending those ways in which 
the media are fostering new diplomatic spaces. These 
diplomatic spaces are animated by public participa-
tion, expectations, and needs, including profound 
identity needs. The public dynamics of these spaces 
may challenge traditional mores of state-centric diplo-
macy. Nevertheless, mastering the dynamics of these 
spaces is critical. 
State-Centric Digital Diplomacy: 
Digital Media as Diplomatic Tools 
For the rational, pragmatic state actor, digital and 
social media accord unprecedented global reach and 
enticing potential for diplomatic innovation. Recent 
digital diplomacy reports by private and government 
researchers highlight the obstacles and opportunities 
regarding digital media for diplomacy and foreign 
ministries.1 
 
1 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, Digital Media Strategy 2016–18 (Barton, November 
2016), http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/corporate/ 
Documents/digital-media-strategy-2016-18.pdf (accessed 
20 March 2018); Shaun Rioardan, The Strategic Use of Digital 
and Public Diplomacy in Pursuit of National Objectives (Barcelona: 
Federació d’Organitzacions Catalanes Internacionalment 
Reconegudes [FOCIR], 2016). 
Digital diplomacy has become increasingly reliant 
on innovations in strategic communication. Strategic 
communication is the gold standard for designing per-
suasive messages and media strategies for enhancing 
national images, advocating policies, and influencing 
publics. Strategic communication is instrumental in 
the competitive pursuit among countries to enhance 
their soft power.2 Although Nye speaks of soft power 
as “intangible”, the ability to “wield” soft power 
resources is established through communication. As 
Rawnsley has remarked, “If no one knows about one’s 
values and good deeds, where’s the power?”3 
Digital diplomacy’s reach and efficiency is increas-
ingly amplified by networking approaches. Networking 
strategies can enhance the circulation of information, 
collaboration with others, and engagement opportu-
nities with publics. Networking can transform static 
messages into more dynamic strategic narratives.4 
While states are keen to master new digital tools, so 
are other political actors. Digital media have empow-
ered non-state political actors capable of rivalling state 
communication efforts. Digital media have brought 
state and non-state actors into reciprocal contact with 
the very same publics that they are trying to influence. 
 
2 Jonathan McClory (USC Center on Public Diplomacy), 
The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 (Portland 
Group/USC Center on Public Diplomacy, July 2017), http:// 
softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/The-Soft-
Power-30-Report-2017-Web-1.pdf (accessed 20 March 2018). 
3 Gary Rawnsley, “Approaches to Soft Power and Public 
Diplomacy in China and Taiwan”, The Journal of International 
Communication 18, no. 2 (2012): 121–35 (123). 
4 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin and Laura Roselle, 
Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World 
Order (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
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Mixed Results 
Scholars have seen a significant spike in the number 
of states deploying digital media and strategic com-
munication to join the soft power competition. How-
ever, what they are not seeing is significant gains, 
such as increased favourability ratings by foreign 
publics, to match these increased efforts and invest-
ments. The results appear mixed. 
Surprisingly perhaps, aggressive stra-
tegic communication may aggravate 
rather than enhance global relations. 
Surprisingly perhaps, aggressive strategic commu-
nication may aggravate rather than enhance global 
relations. Nye posited that the pursuit of soft power 
would improve relations. Researchers now question 
that assumption, citing the competition for soft 
power among Asian countries as a driver of greater 
friction than friendship.5 
Strategic communication appears less precise with 
diverse, global publics. Perhaps nowhere has strategic 
communication been more urgently pursued than 
in efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE). While 
there have been intensive studies to develop counter-
narrative strategies, their use has often produced 
counter-intuitive outcomes.6 Rather than winning 
hearts and minds in the Islamic world, new groups 
such as the “Islamic State” (ISIS) have been successful 
in recruiting youth in Western societies. Further-
more, these groups were often able to use counter-
narratives for their purposes of radicalizing and 
recruiting. 
 
5 Ian Hall and Frank Smith, “The Struggle for Soft Power 
in Asia: Public Diplomacy and Regional Competition”, Asian 
Security 9, no. 1 (January 2013): 1–18; Jan Melissen and Yul 
Sohn, Leveraging Middle Power Public Diplomacy in East Asian 
International Relations, Issue Briefing (Seoul: The East Asia 
Institute, 24 November 2015), http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/ 
eng_report/2015112410453330.pdf (accessed 4 September 
2017). 
6 Cristina Archetti, “Terrorism, Communication and New 
Media: Explaining Radicalization in a Digital Age”, Perspec-
tives on Terrorism 9, no. 1 (2015): 49–59; Bibi T. van Ginkel, 
Responding to Cyber Jihad: Towards an Effective Counter-Narrative, 
ICCT Research Paper (The Hague: The International Centre 
for Counter-Terrorism, March 2015), https://www.icct.nl/ 
download/file/ICCT-van-Ginkel-Responding-To-Cyber-Jihad-
Towards-An-Effective-Counter-Narrative-March2015.pdf 
(accessed 20 March 2018). 
The rising tide of populism represents another 
critical concern for the use of strategic communica-
tion in diplomacy. The focus of strategic communi-
cation on persuasion may actually undermine inter-
group mediation efforts. Research suggests that the 
intent to influence can be met with greater resistance 
as attitudes are hardened rather than changed. The 
result is polarization. The 2017 Global Risks Report by 
the World Economic Forum warned of “deepening 
social and cultural polarization”, as a threat that 
could undermine democracy.7 
Public-Centric Digital Diplomacy: 
Digital Media and Diplomatic Sites 
Conspicuously overlooked in analyses of the power 
dynamics between states and even non-state actors in 
digital diplomacy is the participation of publics in the 
diplomatic equation. From a public perspective, digi-
tal media appear to represent a new diplomatic space 
for public participation and expression. When publics 
speak of “going online”, they are suggesting a place. 
The online environment represents a place for people 
to meet and interact. 
Awareness of these new public spaces and its 
implications for diplomacy appears to have grown 
gradually. Several scholars have suggested that diplo-
macy is becoming “more public” – not necessarily 
in terms of the audience (i.e., diplomacy directed at the 
public), but rather the context (i.e., diplomacy conducted 
in the public arena). Hockings and his colleagues sug-
gested the term “integrative diplomacy” to capture the 
complexity of the public stage that diplomats must 
now share with a broad range of actors.8 Gregory 
recommended adding a “public dimension” to diplo-
macy.9 Kelley has perhaps been the most forceful, 
stating that “diplomacy is well beyond the point of 
 
7 World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2017, 
12
th
 ed. (Geneva, 2017), 58, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/ 
GRR17_Report_web.pdf (accessed 20 March 2018). 
8 Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, Shaun Riordan and Paul 
Sharp, Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy in the 21
st
 
Century, Report No. 1 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations ‘Clingendael’, October 2012), 
https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/futures-diplomacy-
integrative-diplomacy-21st-century (accessed 20 March 2018). 
9 Bruce Gregory, The Paradox of Public Diplomacy: Its Rise and 
‘Demise’ (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Public Diplomacy and 
Global Communication, February 2014). 
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opening itself to the public – it is becoming en-
meshed within the public domain.”10 
The new diplomatic space is not 
defined by its actors so much as by its 
communication dynamics. 
The new diplomatic space is not defined by its 
actors – whether state, non-state or publics – so 
much as by its communication dynamics. In this 
regard, these diplomatic spaces might be more accu-
rately captured by Neumann’s term “diplomatic 
sites”, which place diplomacy in the realm of social 
reality.11 The online dynamics, while virtual in theory, 
can be very real to the participants – and have actual 
consequences for diplomats. Phenomena such as 
Brexit, Trump, and anti-immigrant sentiment are part 
of those consequences. Therefore it is critical for dip-
lomats to understand the dynamics of these new 
diplomatic sites. 
 Emotion as a Defining Dynamic 
Emotion has become a defining dynamic of these 
new diplomatic sites. Emotions permeate nearly every 
aspect of the online experience, from the hand-held 
nature of the electronic devices, to the immediacy of 
real-time personal interaction, to visuals that sear our 
sensibilities.12 Alongside YouTube videos of cute cats 
are beheadings posted by extremists. Diplomats can 
expect this dynamic to intensify as technical innova-
tions alter sensory experiences. The popularity of 
virtual and augmented reality gaming, for example, 
rests in part upon immersive media technologies that 
heighten emotional involvement. 
While emotion may be implicit in traditional 
diplomacy, in the public space it is likely to be more 
explicit, even deliberately vocal, visible and disrup-
tive. Innovations in diplomacy will require height-
 
10 John Robert Kelley, “The New Diplomacy: Evolution of 
a Revolution”, Diplomacy & Statecraft 21, no. 2 (June 2010): 
286–305. 
11 Iver B. Neumann, Diplomatic Sites: A Critical Enquiry (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
12 Tovah Benski and Eran Fisher, eds., The Internet and Emo-
tions, Routledge Studies in Science, Technology and Society, 
22 (New York: Routledge, 2014); Javier Serrano-Puche, Emo-
tions and Digital Technologies: Mapping the Field of Research in 
Media Studies, MEDIA@LSE Working Papers 33 (London: 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 2015), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/research/mediaWorking 
Papers/pdf/WP33-FINAL.pdf (accessed 20 March 2018). 
ened sensitivity to develop not just effective, but affec-
tive strategies that respond to the emotions of the 
public. 
 Personalized Do-it Yourself Politics 
In these new diplomatic sites, emotion and political 
action coalesce to become personalized. Established 
or recognizable political actors are joined by the 
rising phenomenon of spontaneous personal net-
works. Bennett called the rise of “large-scale, rapidly 
forming political participation” and “personalized 
politics” one of the most notable trends in the first 
decade of the 21st century.13 He labelled the phenom-
enon “Do-it-yourself” politics. Danah Boyd termed it 
“me and my gang.”14 She pointed to a shift in publics 
forming around topical issues towards personal 
networks. 
While marketing and technology are fuelling a 
more personalized online experience, the drive to-
ward personalized politics can pose critical challenges 
for diplomacy. Personalized self-defined politics can 
undermine larger social institutions and protocols 
that maintain social cohesion. This is the point of 
“disruptive power”15 and the tactics of the “outrage 
industry.”16 Recent breaches of diplomatic protocol 
are repercussions of this emerging dynamic. 
 Story-Driven Resonant Narratives 
If one looks closely at the political discourse of per-
sonal politics, people are not just sharing informa-
tion. They are sharing stories. While the Arab Spring 
was initially heralded as a social media revolution, 
researchers now credit the story-driven nature of the 
phenomenon.17 These stories are not carefully crafted 
strategic narratives but emotionally resonant narra-
tives of affinity and identity. 
 
13 W. Lance Bennett, “The Personalization of Politics: 
Political Identity, Social Media, and Changing Patterns of 
Participation”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 644, no. 1 (November 2012): 20–39. 
14 Danah Boyd, “Can Social Network Sites Enable Political 
Action?”, in Rebooting America, ed. Allison H. Fine, Micah L. 
Sifry, Andrew Rasiej and Josh Levy (San Francisco, CA: 
Personal Democracy Press, 2008), 112–16. 
15 Taylor Owen, Disruptive Power: The Crisis of the State in 
the Digital Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
16 Jeffrey M. Berry and Sarah Sobeiraj, The Outrage Industry: 
Political Opinion Media and the New Incivility (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
17 Zizi Papacharissi, Affective Publics: Sentiment, Technology, 
and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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The combination of personal tools and personal 
stories – or emotional media with emotional mes-
sages – can create a diplomatic space that is hyper-
emotional. Emotionally powerful stories can even 
override hard facts. Online anger can become offline 
outrage. Noted sociologist Manuel Castells in Networks 
of Outrage and Hope found that fear and hope repeatedly 
surface as the two most salient emotions in creating 
what he called “emotional movements.”18 When 
publics confront officials as an emotional movement, 
an immediate empathic response is often critical to 
successfully mediate and deescalate tensions, accord-
ing to emerging crisis research.19 
 Emotion and Identity 
Next to emotion, identity emerges as a strong under-
current in these diplomatic spaces. In much the same 
way that states appear driven to enhance and pro-
mote a positive national image, publics appear driven 
by profound identity needs. Identity is not only about 
self-expression; it is also about self-validation, espe-
cially in turbulent or uncertain times. 
In the online environment, identity can be a 
shared feeling. People recognize themselves in the 
emotions of others: “angry like me.” Vigilant diplo-
mats will note that when identity is linked to emo-
tions, publics can become fluid, changing entities. 
Fixed labels for political actors and publics, such 
as demographics (age, income), geography (domestic/ 
foreign, or Europe/Mideast) or socio-cultural groups 
(youth, Muslim) may not be as helpful as they once 
were. More disconcerting still, fluid identity bounda-
ries can occur between national boundaries and, 
increasingly, within national boundaries. An incident 
among domestic publics or with the government can 
go viral, with global implications.20 
 Emotion and Community 
Publics are not just identifying with others through 
emotion. Shared emotions also can create community. 
In contrast to scholars who use the term “network” to 
study people using social media, the people actually 
 
18 Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Move-
ments in the Internet Age (Cambridge: Polity, 2012). 
19 Matthew W. Seeger, “Best Practices in Crisis Communi-
cation”, Journal of Applied Communication Research 34, no. 3 
(August 2006): 232–44. 
20 R. S. Zaharna and Nur Uysal, “Going for the Jugular in 
Public Diplomacy: How Adversarial Publics Using Social 
Media Are Challenging State Legitimacy”, Public Relations 
Review 42, no. 1 (March 2016): 109–19. 
using these tools speak of “community.”21 Emotions 
are the glue that can transform a network of individ-
ual nodes with relational ties into a community with 
powerful social bonds. 
Online virtual communities sustained by emotional 
connections and a sense of belonging can have real 
consequences as members seek each other offline 
to promote their agenda. For example, despite the 
group’s lethal agenda, ISIS recruitment exemplifies 
a highly relational and emotional approach that 
stresses shared identity and belonging. Their call to 
the Ummah is relational, speaking to ties of a brother-
hood of Muslims. Emotional perspective taking and 
empathy are also pivotal recruitment tools. Research-
ers have noted how ISIS recruiters seek to “engage 
individuals as individuals […] interlocutors listen and 
respond to their personal concerns and the details of 
their lives, making them feel valued and cared for 
and creating a sense of warmth, inclusion and belong-
ing.”22 Counter-narrative strategies that threaten or 
demean the community miss the mark in trying to 
crack the emotional ties that bind the perceived iden-
tity within the community. 
Implications & Recommendations 
The challenge of digital diplomacy is not about digital 
tools or learning a new medium of communication. 
The challenge is navigating the dynamics of emerging 
public diplomatic spaces, which are sprouting online 
and then flourishing offline. This trend is likely to 
intensify. 
As forces of globalization and digital technologies 
bring diverse domestic publics together with foreign 
publics and political actors, diplomacy will need to 
expand its predominantly state-centric perspective 
to include a public-centric perspective. Traditionally, 
diplomats have mediated identities and relations at 
the state level and from the state perspective. They 
also did so in a familiar and well-cultivated diplomatic 
space behind closed doors. The challenge of digital 
diplomacy will be to innovate in order to effectively 
monitor and mediate identities within and between 
publics in today’s diplomatic spaces. 
 
21 Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading 
on the Electronic Frontier (MIT Press eBooks, 2000), 
http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/ (accessed 20 March 2018). 
22 Lydia Wilson, “Understanding the Appeal of ISIS”, New 
England Journal of Public Policy 29, no. 1 (2017): article 5 (4–5). 
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 Avoiding the State-Centric Strategic 
Communication Treadmill 
In the soft power competition between states, con-
temporary diplomacy relies heavily – perhaps too 
heavily – on the tools of influence and digital tech-
nologies in order to promote national images, inter-
ests, and policies. The illusion of control may keep 
diplomacy caught on a communication treadmill of 
creating ever-more sophisticated media and messag-
ing strategies that do little to actually advance diplo-
matic goals in the new diplomatic space. If digital 
diplomacy is to achieve in the public domain what 
traditional diplomacy has achieved behind closed 
doors, it must move beyond state-centric strategic 
communication aimed at influence. There may be a 
much-needed return to diplomacy’s forte in media-
tion and collaboration. 
 Developing an Eye for Public-Centric Needs 
Public participation and public needs are part of the 
diplomatic calculus. Diplomats must develop a pub-
lic-centric eye for the full range of publics (foreign, 
domestic, and diaspora), as well as their varying needs 
for identity, emotion, and participation. “Pragmatic 
rationalism”,23 which has defined traditional diplo-
macy among state actors, may be less effective and 
strategic in meeting public-centric needs and expec-
tations. Diplomatic innovation will mean developing 
public-centric diplomatic instruments for monitoring 
emotional dynamics, mediating identities and 
negotiating conflicts in the public domain. 
Ultimately, it is this human 
dimension that will be the critical 
leverage point in enhancing diplo-
macy’s effectiveness in tomorrow’s 
online-offline diplomatic spaces. 
 Leveraging the Human Dimension 
As the novelty of the new media becomes old, the 
thinking of digital diplomacy will be less and less 
about the digital and more and more about the pub-
lic. Moving to this second level of analysis paradoxi-
cally requires a return to diplomacy’s traditional core 
of managing human relations. It will require devel-
oping diplomatic skills for responding to the emo-
tional imperatives of publics, including empathetic 
response strategies. Pro-active diplomacy initiatives 
may engage publics around identity issues, bridging 
 
23 Kelley, “The New Diplomacy” (see note 10), 286–305. 
the domestic with the global. Ultimately, it is this 
human dimension that will be the critical leverage 
point in enhancing diplomacy’s effectiveness in 
tomorrow’s online-offline diplomatic spaces. 
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“The modern art of diplomacy is to use Theodore 
Roosevelt’s big stick, but digitally – and never ever 
to speak softly”; this or something similar could 
be a future definition of 21st century ‘diplomacy’. 
Academically, as an intellectual exploration, the 
Working Group’s investigation considered how the 
upheavals of the international world might affect 
future diplomacy. Practitioners, on the other hand, 
want to know what concrete conclusions can be 
drawn from this exploration. Are there necessarily 
consequences to be drawn for politics, the work of 
diplomacy, and or changes to be made to diplomatic 
instruments? These collected essays by our inter-
national group of academics, practitioners, and ob-
servers should be followed by at least an attempt at 
answers to these questions. The ironic redefinition 
of ‘diplomacy’ above therefore only exaggerates the 
obvious signs of changes that might well become 
requisite. In fact, the working group’s final conclu-
sion is rather complex: it is not a checklist for diplo-
matic reforms, and it is unclear how much will be 
possible to translate into real-life politics. 
* 
I. The most profound effect on the actual character 
of diplomacy of 21st century global changes is that 
public spheres are multiplying in modern states, espe-
cially in Western democracies. The fracturing of our 
societies, a process which is accelerating this century, 
has given rise to this fragmentation. Our homes, pro-
fessional worlds, education, interests, experiences, 
and ideological orientations are increasingly differen-
tiated. Therefore in diplomacy we are engaging with 
and responding to an increasing variety of actors that 
span many different and coexisting public spheres. 
These diverse public spheres exist side by side, some-
times without touching; they can also work together 
or collide and split into new particles of publics. 
This process of pluralization is likely to intensify. 
It affects a society not only from the inside, but also 
works inter-societally – that is, cross-border. Con-
sequently, foreign policy developments naturally 
become topics within the new publics. This is of 
course the case when foreign policy problems are 
simultaneously domestic concerns, but it can also 
happen if a public has an interest in events outside 
their country’s borders. The new publics therefore 
want to influence the implementation of foreign 
policy through diplomacy according to their topics of 
interest. Thus diplomacy no longer only acts purely 
intergovernmentally for the national goals of a coun-
try. Diplomacy must now explain and justify itself 
domestically and mediate between a state’s goals and 
the public’s perspectives. Publics may claim that a 
government should behave differently from what the 
political leadership wants; meanwhile, the govern-
ment claims to represent the interests of the public 
properly. Even in autocratically ruled states, the dis-
parity between governmental decisions and public 
values can be observed. These conflicts shatter the 
confidence of the public in their political leadership, 
and can tear a society apart. 
Diminishing confidence in political leadership can 
be seen in a positive light. It arises out of the public’s 
desire to participate in national and international 
decision-making, a trend that came out of the eman-
cipation processes beginning with the Enlightenment. 
The situation of popular mistrust in politics and its 
actions – and thus also diplomacy – will likely in-
tensify rather than weaken, and without solving the 
tension created between the publics and the repre-
sentatives of a state. First the legitimacy of a govern-
ment and then that of a state as a whole is in ever 
greater danger of becoming paler and less effective. 
This raises the question of whether a state can still act 
effectively and efficiently. A solution is conceivable, 
with recourse to that no doubt millennia-old funda-
mental virtue of diplomacy, as Bismarck (quoted in the 
introduction) must have had in mind: patient media-
tion. Yet now this mediation must be performed not 
only between international partners, but also between 
state interests and the new publics. This shift will re-
quire a renewed understanding of what diplomacy 
can do, and consensus in a country about the prin-
ciples of its governance systems. The new publics as 
well as governments will experience how this works, 
and, hopefully, process their experiences productively. 
Conclusions – An Open Diplomacy 
 Conclusions – An Open Diplomacy 
 SWP Berlin 
 New Realities in Foreign Affairs:  
 Diplomacy in the 21
st
 Century 
 November 2018 
 63 
II. Digital techniques are establishing themselves as 
instruments of diplomacy with dramatic effects. The 
process of adapting to new developments that tech-
nologies offer is quite advanced in foreign ministries 
around the world, albeit with great differences across 
states. Digital technologies facilitate communication, 
accelerate decision-making, multiply the quantity 
of rapidly available information, and provide social 
media platforms for communication with the public. 
The importance of digital connectivity, however, lies 
not only in technology, which could be compared 
with, for example, the introduction of the telegraph 
in the 19th century or the fax machine in the 20th. 
With the application of technology itself, there comes 
a shift in the understanding of the very contents of 
communications. Information is processed using the 
available technology. The acceleration of communi-
cation also makes decision-taking more urgent, which 
imposes considerable pressure on decision-makers 
concerning local and national positions. The pressure 
is magnified by an awareness of competition with 
other actors. The competition probably has the same 
technical capabilities but may have different goals. 
Furthermore, digital media make more facts avail-
able, and tend to arrive on the desktop in the exact 
moment a decision has to be made. 
Recent public discussions about Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, etc. have shown that these media are not 
merely more convenient and far-reaching platforms 
for dialogue with diplomats’ interlocutors. Decisions 
about the platforms for, frequency of, and publica-
tion time of posts are typically made by algorithms 
rather than humans. An additional concern is that 
bots and trolls can publish fake ‘personal’ postings 
and fake news. Thus, the initiators – whoever they 
may be – can introduce topics as they please to the 
diplomatic institution, usually the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the politicians at its head, and they may 
present them for public discussions. The emergence 
of new pathways for public engagement has political 
consequences and concerns the control of public 
opinion – and thus also of politics. Digital commu-
nication can become propaganda in the broadest 
sense. Coupled with the demands of new publics for 
participation and their distance from the state, this 
may mean that governments are gradually losing the 
ability to conduct their affairs satisfactorily. Thus 
the reactions of alert and suspicious publics pose a 
threat to the legitimacy, effectiveness, and efficiency 
of governance. Emergent communication technolo-
gies can lead to significant changes for the essence of 
diplomacy by engaging it in the everyday life of a 
society. 
When attempting to solve this problem, digital 
connectivity must first be understood as ‘politics’. Of 
course, digitization is technology too. The danger of 
overlooking essential information, for example, can 
only be avoided or mitigated by carefully thought-out 
technical processing. More important, however, is the 
handling of social media and their expected future 
products. In practical terms, this can mean that gov-
ernments themselves continue to develop and create 
algorithms and platforms that meet a government’s 
own requirements. At the same time they must have 
a philosophy for their application and development, 
based on the culture and values of a country as well 
as the purposes of a state. 
It makes sense to do this together with other gov-
ernments, at least within the framework of the EU. 
Digital connectivity has an international dimension 
that is more apparent than elsewhere, with strong 
momentum between EU member states. The new 
digitization policy, which opens up to new publics, 
must become the conducting agency of digital pro-
cesses and their applications. 
III. The consequences of increasing social fragmen-
tation within domestic development can also be ob-
served in an international context. The differentiation 
of trade and traffic between states, the increase in the 
number of countries with considerable international 
influence, the loss of order in the international state 
structure, and doubts about the validity of the rules 
for liberal international order have clearly recogniza-
ble consequences. The most important of these is that 
the number of actors engaging in an international 
context is increasing. They are, like national actors, 
different, but also similar to one another; profit- or 
ideology-oriented, they compete or cooperate with 
one another. Since they operate internationally, they 
affect foreign policy and diplomacy directly and 
sometimes with significant outcomes. 
Such outcomes mainly take shape in the more frac-
tured interactions of non-state and state actors. The 
diversity of actors’ interests results in unpredictable 
processes of interaction. Such processes follow (though 
less so than in the 20th century) the requirements 
of international law, that is to say, international regu-
lations – which are themselves less binding, and 
may even be easily circumvented. Thus, diplomatic 
interaction pathways intersect with old and new 
players at different levels. With some – undeniably 
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dramatic – exceptions, there are fewer attempts to 
seek solutions to problems using the force of arms. 
Instead, other means of coercion become more im-
portant. These are mostly economic and financial in 
nature and exercise the use of force by non-military 
means to solve problems that cannot be resolved 
through negotiation. Given these complex losses in 
international structures and increasing difficulty in 
navigating them, there are more and more attempts 
by state actors to withdraw into their nation-state 
frameworks. 
It is difficult to see how a solution can be found 
here without an enforcing international authority 
that is able to direct peaceful international conduct. 
It would need to be seen as at least as legitimate as a 
sovereign state, and would have to use traditional or 
innovative diplomatic means to open up fresh, more 
open ways of coping with the divisions between the 
many new and old actors. That is a fundamental task 
of foreign policy itself. To say that the problem can 
only be tackled multilaterally, in a time when multi-
lateralism itself is in doubt, gives little cause for 
confidence. After all, it can be said for Europe that 
whether it likes it or not, the EU, thanks to its con-
struction, is experimenting with the creation of 
supra-sovereign institutions of order – which are not 
to be confused with traditional executive institutions. 
IV. The personality and personal profile of future diplo-
mats are critically important to the practice of dip-
lomacy in the 21st century. Diplomats will need to 
represent the fragmentation of their societies, cope 
socially and linguistically with changing demands, 
and meet the need for a different approach to publics 
and to digitization. The selection, training of per-
sonnel and career paths must therefore be expanded 
to meet these new requirements. However, this is 
a task that the foreign ministries of most countries 
have long been addressing, albeit with different goals. 
* 
Among the general considerations of the SWP’s 
Working Group, there was no concluding list of for-
mulas. Ultimately, we can provide only approaches 
and signposts at a time when questions are becoming 
more common concerning international politics. 
After all, we are still at the beginning of our under-
standing of what the changes in and between the 
countries of the world really mean to the venerable 
institution of diplomacy. Old or new diplomacy in 
the 21st century has the task of working towards its 
main goal: foreign policy that is conducted by peace-
ful means. The authors of this volume hope that their 
reflections will be helpful for the orientation of all 
who are politically concerned with the redesign of 
diplomacy. 
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Abbreviations 
AA Association Agreement 
AfD Alternative for Germany 
AI artificial intelligence 
AR augmented reality 
BDI Federation of German Industries 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
CCTV Closed Circuit Television 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU) 
CPG Civil Protection Group (NATO) 
CVE counter violent extremism 
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
DDS digital diplomatic system 
DEI digital emotional intelligence 
DNA desoxyribonucleic acid 
EADRCC Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination 
Centre 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (UN) 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EIA economic integration agreement 
EP Eastern Partnership 
EU European Union 
FAC Foreign Affairs Council 
FPA foreign policy autism 
FTA free trade agreement 
G7/8 Group of Seven/Group of Eight 
G20 Gruppe of Twenty 
IARPA Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity 
IFIs International Financial Institutions 
IO international organization 
IR International Relations 
ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
IT Information Technology 
JHAFG Joint Health Agriculture and Food Group 
MFAs Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
MIKTA Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Australia 
MR mixed reality 
MSF Médecins sans frontières 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NDS National Diplomatic System 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control (U.S.) 
Oxfam Oxford Committee for Famine Relief 
PTA preferential trade agreement 
TNA transnational actor 
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
UN United Nations 
VR virtual reality 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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